

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

From an Engraving by T. L. Atkinson.

John Jacob

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GENERAL JOHN JACOB

COMMANDANT OF THE SIND IRREGULAR HORSE
AND FOUNDER OF JACOBABAD

BY

ALEXANDER INNES SHAND

Author of "The Life of Sir Edward Hamley,"
"The War in the Peninsula," &c.

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WITH MANY ILLUSTRATIONS

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PREFACE

MRS. JACOB, of Tavistock, has had the goodness to place at my disposal all the papers of her uncle, the late General Jacob. He had carefully preserved the letters of his correspondents, and from that mass of material, with the unpublished manuscripts, memoranda, and pamphlets printed for private circulation, the difficulty was to make a selection. I am deeply indebted to Sir Bartle Frere and his sisters for access to their father's private letter-books; and I owe a special debt of gratitude to Major-General Sir Henry Green for invaluable information as to Sind affairs in general and the personality of his old friend and commandant, to whom he succeeded in the charge of the frontiers.

Nor do my obligations end there, for almost all the portraits and illustrations are from engravings lent by Mrs. Jacob and Sir Bartle Frere and from photographs in the collection of Sir Henry Green. Most of the latter were taken by Dr. Henry Cook, who was attached to the Belooch mission.

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
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GENERAL JOHN JACOB

CHAPTER I

SIND IN 1838

THE oldest inhabitant of the parish of Woolavington, in Somerset, well remembers John Jacob, fifth son of the Vicar and future Warden of the Marches in Upper Sind. He describes John as "a fine-spirited young fellow, fond of fighting and far-away the best horseman in the country." Naturally that recalls the boyhood of the man whose genius in war and sagacious audacity in civil policy were to lay the solid foundations of British supremacy in India. Clive was what Jacob never was—a noted scapegrace, and in his earliest years he gave evidence of the fiery temper and uncontrollable passions which closed the most brilliant of careers in sombre tragedy. Clive, like Jacob, according to an uncle, was out of measure addicted to fighting, and the memorable feat, when he climbed the church spire and seated himself astride a dizzy gargoyle, showed the constitutional contempt of danger which was the distinguishing characteristic of both men. But Clive seems to have been the first of his ancient family who gave any proof of talent. John Jacob came of a cultured and studious stock. Many of its members, before

and since, have risen to eminence and deserved well of their country. To go no farther back, his great-grandfather was a surgeon of Kent, held in good repute, an Alderman and Chamberlain of Canterbury; his grandfather, also a surgeon, was a notable antiquary and naturalist; one of his uncles, a Glamorganshire squire in affluent circumstances, who removed afterwards to Guernsey, devoted his leisure to literary pursuits and collected materials for a work on the Channel Islands. A part was published in Paris; the sequel never appeared. That gentleman's fifth son was Sir George Le Grand Jacob, who had much in common with his cousin of Jacobabad fame, and had a distinguished career in the Indian service as soldier, administrator, and scholar. Like his cousin, Sir George was essentially masterful, strong in opinions as he was fearless in expressing them, and he was gifted with similar genius for conciliating and controlling Orientals. The Jacobs, in their many branches, were prolific. The Vicar of Woolavington had a sixth son, born a year after John, who followed him to Addiscombe, and thence to India, after completing his training at Chatham. William Stephen passed for the Engineers, and his tastes were scientific. Serving in the Bombay Presidency, he was sent on a survey of the North-West Provinces. He cannot have had private means, but he must have found wealthy backers, for in 1842 he established an observatory at Poona. On being gazetted captain he resigned his commission, and thenceforth devoted himself enthusiastically to astronomy. Indefatigable in study, notwithstanding his feeble health he not only did appreciable service to science, but persuaded

a parsimonious government to assist in endowing scientific institutions. He had all the thoroughness and earnestness of the family temperament, and returning to India on an astronomical mission, died prematurely at the age of forty-eight. Another brother was Headmaster of Christ's Hospital; and a cousin became Archdeacon and Canon of Winchester, and father of the present Bishop of Newcastle.

John Jacob was born at Woolavington on the 11th of January, 1812. We know little of his early years, and nothing of his mother, except that she was the daughter of the Rev. J. Bond, Vicar of Ashford, in Kent. So that although we can say, with many biographers, that in Jacob's case the child was father of the man, we cannot add with many more that he owed everything to the maternal training. As for lessons and schooling, all he had came from his father. The vicar, who had little money to spare, taught his own boys, and when John got his cadetship he went straight from Woolavington to Addiscombe. The venerable parishioner we have quoted followed his career with intense interest and admiration, but he never again set eyes on the lad. When John sailed for India in January, 1828, as second lieutenant in the Bombay Artillery, he took the last look of his native land. For thirty years he was to serve in India, and gradually he became so absorbed in engrossing work that he seldom seems to have dreamed of indulging in a furlough. For exactly two-thirds of these thirty years he was spending himself and being spent in a climate that, to endorse the language of all who knew it best, can only be described as infernal. Yet for these twenty

years the brain was as active as the body, which by night and day was ever ready for the bugle-call to boot and saddle. The busy warder was a responsible political officer, a diplomatist, a civil engineer, a mechanical inventor, a bookworm immersed in spare hours in the study of science and philosophy. Moreover, he was an indefatigable writer and pamphleteer, with views and influence extending far beyond the marches of Sind, who for good or evil left an indelible mark on the reorganisation of the Anglo-Indian Army; who in his uncompromising attacks on class interests and prejudices made more enemies than any man of his time, and who gave warnings which, had they been heeded, might have averted the Mutiny.

It was in 1828 that he landed at Bombay, and the first ten years of his service were uneventful. So far as we know, no records have been preserved of it. Jacob lived a public man; he had never enjoyed domestic life, and when a fifth son dies unmarried and childless, there is small chance of youthful letters being preserved. The first seven years were passed with his regiment; he was then detached on a small command, and afterwards employed as a subordinate to the Collector of Gujerat. We may be sure that a man of his earnestness and energy must have been educating himself, and we know that when ordered on active duty in the North-West he was already tolerably proficient in Oriental languages. His opportunity came when he was ordered to Sind with the Bombay column in 1838, to join the army of the Indus on the outbreak of the first Afghan war. The annexation of Sind was ultimately inevitable: it was

the evident destiny of that troubled country, controlling the navigation of the Indus and with a port so advantageously placed as Kurrachee to be absorbed in the Anglo-Indian Empire. But had it not been for the blundering aggressiveness of Lord Auckland, which precipitated events as it invited disaster, Jacob might have rusted in Bombay cantonments. As it was, his lot was cast in with Sind, and he has left an imperishable memorial in a city of his creation, for Jacobabad got its name from Lord Dalhousie as a tribute to the work of its founder.

To appreciate his career and the part he played in subsequent controversies, we must give a preliminary glance at the condition of Sind and the circumstances which led to the annexation. It seemed likely that these conditions might have safeguarded its independence, till political and commercial considerations outweighed the grave military objections to armed intervention. When our invading forces entered the country, the party which opposed the measure gave Sind, in ridicule, the sobriquet of "Young Egypt." The invasion may have been impolitic or premature, but the comparison was really just, and Sir William Napier speaks with good reason of "infelicitous derision." He draws the parallel in sharp sentences. "The two countries have a striking similarity. In their flatness, fertility, deserts, mountains, single river, and annual inundations—in their deltas, their scarcity of seaports, their frequent changes of rulers, their three races, . . . in their former greatness and their decay under a bad government." The one country draws its wealth from the Nile, the other from the Indus,

and both rivers as they supplied water to fertile soil were the great natural highways for traffic. In both countries, beyond the broad strips of irrigated land stretched waterless expanses of inhospitable desert. But there the resemblance ceased, and in other respects Sind was as repellent to foreign cupidity as Egypt was inviting. Egypt, with its enervating air and crouching fellahs, was always ready to fall prostrate at the feet of a conqueror, unless defended by foreign mercenaries under a fighting caste like the Mamelukes. The ruling caste in Sind might be demoralised by sensual indulgences like Egyptian Sultans, but their rule rested on hordes of Belooch horsemen, greedy of plunder and fearless of death, who were commanded by warlike Mayors of the Palaces. If Sind were subjugated by a civilised power their occupation was gone, and it was no light matter to stir such a hornet's nest. Inured to the desert warfare, they knew each well and watering place, and if beaten in the plains and driven from their deserts, they could find inaccessible refuges in the hill country inhabited by tribes which, though always at deadly feud, were yet united by common blood-ties.

The Egyptian climate, though enervating, is salubrious. That of Sind is one of the worst in the world, and for a full half of the year, campaigning for Europeans was then supposed to be impossible. It is true that Sir Charles Napier carried it on through the dog-days, but only at the cost of inconceivable suffering and grievous losses: and the fiery old General himself had nearly fallen a victim to sunstroke. The heat is tropical from early spring to late autumn; even in well-wooded and

cultivated country the temperature is sometimes 117° in the shade, and often 7° more in the confinement of cantonments. There are dust-storms blowing up with startling suddenness that may be disastrous to a column on a desert march. Then those sand pillars go whirling about in the wastes, which are familiarly known as "dancing dervishes." There are chilly puffs giving brief warning in an atmosphere torrid as the breath from a blast furnace: with shrieks and groans the storm swells into a hurricane or cyclone, laden with minute particles of saliferous dust which blot out the sunglare in Egyptian darkness, stifling men and horses alike, and overturning long trains of laden camels. The waterskins shrunk and the contents evaporated, when the parched and footsore soldiers went groping for doubtful wells. Jacob in his experiences tells many stories of these storms, which sometimes quelled even his iron capacity for work. But perhaps the most vivid description is by Sir Charles Napier, of one that burst upon him in the Western wilderness in the month of November. "The air was calm, but suddenly everything animate and inanimate became overcharged with electricity, and the sand, rising violently, blinded the horses: the human hair stood out like quills, streaming with fire, and all felt a strange depression of mind, until the evil influence passed away." Then there is the *mirage*, fatally delusive, and scarcely less depressing to the spirits, when it is essential to keep up the *moral* of the men, and when the tantalising pleasures of hope are succeeded by intense disappointment. Romantically poetical from one point of view, "it touches everything," in the words of Sir Richard

Burton, "with the wand of an Enchantress, turning the hovel of wattles into a stately fortress, and transforming the glittering surface of salt into lakes shaded by timber." It is seldom that it rains in Sind, but when it does rain there is always an epidemic of fever, as the fever invariably accompanies the annual inundations of the Indus. Such was the country in which Jacob spent twenty years of indefatigable energy, without seeking recreation of any sort or taking more than a couple of months of furlough, and the digression on climate was indispensable, for it gives us the measure of the powers of the man.

And such considerations as these, had he paused to weigh them, might well have made Lord Auckland hesitate, when he rushed headlong into his calamitous adventure. Excessive apprehension hurried him into the insanity of audacity. He had taken alarm at the distant approaches of Russia, at a time when Lord Salisbury's belated advice as to the study of large maps might have been statesmanlike and seasonable. The wildest spectator had never dreamed of running railways through Siberia to Merv, with branch lines to the Yellow Sea. The Khanates, the Turcomans, distracted Afghanistan and the warlike power of the Punjaub, were interposed between the Russian and British outposts. Whatever may be said for a forward policy now, then the obvious wisdom was to leave well alone. Runjeet Singh, though suspicious, was friendly, and Dost Mahomed, who had established a partial ascendency and who seemed likely to assert undisputed autocracy in Afghanistan, was disposed to court the British alliance. Civilities and a subsidy would have

bound him firmly to us: by encouraging commerce while respecting their independence we should have established amicable relations with his people, who are as much in love with money as with fighting; and as the common friend we might have mediated successfully between the Pathans and the Sikhs who had robbed them of territory. Lord Auckland took a different view, and it is impossible to explain the eccentricities of his action. No one has put the case against him more strongly than Sir William Napier, a shrewd judge of policy as he was a master of strategy, though intensely prejudiced in defending his brother. And the judgment of Sir William was confirmed by a greater soldier than himself, when the Duke of Wellington summed up the situation with his terse common sense. In the words of the Duke, when we took the road to Cabul through Sind, "the troops would force their way through a wild, disunited people, only to find the commencement of their difficulties."

But when the Governor-General had decided on the invasion of Afghanistan, the occupation of Sind became indispensable as a base of operations. The British outposts were on the Upper Sutlej, and the short way to Cabul was by Attock and the Khyber Pass. From Loodiana to Cabul the distance was five hundred miles; from Attock on the Indus it was three hundred. The Maharajah professed himself our ally; by the treaty signed by Shah Soojah under British pressure, he had been secured in possession of his Afghan conquests; there was no reason why he should not have granted our troops free passage, and suffered us to make his Seven

Rivers the base of operations. His refusal should have been warning enough; so doubtful an ally was not to be trusted when he could throw his Sikhs upon our flanks in the event of misfortune. But as it chanced, in the subsequent high-handed dealings with the Ameers, Lord Auckland offered the mistrustful Maharajah something like a direct challenge.

The passage of the Punjaub being closed, the alternative route lay through Upper Sind. So little did we know at that time of Sind, that Kurrachee, which has a great commercial destiny, was mentioned casually by Outram, then a captain serving under Sir John Keane, as simply "a port in Sind." Since the treaty signed in 1809, we had had some sort of relations with the Sind Ameers. Burnes had sailed up the Indus in 1831, and had been followed in the next year by Colonel Pottinger, who, having negotiated a second treaty, had been appointed British Resident. But these relations and treaties were strictly commercial, and it was left for Lord Auckland to pass the doubtful line which divides trade from politics on the borders of our Indian possessions. It was really a case of the wolf and the lamb, though the Sind Ameers can hardly be described as lamblike; but Lord Auckland, in pursuit of his policy, deliberately picked a quarrel. He tendered an *ultimatum* which independent princes, jealous of the power they doubtless abused, could never have been expected to accept. We must advert afterwards to the administration of these Ameers, but the only possible excuse for our interference then was the policy of necessity—the paramount duty of self-preserva-



BUKKUR, A FORTIFIED ISLAND IN THE INDUS. *From a photograph in Sir Henry Green's collection.*

tion. The pretext was given by our good friend the Maharajah. On some trivial pretext he had threatened to invade Sind; the Beloochees were quite prepared to fight him: with the help of distances, of the droughts, and their deserts, they would probably have won. Lord Auckland tendered protection, which they did not desire. When that proposal was rejected he suggested mediation, and forced another unwelcome treaty, by which he established a resident at Hyderabad, with a guard of British troops, to be settled at British discretion. The treaty was signed by the Governor-General, the Maharajah, and our puppet Shah Soojah. The exiled Afghan pretender ceded to us certain shadowy claims in Upper Sind, with arrears of tribute which, as was subsequently proved, had been duly paid and formally discharged. On the strength of that treaty, having got our footing in the Southern capital, we sent Burnes as envoy to Upper Sind, to demand the cession of the three strong places commanding the Upper Indus. Bukkur, a fortified rock in mid-stream, was between the towns of Sukkur and Roree, situated respectively on the right and left banks.

So far the way for the invasion was prepared, and the Viceroy had his base, though it cannot be said he had secured it. As for the advance, the shortest detour from Loodiana to Cabul was little less than 1,500 miles, exactly thrice the distance through the Khyber: beyond the Indus it passed through Cutchee, the hottest of all the torrid regions; thence for seven marches and seventy-five miles it traversed the terrific defiles of the Bolan, where precipices rose on either side from the

rugged river-bed which was the only causeway. The desert was ranged by warlike horsemen, and the mountain heights were held by tribes who made deadly practice with the matchlock, when ambushed among their rocks. With that prospect before him, with the fortresses of Candahar and Ghuznee to be stormed before he led Shah Soojah back to his capital, Keane, the Commander-in-Chief, disembarked with the Bombay column at Kurrachee, Jacob accompanying the force as a subaltern of artillery. Keane made his way up the Indus valley, the transport service and the supply of a sufficiency of camels presenting almost insuperable difficulties, surmounted chiefly by the energy of Outram. At Bukkur he met the Bengal force, and then Sir Willoughby Cotton headed the march through the Bolan, fighting his way at every step, and exhausting the resources of the barren country. Candahar was taken and Ghuznee stormed, thanks to the skill and daring of subordinates who won their general his peerage and the thanks of Parliament. There was a moment of ephemeral rejoicing when Shah Soojah was led in triumph into the Bala Hissar; and Dost Mahomed, losing heart for a time, fled across the mountains, to be vainly pursued. In a memorable declaration, issued from Sind on the 1st of October, which reads ludicrously now, Lord Auckland asserted that Shah Soojah's popularity had been proved by the unanimous testimony of the best authorities, and praises the excellent conduct of his rabble levies, who had pillaged and ravished indiscriminately, to the disgust of the British officers. Even then the few who could read the signs of the times discerned the warnings

of the impending storm, the tail of which, as Sir William Napier expresses it, was soon to break upon Sind. Even before Keane and his column had left Hyderabad, he had reason already to be anxious as to his interminable communications, even had all gone fairly well. Already Outram was writing of the "treachery" of the Ameers, and noting that they were holding back their forces merely that they might use them with deadly effect, in the event of the disasters they anticipated. We have only to do indirectly with the Afghan tragedy; it is the condition of Sind which immediately concerns this biography, and it was essential as a prelude to show the state of unrest which was aggravated by the British aggression and led inevitably to Napier's campaigns.

CHAPTER II

FRONTIER FIGHTING

JACOB first saw active service in the summer of 1839, and from the first he was fortunate in opportunities for showing his soldierlike qualities. Keane had passed the Bolan on his ill-fated expedition. As was to be expected, the robber tribes, brushed aside from the march of his columns in force, had closed in upon his rear. His convoys were being cut off, his messengers were murdered, and news from the front was only being received at doubtful intervals. The safety of the army was endangered by the interception of supplies, for the strength of the troops left in Upper Sind was insufficient to furnish escorts. The political agent had made futile efforts to bribe the tribes to abstain from molesting the convoys; their chiefs, who found plundering profitable and delighted in the excitement of lucrative warfare, turned a deaf ear to his proffers. Nor can it be said that their motives were altogether mercenary. Invading their barbarous solitudes, we menaced their cherished independence. Beja Khan, who had formed and headed a coalition, was a patriot after his own fashion. He resented the tame submission of the aged chief of his



A Chief of the Jekranee Belooch, in the Bolan Pass.
From an engraving after a sketch by Captain Postans, 1839, *in Sir Bartle Frere's collection.*

tribe, and invited all adventurous spirits to follow him. Moreover he was a fearless and dashing warrior, and he showed no mean talents as the leader in a guerilla war.

The political agent asked for military assistance, and so urgent was the appeal, that although it was the height of summer, a detachment was ordered out into the desert to hunt the Khan and his flying horsemen. It was more easy to give the order than to find the men, for the force left in camps at Sukkur and Shikarpoor had been reduced already to an almost irreducible minimum. The consequence was that for the most trying and exhausting of campaigns, many of the soldiers sent forward were singularly inefficient. Jacob has himself described the quality of the men placed under him for his first field-command, and they remind us of the ragamuffins with which Falstaff marched through Coventry. "There had been left behind from the army of Lord Keane, at Sukkur, about one hundred and fifty European soldiers, chosen from every regiment of the army, Royal and Company's, and from every troop of horse and company of foot artillery, of both the Bengal and Bombay Presidencies. These men were of course the worst that could be found; they were composed of those who could not march, who were troublesome, disorderly, discontented, or feeble." Jacob, as the only artillery officer left in Upper Sind, was charged with licking a few of them into shape and organising a scratch battery. He selected forty of the least ineligible, and marched about midsummer day for Shikarpoor, having sent his guns forward by water. When he wrote

the story of the failure several years afterwards, the heat of that summer had never been equalled since Europeans brought thermometers into Sind. The average temperature in the hospital shed at Shikarpoor was 130°; on several occasions the mercury marked 12° more. "Even at midnight the wind appeared like a blast from a furnace. Such was the atmosphere in which British soldiers were sent forth for the first time against the wild tribes of Eastern Beloochistan."

It seems sheer insanity to have sent such men out, and the expedition was as inevitably doomed to failure as to intense suffering. Seven out of the forty, besides another officer who had accompanied the little party, died of sunstroke in the first march of ten miles. Four others were sent back to Sukkur on camels, only to die on the road or after reaching the hospital. Such remedies as were available were tried in vain, and the survivors were appalled by the mortality. Not unnaturally, when actually under the shadow of the wings of the Death Angel the men were on the verge of mutiny and demanded to be led back; but Jacob addressed them in a strong appeal, and animating them with something of his own indomitable spirit, encouraged them to persevere. Though under canvas through the day and only marching at night, four of the survivors had died before they dragged themselves into cantonments at Shikarpoor, after three short marches. Sixteen had perished out of the detachment of forty-two, but the deaths had not been in vain. They warned the authorities at Shikarpoor of what they might surely have known before, that operations at that season were

impracticable. It was decided that they must be deferred to cooler weather, and accordingly for more than three months Beja Khan and his tribesmen had free hands to work their will with Keane's convoys and communications.

The operations were resumed early in October under Major Billamore, and with very inadequate means were brought to a successful conclusion. Jacob, whose veracity has always been admitted to be unimpeachable, thus sums up the results. We quote the passage, because he was fortunately induced to write the story of the campaign, in consequence of the injustice done the force and its commander in Sir William Napier's history of his brother's "Administration of Sind": "Every object had been fully accomplished, without serious loss and without the shadow of a disaster. The mountaineers had been thoroughly beaten wherever encountered: the robbers who had fled for shelter among them compelled to surrender. The mountains had been penetrated in every direction, and roads made in the heart of them. *In short, nothing could have been more complete than was, in every way, the success of the expedition.*" The brilliant historian of the Peninsular War, as the eulogist and apologist of his illustrious brother, is seldom to be absolutely trusted. He is apt to exaggerate the forces Sir Charles vanquished, and needlessly magnifies the difficulties he surmounted. He grudges to other men their share of the glory, though the Conqueror of Sind in any case had won enough and to spare; and more especially he denies it to soldiers like Jacob, who had subsequently sided with Outram in the controversy as

to the Ameers. When Sir William is describing his brother's Cutchee campaign of 1844, he actually ignores Billamore and his expedition altogether. Preluding with a lurid though not untruthful picture of the difficulties Sir Charles was preparing to face, he writes, "In those fearful passes the British arms had also been fatally unsuccessful. There Clibborne had been defeated." Jacob's straightforward narrative will show that Sir William, to say the least, was hurried away into underrating the success and results of that earlier expedition, which was invaluable as a preliminary survey of unexplored and impracticable uplands. Billamore and his subordinates scouted for Sir Charles, penetrating the country, literally preparing the way, and practically testing its defenders' fashions of fighting.

But if Sir William let himself be betrayed into injustice when defending the reputation of a brother who had been mendaciously and malignantly attacked, and if his topography is often sadly at fault, he has left characteristically vivid pictures of the conditions of wild warfare on the frontier which equal the best chapters in his "Peninsular War." The Eastern Belooch and their country, as he depicts them in 1844, were the same as Billamore had found them when he forced the defiles in 1839, and the descriptions by Jacob, who had also a picturesque and vigorous style, agree with those of Napier. The Doombkees and their kinsfolk, the Jekranees, occupied the flat country of Cutchee, bounded on the south by the desert of Kusmoor, and on the west and north by mountain ranges. These hills were inhabited by the Murrees, and beyond them again were the

Boogtees. The former tribes, like the Bedouin of the Arabian deserts, were born horsemen; they reared a hardy breed of horses, and specially trained them to dispense with drinking, except at long intervals. Their horses were said to have been taught besides to eat raw meat, which temporarily increased their strength, as it alleviated thirst. We are reminded of the recipe of old Sir Harry Lee in "Woodstock," when he reinvigorated his son Albert's "weary cattle" by folding spiced slices of venison round their bits. In any case, such a training gave an immense advantage in a country where water was scarce and where the sole vegetation was stunted tamarisk. The hill tribes had also their breeds of ponies, but these wiry little animals, like those of the border Scots, were chiefly used to transport them from place to place. After a raid on the plains, whether they had been baulked or gathered loot, they hastened to regain the steeds left under a horse guard. Sure-footed as goats, and scrambling over rocks and in river channels, these eluded pursuit, giving Jacob no little trouble afterwards when he established his frontier watch.

All these Belooch, whether they fought on horseback or on foot, were equipped with formidable weapons. All were athletic and muscular men, sun-dried till they carried little but bone and sinew. Their swords, broad and short, slightly curved and of the finest temper, had edges almost as keen as that of Saladin's scimitar when he astounded the Crusaders by severing the floating veil. Napier asserts that in all their forays they were attended by professional sword-whetters. Be that as it may, they proved themselves terrible antagonists in many a Homeric

single combat, and were as dangerous when their wounded strewed the ground as the Dervish swordsmen of the Soudan. They carried matchlocks besides, a weapon which Sir Charles Napier demonstrated a few years later to be infinitely inferior to our old Brown Bess; but in 1839 it had strangely made a reputation which acted on the *moral* of our men when they faced it. These wild warriors played the game of war well according to their irregular rules; they studied surprises and excelled in ambushes; they fought when all the chances were in their favour, and fled with no sense of shame when outnumbered. But courage was the common quality of all. When cornered, they fought it out with desperate resolution and died to a man rather than yield. Sir William Napier insists upon another point to which Jacob, who knew them better, makes no allusion. He says that in the field they took their women and children along with them rather than leave them in unprotected villages, and in the event of a grave reverse gave orders for a general massacre. He asserts that Sir Charles was so strongly impressed with that belief that it seriously hampered his operations in 1844.

Such were the enemies against whom Billamore was ordered to march from Sukkur in the beginning of October. Of the country in which he was to seek them he could learn next to nothing. It was true that Belooch Khan, the nominal head of his tribe, was our friend, and he proved a staunch one. But he kept himself quiet in his town of Lahree and gave little active assistance. Beja was the virtual ruler; his fame had gone out far and near, and he had established a reign of terror. No

one ventured to give aid or information to foreigners who would be defeated and must go as they had come. They were likely enough to overrun the plains and possess themselves of the Khan's headquarters at Pooljee, but he had his refuge in the hills behind and would return when the invaders had retreated.

Billamore's little force was composed entirely of Orientals. There had been but slight reserves left behind by the army of Afghanistan, and it was thought, with reason, that the climate would prove deadly to Europeans. For besides the heat and drought Cutchee is exceptionally subject to sandstorms, and these are often accompanied by blasts of the deadly simoon. Billamore had only about five hundred native infantry, with a single bullock battery of two 24-pounder howitzers and one 6-pounder gun. It was Jacob who was charged to improvise a company of artillerymen. He had a havildar and eleven Golandanze sepoys with a few gun lascars to begin with, and he made up his strength by selecting a party from one of the Bombay regiments. Nothing shows more strikingly the rough and ready character of the force than the composition of the company of pioneers, the most indispensable of adjuncts to the expedition. The nucleus was a single sapper; there were three regular pioneers; the rest of the fifty were tent and store lascars. Only a brief space was given for training gunners and sappers; yet they proved eminently serviceable. The sole exceptions were Jacob's Bombay sepoys, taken from a regiment priding itself on the caste of its members. He was a man who stood no nonsense of the sort, and these he speedily discarded. Yet he always sought to

conciliate native prejudices, and in this case he was relieved from his embarrassment by his Golandanze men, who happened fortunately to be all high-caste Brahmins, but who ridiculed the scruples of their weaker brethren. The men he dismissed were replaced from the ranks of the 5th Bombay Regiment, which he pronounced to be the best in that Presidency. When afterwards recruiting for his Sind Horse, he always believed beyond all others in the races from which it was drawn, and he quotes with approval the spirited eulogy of Sir John Malcolm: "The true descendants of Seewajee's mountain rats, whom not all the pride and power of the armies of Hindustan could prevent from marching to the gates of Delhi." Jacob adds on his own account: "They were small and not at all good-looking, but of an amazing energy and activity, and full of zeal and courage, and with sinews that no labour could tire and hearts that no danger could daunt. Very respectful and warmly attached to their officers, they not only feared no enemy under their guidance, but rejoiced at the prospect of meeting a formidable foe for the sake of the name of the regiment."

Billamore crossed the desert to Shahpoor with comparative ease. Sir William Napier has greatly exaggerated the distance. Thence he marched to Pooljee, which, as he gathered from his scouts, was still occupied by Beja with his Doombkee and Jekranee levies. But he reached it, only to find its hovels in a blaze: Beja had deemed discretion the better part of valour, and sought temporary refuge in the hills. The troops encamped near the abandoned town, while Billamore awaited instructions

from the politicals. He had no anxiety as to trouble from the rear, for Belooch Khan had confirmed his submission, and the old chief held to his pledges, though Beja spared neither blandishments nor threats. That dashing freebooter had retired indeed, but it was in pursuance of his deliberate strategy. He had hoped for assistance from Belooch Khan; he thought the invaders might retire before the climate and shortcomings, and the burning of his mud town was no great sacrifice. But when Belooch disappointed him and Billamore held his ground, his fiery spirit chafed at the delay and he suddenly took the aggressive. All the chances of effective surprise were in his favour, for Pooljee is only five miles from the hills, divided from them, beyond the narrow arable belt, by a stretch of stony wilderness, traversed latitudinally by a strip of jungle. He descended and made a demonstration. Billamore had no cavalry, but shortly before the political agent had enlisted four hundred Belooch. As it chanced, on the very day of Beja's descent, half of these irregulars rode into Pooljee under Lieutenant Amiel. Amiel's arrival was purely incidental; he was in no way under Billamore's orders. They seem to have acted without accord, and it would have been well for our prestige if he had never turned up or had submitted himself to Billamore's cooler judgment. Billamore had marched out to meet Beja. The intelligence reached Amiel—who had picketed his horses in the ruined town—immediately afterwards. Yielding to his impetuosity he sounded to saddle, galloped out with his men, overtook Billamore who was threading the thick jungle, and emerged on the plain beyond,

There his Belooch found themselves face to face with the Doombkee horse, and stricken with panic they ignominiously turned tail. Beja charged home, twenty-five of the Belooch were cut down, and the rest were only saved by the fleetness of their horses. The pursuers drew rein at the jungle strip, and when Billamore with his infantry had struggled out of cover, they were already disappearing in the spurs of the hills. It was an unfortunate incident at the opening of the campaign, but not without its advantage. It showed that to deal effectively with those robbers a troop or two of cavalry were indispensable. Billamore represented that strongly at headquarters, and in consequence the Sind Horse was brought upon the scene—the corps with which Jacob was to be inseparably associated.

The origin of the famous regiment was in this wise. Early in 1839, when all North-Western India was in a ferment, Pottinger, then political resident in Sind advised the formation of some squadrons of irregulars for frontier service. The idea was adopted by the Bombay authorities, and the detachment which Lieutenant Clarke brought to the support of Billamore had been transferred from the Poona Irregular Horse, to form the nucleus of a corps to be raised in Sind.

No sooner had Clarke arrived at Chuttur—another of the townships under the control of Beja Khan—than he had an opportunity of retrieving the prestige which had been compromised by Amiel's recklessness. It was the first of the long series of dashing actions commemorated in the "Records of the Sind Horse." Scarcely had Clarke unsaddled than he received information that a strong

body of Beja Khan's horsemen had left their hills on a pillaging expedition. Immediately he remounted half of his men, and for once an English officer was fortunate in finding a trustworthy guide. The villager who had brought the intelligence had been plundered shortly before, and owed the robbers a debt of vengeance. Having ridden out at midnight, at break of day Clarke had stolen upon the Doombkees. The band was three hundred strong : they had off-saddled and were bivouacking in a cornfield, when the alarm was given. They had barely time to spring on their mares when they were charged by the Poona Horse, and after some sharp fighting, abandoning their booty, they scattered in flight. It was characteristic of the cavalry warfare on that broken frontier, that the fugitives were followed in hot pursuit up the boulder-strewn bed of a mountain torrent. Nor was it merely a race where the troopers could look to their bridles : it was a running fight, in which some fifty of the marauders were cut down, while a dozen more were unhorsed and captured.

With the exception of Amiel's affair, it was the first act in a novel kind of warfare, under unfamiliar conditions, in which, as Jacob remarks, experienced Indian officers were as much abroad as the merest griffin. The Horse were not only a fighting force, but armed explorers, and the next episode was an attack on a place described as "one of the most curious in existence." Amiel had returned to Shahpoor, where his raw levies had been reinforced by 250 of Skinner's Hindustanee Horse. Shahpoor lies due south of Pooljee, and to the west and at the other base of a triangle of which Pooljee is the

apex, is the oasis of Ooch. Amiel reported that the country round Shahpoor was nightly raided by numerous bands of robbers who had gathered into Ooch. Billamore lost no time in marching. He had sixty of the Sind Horse and half as many foot soldiers with him, and was accompanied by Jacob and two other subalterns. Jacob, though he seldom dwells on aspects of the scenery, was greatly struck by a spot which seemed a romantic caprice of Nature.

"The place is not very interesting in itself, but very curious, as affording proof positive of the description given by 'The Father of History' of places on the caravan roads of Africa, where fresh water runs out of hills of salt. East of Shahpoor is a low and very irregular range of hills of soft sandstone, in masses more like hard earth than rock. . . . There is in these hills the entrance to a little valley some five or six hundred yards wide. Through this runs the bed of an occasional mountain torrent, and along the northern side of this torrent bed, for the extent of a mile and a half in length, some twenty-five or thirty feet in height, is a rounded bank, partly covered with coarse reeds, and where it is not so, entirely covered with a thick *incrustation of efflorescent salt.* On the top of the bank grew a few date trees, which trees are found nowhere else in Cutchee. From this bank, nearly all over it, from top to bottom continually exudes water, which though not exactly sweet to a fastidious taste is highly esteemed by a thirsty traveller, and is largely drunk by man and beast, without any ill effects, except to strangers."

The only permanent habitation was the reed hut of a

solitary fakir, and even he was often absent on professional rounds. But in tolerably peaceful times, the water and the coarse pastorage attracted wandering bands of Jutt herdsmen, whose cattle and camels were numbered by the thousand. The surrounding country is absolutely barren; nothing was to be seen but stone cropping out from the drift sand, which made the existence of this oasis the more remarkable. Billamore knew nothing but the vague direction; there were no conspicuous landmarks to steer by; this time he could bribe no native to guide him, and he had to puzzle out the way for himself. But as wild bees are lined to their nests at the intersection of their cross-flights, Billamore, as he approached, saw desert scouts galloping from various quarters in one direction. Leaving his infantry to follow, he rode forward with his horsemen. The Belooch who had time to saddle did not wait to face him, but dispersed by twos and threes among the hills, where they outstripped his jaded cavalry. But there were some hundred men on foot who could not get away, and with them were women and children. These footmen scrambled to the top of the nearest ridge, and having placed the non-combatants out of danger in some sandstone caves, they opened fire with their matchlocks. Billamore did not wait for his infantry to come up, but dismounting a handful of his men, he led them at once to the assault. The assailants had the advantage in weapons; the Belooch, despairing of quarter, determined to die like men, and a fifth of their number had fallen before they could be persuaded to surrender. Billamore learned from his prisoners that the horsemen

who had escaped had been led by two of the most famous of the Belooch freebooters. In fact they were so noted for their daring and enterprise, that he hoped they might be tempted to return and attempt a nocturnal surprise. But the night passed quietly, and on the following morning, sending back his infantry, he led his horse into the hills in quest of the enemy. As might have been expected, it was a wild-goose chase and not a glimpse was caught of a turban. The troop returned in dejection to Ooch, and led their jaded beasts to the watering. Scarcely were the bridles out of the horses' mouths, when, as if by magic, suddenly appeared not half a mile off, emerging from a cleft in the hills, a hundred mounted Belooch, who deployed in regular line and came on as if intending to charge. Billamore's troopers were ready in a moment, formed regularly in opposing line. Jacob says the officers were delighted; there could be no fairer field for a "gentle passage of arms" than the soft green meadow stretched between the combatants. The Belooch came on with a shout; the British passed from a trot to a gallop, when the ground gave way beneath the horses' feet, and the leading files were bogged to their saddle girths. Many rolled head over heels, and all were in dire confusion. The Belooch had played a huge practical joke: they had lured their enemies into a quicksand, and their shouts of provocation were exchanged for peals of laughter. But then, as on subsequent occasions, their chiefs showed a spirit of generous chivalry. A single European officer, admirably horsed, had alone struggled out on the farther side; as Jacob does not name him, we may presume it was

himself. He was absolutely at the enemy's mercy, but the leader only laughed in high good-humour as the European still rode towards him, and, turning the rein, followed his party. There was nothing to be gained by tarrying at Ooch, and Billamore took his horse back to Shahpoor. All that was so far gained by the expedition was a few hundred head of cattle and some valuable experience of the enemy's tactics.

CHAPTER III

BILLAMORE'S HILL CAMPAIGN

IN the beginning of November the politicals had at last come to a decision. The force was ordered to proceed in two detachments to penetrate the Murree and Boogtee hills, where Beja and his followers had sought a refuge. One party was to march by the pass near Pooljee upon Deyra ; the other by the pass above Lahree upon Kahun. Both routes tended eastward in almost parallel lines, that from Pooljee to Deyra being the more southerly ; and both Deyra and Kahun were in the heart of the mountains, Kahun being on the border of the territory of the Murrees. The former detachment was commanded by Billamore in person, and with him went the artillery under Jacob, and two-thirds of the Sind Horse under Clarke. The smaller party was led by Captain Raitt, and with him were the other troopers of the Sind Horse.

Then there was a striking example of what British officers can do when their military pride is aroused and they are thrown on their own resources. Nothing was known of the country before them, but they were told nothing was procurable save wood and water, with here

and there a little grass. There was nothing approaching a regular commissariat, and yet extensive commissariat arrangements were required. They could hope for no assistance from the civil or military authorities at head-quarters, for everything was to be done on the spur of the moment. Jacob says, "There was little experience, indeed, for all were in their first campaign; but the officers were full of unconquerable zeal, of an energy which nothing could tire, and thrilling with those chivalrous thoughts of military service to which the youthful soldier, alas, is alone allowed to give place in his mind, but which cause fatigue, hardship, danger, difficulty and impossibility itself to disappear before them." With such feelings and with the consciousness of excellent work accomplished in the face of extra-ordinary difficulties, it is little wonder that Jacob resented the disparaging allusions of Sir William Napier. He never alludes directly to the illustrious historian, though afterwards he severely criticised "The Administration of Sind"; he leaves his own unvarnished narrative to speak for itself. But he was not a man to turn the other cheek, and there is one sarcastic side-stroke in his remarks on his artillery bullock teams. Of the bullocks he had one hundred and twenty, and he is speaking of his anxiety as to providing food for them. He goes on to say that the mention of bullocks may raise a smile on the face of the modern artilleryman, and the next passage is eminently characteristic of the combative writer: "The modern horse-battery is beautiful, soldierlike, and complete; nevertheless, when I hear sometimes its immeasurable superiority over 'the old beef-affair'

talked of, I cannot help silently thinking of Major Billamore's artillery in the Murree Hills, and of the subsequent performances of the Bengal Horse Artillery and of the Bombay Horse Batteries in the same locality; and a thought then crosses the mind that the *material* is not all in these things!" The bullocks carried forage for a week and grain for a month; if there was neither baggage corps nor camel train there was common sense, and "nothing was forgotten that freight could provide or means at command procure." It seems strange that no opposition was offered to the advance. The little forces moved forward unopposed through defiles where a few resolute men might have made a stand and beneath precipices whence rocks might have been rolled down upon them, till they penetrated to the heart of the mountain fastnesses, and occupied both the object-towns. Twenty miles to the south of Deyra, Billamore was met by Islam Khan, son and heir of old Beebruck, the chief of the Boogtees. Islam brought assurances of submission from his father, and with lavish protestations of personal friendship guided the unwelcome invaders to Deyra. Then he was a young and handsome warrior. Writing fourteen years afterwards, Jacob remarks, "He is now grey-headed, old-looking, careworn and feeble. So well does trouble supply the place of years." Yet Islam was a Belooch, inured to the climate, and accepting trouble and immemorial feuds as part of the patrimonial inheritance, whereas Jacob came to the country from temperate climes, carried an infinitely heavier weight of responsibilities, overtaxed his brain as well as his body, and nevertheless dropped in harness, while still doing

vigorous work. Comparing the lives of the two borderers, it is a striking example of the indomitable will.

We have spoken of Deyra as a town, but it was really a mud village. It stood about 150 yards square, and was rudely fortified against raids from its neighbours, with a mud wall twenty feet in height, with towers at the angles and a single gate. There was a perennial supply of water from a fountain, bursting out of a hillside, some miles to the north, but, as Billamore found, the stream could be cut off if the place were beleaguered. The little place was the trade capital of a wide district; there was a tolerable bazaar, whither the mountaineers came to supply themselves, and no panic had preceded the arrival of the expedition. On the contrary, Deyra was overcrowded, and a formidable element in the population was some eight hundred savage warriors, armed to the teeth. At first everything passed off pleasantly; private property was scrupulously respected, and nothing was taken without being paid for. But as the days dragged by, the warlike Beloochs seemed to realise the numerical weakness of the detachment. Sullenness succeeded to friendly intercourse, and soon there were signs of active hostility. Moreover, spies came in with intelligence that the main body of the Boogtees, under the chief of another branch, was gathering in the adjacent hills with the idea of overwhelming the British. The news was confirmed when the armed Belooch in Deyra, stealing out by twos and threes, had disappeared almost to a man; and finally, Islam, who had been effusively civil to the last, was reported missing. There could no longer be a question as to the imminent

peril. Billamore was assured that the attack was only deferred till Beebruck, the sole hostage left, had been placed in safety, and it was a question whether attachment to the superannuated patriarch would outweigh more pressing considerations. Beebruck had attempted to escape, and he was placed under strict guard.

Meantime, Captain Raitt, with his weaker party, was in equal danger at Kahun. His provisions were running short, the people would furnish nothing except under compulsion, so on orders from Deyra he marched to join Billamore, leaving a company of grenadiers under Lieutenant Peacocke to hold a fort in a strong position within a mile of Kahun. He brought in his men without interruption on the very day that Beebruck made an attempt to escape. All that night the British detachment was under arms, and at daybreak the vedettes came galloping in, reporting the approach of the enemy. Immediately afterwards, the Boogtees, estimated at about 800, were seen emerging from the jungle to the eastward. "Their line presented a most formidable appearance to the small British detachment; they were small, fierce-looking men, and came on with loud shouts, with much flourishing of swords and firing of matchlocks." At so critical a moment, it seems strange that the crafty Beebruck should have been permitted to go beyond the wall in charge of a file of sepoys. It was a preconcerted move for his rescue, for a party of horsemen riding up the deep bed of a nullah made a sudden dash at the sepoys on guard. They stood firm to face it, and then commenced one of those feats of personal gallantry in hand-to-hand combat which were

to be so frequent in the fighting on the marches. Lieutenant Clarke galloped out to the rescue—struck one of the Boogtees from the saddle, seized another tall athlete by the throat, throwing him across his horse's neck, and brought him with old Beebruck back in triumph. The enemy continued to come on, but slackened their pace as they saw the silent, firm array of the slender British line. Drawing rein beyond musket range, they indulged in vociferous shouts and a harmless, sputtering fire of their matchlocks. The light guns replied more effectively, and they withdrew, leaving over thirty warriors on the ground.

Hitherto the town of Deyra had been respected: now all property was declared fair prize of war, and the stores were seasonably replenished from magazines filled with grain. Moreover, the flocks and herds of the Boogtees were appropriated, and thenceforth there were ample rations, so that "the slender stores of the detachment were made to last during the whole period it was in the hills, or for three and a half months without the smallest assistance or support being ever received from headquarters or from the plain country." Food was plentiful, but the enemy had cut off the water. Had they fought it out in the hills where they dammed the stream, they might have had a fair chance of success, but they gave way to a sortie after a skirmish. The stream was turned on again till it had filled a natural reservoir near Deyra, so that the garrison was relieved of anxiety for weeks to come. Next day there was a more serious action. It was necessary to find forage for the animals, and the camels of the detachment were

sent out into some fields lying seven miles to the west, escorted by 150 infantry and 100 of the Sind Horse, under Clarke. It was a tempting chance for the watchful Boogtees. The fields had been reaped and the camels loaded, when the mountaineers, who were on foot this time and who outnumbered the British by five to one, came rushing down on the sepoys. Captain Raitt, though not unprepared, had barely time to dress his line, but he received them with a steady fire. It failed to stop them, and they were within a few yards of the bayonets, when Clarke let loose his horsemen. "In an instant the mountaineers were broken, struck down, trampled under foot, and compelled to flight; seventy-nine of them were killed, a great many more wounded, but the remainder found safe refuge in their hills and the horsemen were recalled." That sanguinary reverse broke the spirit of the tribesmen. They had been led by three noted chiefs on horseback, and all the three had fallen. They never again attempted to try conclusions with the disciplined invaders, and a time of tranquillity ensued. Billamore decided to leave a garrison in Deyra in the meanwhile, and with the remainder of the force to carry terror to Kahun, whence he intended to return to the plains by the most practicable route he could find.

It was deemed advisable to drag his guns along with him, in order to convince the mountain tribes that the loftiest and least accessible of their passes were not impassable for the artillery they mortally dreaded. But however desirable it might be, he hardly dared risk the attempt, in face of the reports of the officers who had traversed the country, and who unanimously pronounced

the transport of artillery "*a matter of absolute impossibility.*" Then Jacob came to Billamore's rescue with characteristic self-reliance, though, like his chief, he knew nothing of the passes save by report. "The artillery officer," he writes, "was, however, still confident; wherefore Major Billamore allowed him to take a detachment and examine the worst part of the road himself." For nothing is more distinctive in his career than his invariable eagerness to accept the responsibilities which his superiors were often as willing to devolve upon him.

Jacob was in command of the little detachment. With him were a company of infantry of the 5th Bombay, and that gallant cavalryman Clarke with a troop of the Sind Horse. The expedition was to combine cattle-lifting with road-surveying. Forcing the first defile after a feeble resistance, it descended on a broad valley-basin with waving cornfields and pastures dotted over with sheep and oxen. The animals were wild and there was difficulty in securing them, but when Jacob halted for the night in a deserted village, he had encumbered himself with several thousand sheep and a thousand bullocks and cows. He hoped, however, next day to meet Peacocke coming from Kahun—which he did, and to him he handed over the live-stock which was to make Billamore independent of further supplies. Peacocke went on his way to Deyra, and Jacob continued his march. Each night the Murrees and Boogtees came prowling round the encampment, crawling up to the outskirts and "sniping" it, but finding the sentries ever on the alert they attempted nothing serious. For

three days the progress was slow; the extempore pioneers who had been pressed into the service were set to work on the worst places in the track, until it was pronounced practicable everywhere. Beyond the farthest village where Jacob bivouacked, the officers had pronounced that no parts of the road were absolutely impassable; therefore he returned to Deyra and reported that he was ready to proceed to Kahun with his artillery, and to reach that place in two marches if necessary. Captain Raitt coming in the opposite direction with his infantry, had taken three days to perform the journey. So Jacob's confident self-assertion was justified, because he refused to believe in impossibilities.

Billamore marched westwards a few days later. The Sind Horse led the way and they were followed by Jacob with his guns. The pioneers were kept hard at work, but twenty miles were covered in the first day. At nightfall they had reached the village of Khateychee-ke-Ghuree, the farthest point of Jacob's explorations. There they were halted for two days, in consequence of heavy rain. The weather turned intensely cold; the pools were frozen and the unfortunate sepoys as well, but they bore their sufferings without a murmur. At Khateychee they were still twenty-five miles from Kahun; there was only water at one spot, and that was about half-way. Intelligence was received that all the fighting men of the Murrees had mustered near the wells, making sure that the detachment must halt there, and hoping to take them by surprise. Billamore determined to baulk them by marching straight to Kahun. As soon as the ground had dried sufficiently to bear

the camels, he set the detachment in motion. The start was made at daybreak and Kahun was reached soon after dark. The enemy's intelligence must have been bad, for not a sign was seen of them, and the chief difficulty fell to the lot of Jacob, who had infinite trouble with the gun carriages. After his experience of the difficulties of the circuitous route, Billamore was naturally anxious to return by a shorter way. Jacob, who had made a point of ascending the heights, surveying and taking rough sketches of the country, was confident that it could be done. Moreover he had picked up an intelligent Boogtee, a herdsman from boyhood in the Boogtee and Murree Highlands, who had informed him of the existence of a path over the mountains which bound the Kahun valley to the South. This mountaineer, by the way, from thenceforth took the pay of the British—probably his life would not have been safe among the tribesmen after his betrayal to the enemy of one of their secret passes—and did good service to Major Brown when subsequently beleaguered in Kahun. Guided by Shere Beg, Jacob with no little difficulty ascended the mountain immediately overhanging Kahun. He was shown the path, which was a mere sheep-walk; it could only be traversed in single file and "seemed tremendously difficult even for a single horseman"; the length of the defile was about four miles. This was the formidable pass of Nuffoosk, a name familiar enough afterwards to our frontier campaigners, but then for the first time surveyed by a European. Jacob had taken some of his Belooch pioneers with him, and he set them to test the cliffs which rising ruggedly on either side, almost closed

overhead. The rock, though hard, was found to yield to pick and crowbar, and Jacob came back to assure his commanding officer that he would undertake in a few days, with sufficient labour, to hew a track along the precipices over which the guns might be dragged.

Billamore had learned to believe in the subaltern's engineering skill, and gladly consented. His work in the mountains had succeeded beyond expectation, and now he was only anxious to extricate himself. Beja Khan, with Durya Khan, chief of the Jekranee allies, Janee and Rahmut, who had led the Boogtees in the fighting before Ooch—in fact, all the leaders of the robber hordes, finding that there was no safe retreat in their boasted fastnesses, had gone in and surrendered. Their surrender inferred the submission of their followers, who had realised that with all their reckless courage they could not stand up to the regulars in fair fight, and who were still more disheartened by the fact Jacob had forced on their knowledge, that the highest and most rugged of their hills were no obstacles to the passage of artillery. Accordingly, the pioneers and the camp followers were set to work on Jacob's road near Nuffoosk, and he was even better than his promise, for it was pronounced practicable in three days. The working parties were guarded by sepoys and covered by Jacob and his guns. The hillsmen, looking on from their heights, offered no serious opposition. They shouted and gesticulated, and brandished their swords: now and again they had to be brushed aside by the guard; but in general they contented themselves with harmless matchlock-fire at the

artillerymen. They had been taught that those terrible guns gave the invaders their irresistible superiority.

On the fourth day the heavy howitzer and the lighter pieces were dragged through the defile. The road was made passable, but from the great steepness of the pass the labour was tremendous. Yet by nightfall the descent had been effected, and the whole force was encamped on what Sir William Napier describes as the scene of Clibborne's defeat in the following year. Jacob takes a somewhat different view of the affair, and this is his comment: "The detachment encamped on the very spot on which Major Clibborne in 1840 gained so signal a victory over, and with tremendous loss to, the Murree tribe; and then, appalled by the fearful heat and want of water, unfortunately followed up his victory by all the consequences which usually attend on a disastrous defeat." From thence the march was continued next morning, and with three further stages the detachment returned to Pooljee, from which it had set out three and a half months before. Its purpose was more than accomplished; not only had the spirit of the tribesmen been temporarily broken and their leaders compelled to unconditional submission, but stores of strategical experience and topographical information had been gathered, which were eminently useful in subsequent campaigns. But in those days when there were neither war correspondents nor telegraphs, and when the journals were indifferent to collecting Asiatic news, such little wars passed almost unnoticed, and the soldiers who had distinguished themselves got no credit at home. At best they were favourably mentioned in some belated

official despatch from the Commander-in-Chief or the Governor of the Presidency. In this case the leader and his subordinates had neither promotion, honours, nor praise, though that was partly the fault of Billamore. As Jacob remarks; "The proceedings of the British troops who first entered the formidable mountains north of Cutchee, and encountered their fierce inhabitants, are but little known beyond this country. Their commanding officer hated writing, contented himself with a verbal report of the matter to his superiors, and very soon all appeared to be forgotten." Jacob himself was the last man to sound his own trumpet, and, though keen to stand on his defence when attacked, he was always too actively engrossed with the present and the future to spare much thought to the past. He was only constrained to break silence when in the volume on "The Administration of Sind," the results of the pioneering force were utterly ignored. As he says himself, he has told the simple truth in the plainest language, and we can only regret that the narrative is so bald and brief. For when animated by memories of the heroic deeds of others, he could write with the fire of a Froissart, and he tantalisingly closes his sketch with the remark: "In the account above given we omitted numerous adventures, many slight encounters, personal fights and single combats with the enemy, and such like, which, if duly set forth in glowing terms, might without any exaggeration have given the story an air of romance." Happily, we hear something more of those Homeric feats when we turn to Napier's glowing story of the Conquest and to Jacob's realistic Records of the deeds of his own Irregulars. Had

Billamore been a ready penman, like Outram, Napier, or Frere, it can hardly be doubted that Jacob's special services would have been eloquently reported at head-quarters. For Billamore was devoid of jealousy and ungrudging in his appreciation. As it was, the lieutenant of artillery had honourable mention in a field order, dated 11th of February, 1840, of which he, characteristically, takes no note in his narrative :

"To Lieut. Jacob commanding the artillery, the thanks of the commanding officer are especially due for the very able and efficient manner in which he conducted his battery over an unknown and difficult country, offering obstacles of no ordinary nature."

CHAPTER IV

COMMANDANT OF THE SIND HORSE

ON the return to Pooljee the hill force was broken up. Jacob for a time was sent back to routine duty at Hyderabad, but he was not left long unemployed. At Hyderabad he was brought into relations with Major Outram, and then began their lifelong friendship. At that time the sea-passage from Bombay to Kurrachee was tedious and the navigation dangerous: the Government desired to discover an alternative land route to the centre of Sind. From the capital of Gujerat to Naggur Parkur on the Sind frontier the country was tolerably well known, but from Naggur Parkur to Hyderabad it had never been traversed by a European. Outram, then political agent in Lower Sind, was familiar with Jacob's record, and selected him to undertake the survey. He was given for an escort three of the Ameer Sobdar's horsemen, and he trusted his life to their fidelity. Napier mistrusted Sobdar, even more than his brother Ameers, and believed that with all his fair professions he was only to be trusted so far as his interests were identical with ours. That may be taken for granted, but Jacob asserts in his private memoranda that Sobdar was true

throughout to the English alliance, and credits him with exceptional sagacity in forecasting the course of events. At any rate, he now won the Ameer's regard by placing himself unreservedly in his hands, and Sobdar, when he gave him three of his best men, told them that their heads must answer for the Englishman. Considering the season and that he was totally unprovided with the camp equipage and comforts deemed indispensable to Europeans, the mission must have seemed a desperate adventure to any but a man of iron frame and abstemiously temperate habits. As to that we may quote Outram's despatch which enclosed Jacob's report to headquarters :—

"I have the honour to transmit a report on the route from Hyderabad to Naggur Parkur by Lieut. Jacob of the Bombay Artillery, a scientific and enterprising officer, whose zeal and intrepidity in undertaking the journey during the hottest period that has been known in Sind during the memory of man, in preference to continuing the far easier voyage down the river or by sea, on which that officer was engaged when requested by me to survey this road, will, I hope, be appreciated by his lordship and considered worthy of notice."

The important result was to show that it was possible at any season to march troops of all arms direct between Gujerat and Sind. A private letter mentions that he met with nothing but civility from the inhabitants, and that the headsmen of the villages did everything to smooth his journey. Naturally the report is a matter-of-fact document, though the information is minute. The road was carefully mapped and measured ; there are

notes on the villages, the water supply, the agricultural and pastoral resources, and the disposition of the villagers. Above all, he specially regarded everything with a view to the transport of guns and the possibility of finding bullocks to replace broken-down teams. Moreover, at one point he zealously went out of his way to survey an alternative route. Outram's recommendation received due attention, and although all Jacob's reward at the time was flattering official mention, the piece of good service was remembered when he was transferred to the Irregular Horse.

We must revert to the Records of the regiment, although at that time it had no direct relation to Jacob. But as he had served with it before, he was immediately to serve with it again, and he learned much by the experiences and misfortunes of his gallant predecessors in command. When the field force separated, Clarke, who was then second in command, led his detachment back to Shikarpoor. It would have been well for him and for British prestige, had the hillmen been left to themselves through the summer after the losses inflicted by Billamore. But there were reports of troubles beyond our borders; it was resolved to re-occupy Kahun, and apparently it was believed that after the lesson of the winter no serious opposition would be offered. Clarke with eighty of his horse, accompanied Captain Brown with a detachment of infantry. There was sharp fighting at the Nuffoosk Pass which Jacob had pioneered; but Brown pushed forward to Kahun. Thence Clarke was ordered to return to the plains in convoy of a train of camels. The Murrees mustered in force, closed in upon him,

and massacred his party to a man. Brown was left isolated, and it was necessary to attempt his relief. The command of the expedition was given to Major Clibborne, and he marched out with 500 Native Infantry, three guns, and 200 of the Irregular Horse. Sir William Napier, as we have seen, talks of his defeat; that was the light in which his failure was regarded by the authorities, and though Jacob says he won a victory which he failed to follow up, Sir William's version seems nearer the truth. Clibborne was a brave officer, and received praise rather than blame from headquarters, but we may believe that had Sir Charles Napier or Jacob been in command the result would have been very different. Clibborne naturally makes the best of his case, but when he attributes his retreat to total ignorance of the road and the watering places, we remember that it had already been traversed by Billamore and Jacob, Brown and Clarke. At all events nothing can be more picturesquely illustrative of the hill fighting than his realistic narrative, nor more dramatically sensational than the lamentable *dénouement*. Kahun was only six miles from the crest of the Pass; for a day and a half the beleaguered garrison heard the rolling echoes of the guns and the rattle of the musketry and matchlocks; then the sounds died away and the garrison was left to its fate.

The first day the guns were painfully dragged up the ridge by relays of sepoys. When the men bivouacked for the night, they were kept awake by incessant "sniping." Next morning they found the road broken down; it had been made impracticable for guns; the

storming party had to advance in single file, and at each turn they faced breastworks with *chevaux-de-frise* of thorn bushes. Yet the crest had been won, when dense masses of matchlock men, pouring in a plunging fire, swept the sepoys down again before them, while light-footed swordsmen closed in upon the fugitives from either side. The headlong charge was stayed at last by rounds of grape from the guns. The grape did terrible execution in the narrow defile, leaving two hundred of the enemy dead, and among them most of the leaders. They were again in possession of the summit of the pass, but it is then, doubtless, that Jacob would have had Clibborne try again. He might have done so, had he not blundered about his water supply, for there was water at no great distance behind him. He had sent back a water party at the eleventh hour, and while he waited the Belooch marksmen were firing from behind the rocks. He waited still and no water came; men and beasts were suffering alike from thirst and exhaustion. As the heat increased, the thirst became unbearable, the wounded and dying were shrieking and moaning for water. There is a suggestive incident: four bottles of beer found in the officers' baggage were doled out in drops, and the distribution "gave rise to scenes of perfect frenzy." It was in these circumstances that Clibborne decided to retreat. The decision involved the sacrifice of everything—his guns, stores, baggage, and treasure—and many of the wounded and camp-followers were abandoned to be slaughtered. Seldom has a more pathetically sensational episode been embodied in a strictly official report, and it ends

with the formal expression of regret, which must have been penned in intense bitterness, that the writer was unable to make the slightest effort to avert the fate of the Kahun garrison. Happily the garrison saved itself after a protracted and indomitable defence, but Clibborne's adventure not only throws a strong light on the character of the frontier warfare, but had grave consequences in fomenting the disturbances which were subsequently dealt with in Napier's campaign, and by Jacob as his subordinate and as Warden of the Marches.

Clarke had fallen covered with glory, and Clibborne had bestowed generous praise on the help he had received from Lieutenants Lock and Malcolm of the Sind Horse. The Horse had done such good service that other squadrons were raised when the troubles in Afghanistan and the disquiet in the Punjaub were causing increased anxiety in Sind, and in 1841 the regiment mustered more than 600 sabres. Until then Lieutenant Curtis had been in command, but in the summer he was invalided, and was succeeded by Lieutenant Hervey. Already the frontier system had been introduced of advancing subalterns to independent commands and posts of grave responsibility. In December it was decided to augment the regiment still farther, and then, as it chanced, Hervey resigned. Thereupon Outram in flattering terms invited Jacob to fill the vacancy during Curtis's furlough; but Curtis never returned and Jacob remained. At the same time, the temporary commandant—and it was another proof of Outram's confidence—was placed in political charge of all the Cutchee frontier.

The commission was dated in January, 1842, and in March he issued his first regimental order, which inaugurated a new system of aggressive defence. He commends a native officer and his handful of troopers for distinguished gallantry in action with an overwhelming force of robbers. For up to that time the Sind Horse had been employed in keeping Cutchee quiet, and in anticipating any combined operations of the hillmen and the horsemen of the plains. The chiefs who had surrendered to Billamore had been released and had betaken themselves again to their marauding. It would have been no easy matter to keep the peace on the frontier in any circumstances, but then the difficulties were exceptional. Emissaries from Afghanistan were continually coming with appeals to the Belooch to unite and shake off the foreign yoke. Santons were preaching a holy war, and the Khan of Khelat, whom the tribes acknowledged as their suzerain, and who exacted tribute when strong enough to enforce it, had assumed an attitude distinctly hostile.

Such was the state of affairs when Jacob succeeded Hervey. The feeble British guard scattered along the border, had been reduced to the defensive, and the Belooch, recovering audacity with impunity, had been pushing successful forays into Sind, and were concerting invasion on a more extensive scale. He took measures at once for rapid concentration to repel attacks at every point. At first he had to face frequent gatherings of the predatory tribes under their most experienced and daring chiefs. But with that sympathetic ascendency which he exercised over individuals

he seems at once to have organised an efficient service of spies. Warned in time of the enemy's intention, he was never taken off his guard. He had no faith in passive defence; his system was always the offensive. When the Belooch had combined to rush the Marches, they generally found themselves anticipated and countered by an incursion elsewhere. Nothing succeeds in Asia like success, and a superstitious prestige attaches to the foreign leader who seems to be in league with supernatural intelligence. Baffled by Jacob's ubiquity, prescience, and vigilance, the robber adventurers, who had hitherto been most fortunate, found themselves beaten with their own weapons. They lost reputation; doubt and suspicions of treachery did their work, till at length the tribesmen hesitated to obey their summons. Jacob had gained the same useful fame as Napier, when the Belooch mercenaries of the Ameers gave him the sobriquet of "brother of Satan." As he says in the "Records of the Horse," and Outram's valedictory despatch amply confirms the assertion, "During the most trying period of the Afghanistan troubles, there was perfect peace among the people to whom quiet had hitherto been unknown."

On the withdrawal of General England, encumbered with the stores and baggage which Nott had left in Candahar, the mountaineers around the Bolan were in a ferment, swarming towards the tempting booty like wasps round the honey pots. Jacob had orders to distribute his horse so as to cover the retreat of the British column over the plains of Cutchee. It would have been impossible had he not already pacified the

country behind him, but England passed without the slightest misadventure. He wrote to Jacob on October 19, 1842, when the stragglers of his force had emerged from the desert: "Since leaving Dashur we have not seen a head of the enemy, and I can only attribute the marvellous tranquillity of the country to your exertions." In the following month the Sind Political Agency was temporarily abolished, but before leaving for Bombay Outram wrote officially to Jacob :—

"For the first time within the memory of man, Cutchee and Upper Sind had been for a whole year entirely free from the irruptions of hill tribes, by which the villages were annually destroyed, lives and property sacrificed, and the whole country kept in a state of fear.

"During the past year the emissaries of our enemies had been unremitting in their efforts to instigate the northern hill tribes to resume their marauding habits, with a view to disturb our communication with Afghanistan; they so far succeeded that large bands of freebooters were at one time assembled for the purpose under some of the most noted of their former leaders. But in vain they strove to effect objects which were solely counteracted by the indomitable zeal with which you, your officers and men so constantly exposed yourselves, especially through the hot months whereby every attempt of the marauders was baffled; by the extraordinary vigilance you have exerted and the strict discipline you have maintained."

After seeing England's rearguard safely out of Cutchee the Sind Horse was ordered to Khangur, then a mere cluster of hovels on the verge of the devastated Debate-

able Land. Not many years afterwards, under Jacob's firm government and fostering care, the city of Jacobabad with its ten thousand inhabitants and bustling bazaars had sprung up on the desolate site, but then foreseeing nothing of its future he only encamped for a few weeks on the sands. Towards the end of November he was ordered to Sukkur to join the forces that were gathering there under Sir Charles Napier. Hitherto he had only been engaged in desultory frontier fighting : now he was to have opportunities of distinguishing himself in one of the most audaciously brilliant campaigns ever brought to a triumphant issue by unflinching resolution guided by consummate strategy, political and military.

CHAPTER V

ON THE EVE OF THE CONQUEST

THAT Napier deserved all the fame he won is undeniable. It is equally true that the veteran soldier reconciled all his actions to a really sensitive conscience, showing at the same time rare political sagacity. No one bore more generous tribute to his great qualities than his successor, Sir Bartle Frere, nor could any one have been a more competent judge. The rights of the controversy that followed the conquest are another question, and historians have almost unanimously delivered an unfavourable verdict. We need not go into the matter in detail, but a preliminary glance at the policy which led up to the annexation is indispensable. In 1842 Lord Auckland had been recalled, to be replaced by Lord Ellenborough. The new Viceroy was exceptionally versed in Indian affairs, for he had been thrice President of the Board of Control. He was the almost unanimous choice of the Court of Directors, which makes it clear that he was deemed the most capable man to meet a critical emergency, for his mission was to retrieve the errors of his predecessor. He had touched the pockets of the Company and given the Directors no slight cause of offence

by opposing their monopoly of the China trade in prospect of the revision of their charter. Moreover he had already expressed a strong opinion in favour of transferring the Government of India to the Crown. But he was vigorous alike in mind and body, and was supposed to be firm of purpose as he was fearless of consequences. The foibles for which he was notorious seemed to weigh lightly in the other scale. He had regularly trained himself for public speaking and had a passion for oratorical display : his vanity was another weakness, but ostentation and grandiloquence are not altogether misplaced in dealings with Orientals, and if his self-sufficiency was almost overweening, that perhaps was a fault on the right side. His initial energy of action justified the expectations that had been formed. Undaunted by the gravity of a situation which had been rather underrated than exaggerated, he promptly grappled with it. When he touched at Madras in February, 1842, evil tidings were coming in from all quarters and the sepoys there were verging on open mutiny. Never indeed, except in the Mutiny *par excellence,* have the fortunes of our Eastern Empire been at a lower ebb or has the prestige of the British Raj been more discredited. An army had been annihilated at Cabul; Ghuznee had surrendered; Nott was blockaded in Candahar, and Sale in Jellalabad, which Pollock, with the unsettled Punjaub on his flank, was apparently powerless to relieve. There was trouble with Nepaul as well, and the Government was committed to operations in China which tended to drain India of troops. Far from shrinking from responsibility, Ellenborough sought it. His first act on landing in Calcutta,

was to ask unfettered powers from his Council, and these he obtained. Then he proceeded, not unsuccessfully, to reanimate the drooping spirits of our soldiers in a manifesto in which he did not scruple to denounce the policy of his predecessor. That policy had committed us to steps there was no possibility of retracing. In Sind especially there was no drawing back, and other circumstances conspired to induce Ellenborough to go forward there, for the opening up of Sind to commerce with the free navigation of the Indus had been favourite schemes of his own. It was he who had sent Burnes to Lahore, ostensibly to take the Maharajah a present of horses, but really to explore the river and the trade routes leading to Afghanistan. Doubtless it was with the ulterior though unavowed purpose of using the river for the transport of men and material for the inevitable annexation of the Punjaub. The shrewd old Maharajah accepted the horses as gifts of the Greeks, and there were clear-sighted Sindees who saw and said that the advent of the foreign envoy in Upper Sind was the certain presage of a British conquest.

Operations went briskly forward. Sale had been relieved; Pollock had passed the Khyber, and with Nott had made the combined advance on Cabul. Then came a cold fit; the strong-willed Viceroy began to waver, and the bombastic melodrama of the Ghuznee Gates was the most venial of his faults. Sir Charles Napier, who drew out the plan of campaign for him, though desiring no farther interference in the affairs of Afghanistan, was all for maintaining the occupation till we could retire with honour. But the army was prematurely withdrawn,

leaving hostages and ladies in the hands of barbarians, and the immediate effect in Sind was deplorable. For full two years that land of divisions and misrule had been seething with agitation. The warnings in Outram's reports were remembered, when he affirmed that on Keane's passage the Ameers had only refrained from attack because they meant to strike on a more favourable opportunity. Excited by the Cabul disaster, they had waited nevertheless, for with their family quarrels they were slow to combine; they had been encouraged by England's reverses, and even again when Nott was enabled to march out of Candahar, for it was rumoured that the Afghans had forced him to abandon the fortress. Finally, when the evacuation of Afghanistan was decided upon, they took it as a sign that British ascendency was shaken, and fancied that their opportunity had come. The Ameers of the north and south sank their feuds for the moment and simultaneously assumed an aggressive attitude. They interrupted the river navigation; they levied duties contrary to the treaties; they even passed an insolent decree that all the traders who had established themselves on the skirts of our cantonments should have their houses razed and their goods confiscated.

From their point of view they were justified, and their action might be described as patriotic. They had infringed treaties which had been in force for nearly three years, but these treaties had been imposed at the point of the bayonet. There had been a revival of former prosperity under the safeguard of British occupation, but it was the commercial classes and not the Princes who were enriched. Their pride was hurt by the

protection extended to their fugitive subjects, and they suffered in revenue by the regulation of the river tribute. When it seemed politic to subjugate them they were charged with treachery and the "treachery" was patent, for it would have been easy to have convicted them on legal points. But deception is the immemorial weapon of Orientals when the weak is contending with the strong, and the eluding of forced obligations could hardly be imputed as a crime involving destitution and forfeiture. Technically, it was a fair pretext and so we used it. Our sole reasonable plea was imperious and imperial necessity; appeals to rights or even to humanity were shadowy and hypocritical. If the Ameers were foreigners holding Sind by conquest, it was on conquest our own claims were to be based, and they could at least plead a sixty years' prescription. They were oppressors like all irresponsible autocrats and ruled the natives with iron rods by terror of mercenaries who were paid by rapine. But it may be doubted whether the misrule was worse than what was tacitly sanctioned in Indian feudatory States. Jacob, by the way, paints in his private notes an almost ideal picture of the felicity enjoyed by the Ameers' subjects. He says that taxation was lighter than under British rule, and that cases of brigandage were almost unknown. But it must be remembered that he wrote in fierce indignation when he was traversing Sir William Napier's "Administration of Sind," and his statements must be accepted with a certain reserve. Be that as it may, we might have speciously interposed in the interests of humanity, and given the envious another occasion to rail at our unctuous hypocrisy.

It is but bare justice to say that we made no pretence of the kind, and on the score of humanity put ourselves formally out of court. By a clause in the treaty which was afterwards adroitly used against us, it was expressly stipulated that the Ameers were to be absolute with respect to their subjects. So long as they let our vessels pass free of toll; so long as they left us full discretion as to strengthening our garrisons and rivetting our yoke; so long as they submitted their foreign policy to the sanction of our Government—in other words, so long as they forbore to intrigue with the Sikhs, the Afghans, and the hill tribes, they were to have *carte blanche* to rob, murder, and ravish. Such was the situation when Sir Charles Napier was charged by the Viceroy with civil and military supremacy in Sind. Before setting foot in the country he put the case with his accustomed terseness: "We have no right to seize Sind, yet we shall do so, and a very advantageous, humane, and useful piece of rascality it will be." Nevertheless, when he landed at Kurrachee he had recognised that there was no retracing our steps. What was done could not be undone, except at extreme peril to the Empire. To sum up his attitude, as argued by his brother, he would not go behind the existing treaties.

In 1841, when he had thought to settle in a district command at home, Lord Hill had offered him an appointment on the Indian Staff. At sixty he was a poor man: he desired to provide for his family, and though the veteran had suffered all his life from wounds received at Corunna and Busaco, he was still energetic as ever and eager for opportunities of distinction. No sooner

had he arrived at Poona than he began to figure in the *rôle* of reformer, denouncing with his habitual frankness —as Jacob denounced them later—the defects of the Indian military system. The change of Viceroys gave him the desired opportunity; the masterful Ellenborough was a man after his own heart, and Ellenborough saw in Napier a sympathetic and thoroughgoing ally. The Viceroy had approved and adopted his plan for the second invasion of Afghanistan. It was natural that when the decision was taken to bend or break the recalcitrant Ameers, Napier should be the man to undertake the work.

He landed at Kurrachee in September, 1842, and on the 25th made his entry into Hyderabad. The instructions which subsequently met him at Sukkur, left him a wide discretion. He was to enforce the treaties; make a signal example of traitors, but never to go to extremities without decisive evidence of guilt. In fact, the issues of peace or war were in his hands, for proofs of the Ameers' "treachery" were already in his possession. Outram had been relieved of the political agency; as it was said, for pressing unwelcome views on the Viceroy with indiscreet independence of language. But previous to his recall, Lord Ellenborough had forwarded to him letters in triplicate, addressed to the three leading Ameers, and warning them that their domains would be confiscated if any acts of faithlessness were brought home. Outram had withheld the letters, on the ground that, with their uneasy consciences, delivery would drive them to desperation. Ellenborough had approved his prudence, for at that time the scattered British forces could hardly have held their

own against a rising. Napier, who was sent to pacify or subjugate the country, though for the moment he had barely 4,000 men, expected soon to be at the head of an efficient army when reinforced from England's column and the regiments on their way from the Sutlej. He bluntly communicated to the Ameers the contents of the letters. He was willing to offer indemnity for the past in consideration of good conduct for the future; but for fresh infringements of the treaties the retribution would be unsparing. Probably no one would have been more disappointed than the Viceroy had matters been tided over peaceably, for there could be neither safety nor rest for our garrisons so long as the strength of the feudal princes was unbroken. But of a peaceful solution there could have been but slight expectation, though Napier at first seems to have thought differently. Even had the Ameers been inclined to submit to our exigencies, their hands must have been forced by their Belooch mercenaries.

Had Sind been ruled by one masterful chief—by a Runjeet Singh or a Dost Mahomed—probably the first invasion might have ended as disastrously as that of Afghanistan. But it was subdivided into many principalities and distracted by endless jealousies and quarrels. It had been split up into principalities, for there was no right of primogeniture: the supremacy passed collaterally to the elder brother, and each son claimed a share of the paternal inheritance. When the first of the Talpoor sovereigns died—he had been as all-powerful as Runjeet in the Punjaub—his five brothers divided the succession. All were dead in 1842, and two of them had

left no issue. One had taken the upper province, with his seat of misgovernment at Khyrpore; three had ruled the lower country, with Hyderabad for their joint capital, where they had fortified palaces and surrounded themselves with guards, like the Roman Barons of the Middle Ages. The fifth was sovereign at Meerpoor, a Tadmor in the wilderness, many leagues to the east of Hyderabad, and his safety was his isolation in the sands of the desert.

In 1842 Noor Mahomed and Nusseer Khan were ruling at Hyderabad; Roostum, another grandson of the conqueror, was Lord of Khyrpoor; and the Ameeree of Meerpoor had descended to Shere Mahomed, who was to prove our most formidable enemy. Both Roostum and Shere Mahomed, though absolute in their territories, recognised the shadowy suzerainty of the chief Ameer of Hyderabad, who wore the turban of supremacy which answered to the insignia of the Holy Roman Empire. But they had kinsmen almost as wealthy and powerful who were to be won over. Sobdar of Hyderabad had been excluded from power by his uncles, but left in possession of an ample patrimony. Roostum of Khyrpoor had aged prematurely in a course of debauchery, and he had brothers who were anxiously expecting the succession. One of these, Moorad Ali, recommended himself to Napier, was rewarded for his desertion of the national cause, and subsequently served us with tolerable fidelity in Sir Charles's campaign against the northern mountaineers.

Sir Charles has described with cynical humour his memorable meeting with the Ameers at Hyderabad.

Lord Ellenborough delighted in Oriental display; no man despised it more heartily than Napier. On the one hand, were the Ameers glittering in jewels, and outvying each other in the splendour of their accoutrements, with their troops of followers armed to the teeth and resplendent in the silks and shawls of Bokhara. On the other, the spare and shrunken little English General in the shabby uniform, seated in the gorgeous palakin that had been sent for his use, but with the lofty forehead, the aquiline nose, and the hawk-like eye of his martial family. He acknowledged the civilities civilly, but blandishments left him untouched. Brushing ceremony aside he got to business, and bluntly repeated the ultimatum with which Outram had been charged.

"The Ameers would all try on my spectacles, were puzzled by them, and repeatedly asked if I was very happy and very comfortable. In return, my interpreter continually asked if they were very happy and very comfortable. This was the more incumbent on me as having just written a *billet-doux* to them which could by no means add to their comfort or happiness: it was to request that they would not break treaty, and to hint that if they did so my next visit would be less welcome." On that occasion the General was escorted by fifty of the Sind Irregular Horse, "wild, picturesque fellows, with their brilliantly coloured trappings, very much like stage banditti." But that was before Jacob had put them into uniform.

He left Hyderabad next day for Sukkur, where he was to take up his political work in earnest. There he was to await the arrival of England, and the reinforcements

coming by the Indus from the sea and the Sutlej. Already he had made up his mind to annexation, but as yet he had no apprehension of war. He wrote in September that there was no danger of it. But on the 8th of October he says in a letter to Outram, "The Ameers are like all barbarians, ignorant and cunning. They will get on the rocks. However, the length of their tether is the treaty, and they have been given to understand that they shall not go an inch beyond it; if they do, they must take the consequences." For Outram had been recalled from Bombay to Sind at Napier's special request, and throughout the time of the conquest he was his trusted adviser, as Jacob was his right hand in the field. In the unhappy quarrel Jacob sided with Outram, and bitter recriminations were recklessly interchanged. But the General's despatches and familiar letters are on record to prove the high regard he entertained at that time for both, and the unreserved confidence he reposed in them. Alike, indeed, as soldiers, administrators, and politicals, the three had their greatest qualities in common. And the memorable words of Napier when he pledged Outram at a banquet as the Bayard of India will remain an unimpeachable tribute to the courage and conduct which were afterwards unworthily impeached. When he left Sind he was still full of admiration for Jacob, the staunch comrade he had taken to his innermost confidence, and he expressed his grateful regard with the generous impulsiveness of his nature.

Sir Charles had reported that both the Northern and Southern Ameers had undoubtedly been infringing treaties, intriguing with neighbouring potentates, and

stirring up revolt among the tribes. Lord Ellenborough sent back a new treaty, drafted upon the report, to be peremptorily submitted to the Ameers upon clear proof of their faithlessness. At the same time instructions were sent to effect sweeping reforms in the political staff, just when their services were most needful. Napier exclaimed, "One hundred and fifty people in this house alone turned out, without warning or thanks! And Outram indeed has worked like a horse at the head of them!" He adds characteristically, "If I have not been worked, no matter." He had set himself to collect proofs, had satisfied himself as to their genuineness, and was first to deal with Roostum of Khyrpoor, convicted of intriguing with Runjeet Singh. Already he must have dismissed the idea that the subjugation could be effected peaceably. Roostum was charged with fresh offences, and admitted them by submitting to the penalties imposed. The General granted an interview to his younger brother, Ali Moorad, whose friendship for the British had been guaranteed by Outram. Ali Moorad sought the reversion of his brother's "turban," but was sent away with the simple assurance that his rights should be respected. Meanwhile Roostum had broken an appointment, and subsequently eluded all proposals for meetings. Rumours reached our cantonments that he was preparing to assume the offensive, and simultaneously peremptory instructions came from the Viceroy that the new treaty was to be enforced. Sir Charles was busy at Sukkur preparing for war. In the middle of November he had assembled 6,000 men. "It is a very fine force," he writes in his journal. "The military have been all at

sixes and sevens, and it requires vigour to pull the jokers up, but it shall be done."

It was on the 27th that Jacob received orders to join at headquarters. Two days afterwards he was at Sukkur. Then the following entry occurs in the Records : "Until this time the corps had never been assembled together and the men had never been drilled, the regiment having been on service since its first formation, having been constantly broken up into small detachments and always actively employed, the sowars were necessarily allowed to learn their duties as they could, and a man enlisted one day was frequently sent on outpost duty the next. From these causes it would have been unreasonable to expect the regiment to make a very gallant appearance on parade. However the regiment was reviewed by Sir Charles Napier on the 3rd of December, and the General expressed himself highly pleased with it." The sketch of the subsequent operations will show how quickly Jacob got his irregulars in hand, and brought his wild recruits under salutary discipline.

A day or two afterwards the General wrote to the Governor of Bombay, "It is said the Ameers have 60,000 men." (The numbers were greatly exaggerated.) "I cannot believe that the Ameers have so many in one mass; but though it be so, this division would go headlong on them with their bayonets, for my men are young and mad for service." He resolved to make a demonstration in force, and if necessary to strike before being struck at. He understood that the enemy's plan was to wait till he had marched upon Khyrpoor, and then to advance against Sukkur. That, indeed, was their obvious wisdom, but he



SUKKUR ON THE INDUS. *From a photograph in Sir Henry Green's collection*

deemed himself strong enough to guard against it. Leaving a sufficient strength in cantonments, he crossed the Indus with the main body. Jacob had preceded him two days before, and the whole force was assembled at Roree.

Meantime the threatening movement and the presentation of the ultimatum had thrown Khyrpoor into consternation and turmoil. The aged Roostum had determined to resign, and his numerous sons had been mustering men to dispute the succession with their uncle, Ali Moorad. Unquestionably Ali was the legal heir. Roostum, in his alarm, is said to have volunteered to take refuge with the British. Sir Charles expressed his willingness to receive him, but recommended him to seek the protection of his brother. Roostum followed the advice, and fled to Ali Moorad in his fortress of Dejee. That was wise counsel from the British point of view, for it effectually disconcerted the schemes of the sons, and bound Ali to our interests more firmly than before. Jacob in his strictures on the "Administration of Sind," says that Roostum was shamefully dealt with; that we betrayed him and abused his confidence, and that the consequence was to encourage Shere Ali and other recalcitrants to fight it out to the last in despair of reasonable terms. We confess that we see little proof of that. It might have been politic to treat Roostum more liberally, but if resistance were rebellion, he had no claim on us. If he were superannuated, he had given his vizier *carte blanche*, and must be held responsible for the papers to which the State seal was attached. Moreover, he was over-persuaded not to write for the grace that

might have been accorded. Now leaving his brother, who was avowedly our friend, he took a second flight into the desert to join his sons. They held the forts of Shah Ghur and Emaun Ghur; they were in close alliance with the hostile Ameers of Hyderabad, and they were said to have assembled nearly 20,000 men at Dhingee, with the design of attacking Sukkur. Dhingee is situated to the south-west of Sukkur, and about a third of the way to Hyderabad, as the crow flies. Napier had intended to capture Emaun Ghur, which belonged to the Chief Ameer for the time being, and consequently was legitimately vested in Ali Moorad. Now, being threatened from four points, as he wrote to Lord Ellenborough, he changed his plans. Moving southwards to Laloo, lying to the south-east of Dhingee and to the north-east of Emaun Ghur, he could strike at either, according to the intelligence received from his spies. He counted, besides, on the moral effects of the march, for he had boldly risked himself in the desert instead of following the river road. At Laloo he had turned the position at Dhingee, and would constrain the force there to fall back on Hyderabad, if they had not already withdrawn to Emaun Ghur. "Emaun Ghur," he says, "is their fighting cock, and before three weeks pass, my hope is to take off his spurs."

Jacob's Horse formed an important part of the little column of 3,000 men which marched out of Roree on the 26th of December. The first objective point was Dejee, and it was reached on the 4th of January. On the second day the General had sad experience of the cumbrous train which clogged the movements of an

Indian army. He exclaims, "Oh, the baggage! the baggage! It is enough to drive one mad. We have 1,500 camels with their confounded long necks, each occupying fifteen feet! Fancy these long devils in a defile; four miles and a quarter of them! Then there are the donkeys, and ponies, and led horses, and bullocks innumerable. They say I have done wonders in reducing it so much, but I have done nothing, except appealing to the good sense of the officers and reducing my own baggage." Indeed no man could have set an example of more Spartan simplicity, and his belongings were carried in one small portmanteau. Jacob was at least as independent of ordinary comforts, and both afterwards directed special attention to an evil which might be tolerated on the thickly populated plains of Hindustan, but which paralysed in torrid Sind the rapid movements which were essential.

At Dejee it was decided to strike at Emaun Ghur. Though Ali Moorad professed himself our friend, it seems to have been impossible to obtain reliable information or trustworthy guides. All that could be learned was that the fortress lay in the desert, six or eight marches to the south-east; that the scanty springs were at uncertain distances, and that on some of the marches no water was to be procured. It was rumoured that one of the sons of Roostum had thrown himself into the fort with 2,000 followers. He had previously stored it with provisions and ammunition, and trusted so absolutely in its impregnability that he had taken his treasure with him. In fact, he meant to make it a place of arms for the levies of Upper Sind. The advance on it was the first of those

dashing operations which were inspired by thoughtful temerity. They utterly demoralised the enemy by upsetting calculations and presumptions. The British general had not only to deal with the garrison, but he heard that strong bodies of horse were moving about the desert, ready to harass him at the wells or rally to the succour of the fortress, and if his column were annihilated, as might well be the case, the whole of Sind would be up in arms.

Nevertheless he did not hesitate. His first idea had been to take all his little army with him, but as spies came in with woful tales of wells shrunken or dried up, he decided it was out of the question. With almost unparalleled audacity he picked out 550 men for the perilous piece of service. Three hundred and fifty of the Queen's 22nd Regiment were mounted on camels, and Jacob with 200 of his Horse made up the contingent. On the second day Sir Charles found that things were even worse than had been reported. There was little water and no forage, so 150 of the Horse were sent back, Jacob and his subalterns, Fitzgerald and Russell, still preceding the advance with the remaining fifty. To guard against treachery from the rear, Napier had forced Ali Moorad to accompany him. He warned the Ameer and the Belooch guide that their lives should pay for it if they played him false. "Such," he said, "was his anxiety for their subsistence, that they should only eat and drink at the wells with his soldiers," for there had been ominous warnings that the water would be poisoned.

On the second day Roostum, with a force estimated at ten times the number of Napier's little band and with

seven guns, was seen on the flank. Outram was sent forward on his asseveration that the Ameer could only be friendly, nor does Roostum appear to have given further trouble. Meanwhile the General kept pushing forward, dragging a couple of light howitzers along. For eight weary days the march continued. The camels weakened or broke down, but the infantry helped to drag the howitzers over the sand-hills, and the horsemen scoured the desert to guard against surprise. On the eighth day they reached Emaun Ghur to find it evacuated. Mahomed Khan had fled, taking his treasure with him, but abandoning his stores. The fortress was in the appanage of Ali Moorad, and he protested against its destruction. But the general wisely considered that such an expedition was not to be lightly hazarded again, and that the moral effect of demolishing the place would be great. Ali was "persuaded" to consent; he was paid for the grain which was distributed among the soldiers, and the powder was expended in blowing up the fortress. The General had hesitated as to going on to reduce Shah Ghur, situated to the north-east and deeper in the desert. But intelligence having arrived that the Ameers were still gathering to a head at Dhingee, he replenished his water-skins to march back to the Indus. The surest course would have been to retrace his steps by the route which was now known to him. From strategical considerations, making a detour to the southward, he again threw himself into an untrodden wilderness, unknown even to his guides, and taking his chance of finding water. His purpose was to disperse the Belooch at Dhingee by a turning movement. But reports of his success had pre-

ceded him and already done the work. He emerged from the desert to learn that the Dhingee army had broken up; that the scare had spread to Hyderabad and that his base at Sukkur was no longer threatened. So he resolved to strike at Hyderabad while the iron was hot, and to present the new treaty at point of sword to the southern Ameers. Consequently he ordered the main body of his troops to meet him at Peer-Abu-Bekr, a village situated to the south of Dejee, while supplies for his army were to be sent down the Indus.

CHAPTER VI

MEANEE

THE force collected at Peer-Abu-Bekr mustered 3,000 men. The General's right rested on the Indus, and by it he was in communication with Sukkur and Roree. The tribes on the right of the river were threatening Sukkur, but the fortifications had been strengthened and he feared nothing from that quarter. He had invited the Ameers of the south to meet those of the north at Khyrpoor, either personally or by representatives, where the treaty was to be submitted for discussion, or rather for acceptance. Naturally they had either refused or sent evasive answers. Roostum, or rather the sons who controlled the old chief, were openly hostile. They had lost their lands, they had been driven from their palaces, and having moved to the southern border of Upper Sind, were urging their Hyderabad kinsmen to take the field with them. The Belooch mercenaries of the south were of the same blood with their own, and put strong pressure on their vacillating masters. The Ameers inclined to fight, but still hesitated. The General's daring march to Emaun Ghur had given them a formidable idea of his enterprise; they had to stake their all on the issue

of a struggle, and moreover had to summon their feudatories from a distance. After irritating delays, they sent their envoys to treat with Napier, but evidently were still temporising. Only the representative of Sobdar had full power, for Sobdar, while meditating means of retreat, was already preparing to cast in his lot with the foreigners. A man so shrewd as Napier must already have abandoned the hope of securing a peaceful settlement. Had he been guided by purely military considerations, he would have marched on Hyderabad while the Ameers was yet unprepared. But, realising his civil responsibilities, he seems to have determined on exhausting peaceful methods before proceeding to extremities. Fresh levies were coming into Hyderabad each day, yet he only exercised gentle pressure, moving slowly onward with long halts, giving every opportunity for negotiations. Outram, at his own urgent request, was charged with a mission to Hyderabad. That fearless soldier was putting his head in the lion's den, but he trusted in old friendship with the Ameers and felt confident that he could bring them to reason. He would have gone practically unaccompanied, but fortunately, as it proved, a feeble European escort was forced on him by his General.

When the General left camp at Abu-Bekr, his right was protected by the Indus, but to the left was the desert where masses of the enemy's horse were seen to gather, though nothing was known of their numbers. The guard of that uncovered flank was entrusted to the vigilance of Jacob. A fortnight before, after a service of fifteen years, he had been promoted a brevet-captain. His instructions were dated January 26th :—

"SIR,—1st. You are to proceed on the Dâk road towards Hala, skirting the Thurr, or desert, as closely as you find it to be practicable.

"2nd. On arriving at Synd-ke-Ghote, or in that neighbourhood, then halt till you receive instructions from me.

"3rd. Be so good as to send an express to me every second day, if possible; if not, as often as you can. Inform me of the exact state of the road as to water and provisions, and also if practicable for artillery.

"4th. If you come within reach of the Ameer Roostum Khan, let every attention be paid to his Highness. If you meet him after the first day of February, you will be pleased to send him to headquarters in charge of a strong escort, and by such stages as may not be inconvenient to his Highness's health. Should it appear to you likely that any attempt would be made to rescue him, then escort him with your whole corps, marching by the route least likely to encounter any of his followers. You are requested to avoid a collision with his people if possible, and to assure his Highness that no other restraint will be put upon him than to enforce his residence at some one place of his own selection and within his own estates.

"5th. Let the strictest discipline be enforced towards the people of the country.

"(Signed) C. J. NAPIER,
"Major-General.

"6th. Should you hear of or meet with any armed bodies, disarm them if possible; if they refuse, attack them, but give them fair warning to disperse in the first instance, unless they are troops belonging to the Ameer

Ali Moorad or the Ameer Sobdar, in which case order them to accompany you.—C. N."

Two days later the regiment marched, following the prescribed route. On the 2nd of February it halted at Leemah Ke Korrub, Napier having in the meantime moved forward to Nowshara. At Leemah Jacob learned that Ameer Roostum was encamped about twelve miles to the eastward with 6,000 men and six guns. The crafty old prince made amicable advances: messages of all sorts were sent to Jacob, and these messages were duly transmitted to Nowshara. Then we have the first of the unofficial notes from the General, showing the more than cordial relations existing at that time between the Commander-in-Chief and his Captain of Irregulars.

"*January* 30, 1843.

"MY DEAR JACOB,—Wukkeels have come, and I have agreed to halt at Nowshara till the 5th, when, if the Ameers of Khyrpoor do not give in their submission and meet Outram at Hyderabad, I shall march and treat them as enemies. I have, however, stipulated that you shall march to some place where you can find water and forage, and there halt.

"Be so good as to do so, and from that place write to me. Make Gool Mahomed a prisoner and send him to me. He shall get his deserts, the son of a bitch.

"Yours truly,

"C. J. NAPIER."

"NOWSHARA, *3rd February.*

"DEAR JACOB,—I hope Roostum will spare you, and not realise the fears of the wukkeels and cut you in pieces!

"I expect you will put him into an exceeding state of terror by your march: he is a miserable idiot! As I think you are sure of finding plenty of provisions, remain quiet till you hear from me and pick up all the information you can.

"As you have not sent in your friend Gool Mahomed, Kardar of Thurree, I suppose you could not get at him; so I must leave his punishment to Ali Moorad, who, as he probably made him Kardar for a *consideration*, will not punish him for the same reason.

"Yours truly,

"C. J. NAPIER."

While Jacob lay at Leemah, there occurred one of the incidents which had been provided for under the 6th head of his instructions, though the circumstances had not been foreseen, and proved extremely embarrassing. As yet there had been no formal declaration of war, and anything that might precipitate hostilities was to be carefully avoided. The General had arranged a fair system of intelligence, though scouts and spies were never altogether to be trusted. On February 4th he wrote from Nowshara to warn Jacob that 1,500 horsemen were said to be on their way to Roostum, and would pass by his quarters. "This is very insufferable in Meer Roostum, if the imbecile has any power. . . . However, as I have promised to make no movement before the 6th, and as I wish to avoid killing any of these vagabonds, if

possible, you must let them pass unmolested; but if they insult you in spite of your caution, then you must give them the thrashing they seek to get." He adds his suspicion that most of the 1,500 would prove men in buckram, and there he was right. But Jacob, who would have known how to deal with a fighting force, was taken aback when one Hyat Singh, with twenty-four other chiefs of the Sind Murrees, audaciously rode through his camp, in place of avoiding it. That their business in Hyderabad was hostile there could be no doubt, but they proclaimed themselves neutrals, and professed to be peaceful travellers. They were stopped, of course, but refused to surrender their arms or to be sent to the General. Consequently they were detained while Jacob asked for instructions. The answer came promptly from Sukkurund :—

"MY DEAR JACOB,—This is the most provoking accident that could have occurred; however, it is not to be avoided.

"In order to endeavour to browbeat them by an array of force, I have sent a squadron of the 9th Light Cavalry, which I hope will prevent their attempting to resist being made prisoners. If they do resist, it will give us a world of trouble. You have done perfectly right in not forcing them. I wish there had been 500 instead of 25, and then there would have been no difficulty.

"Yours truly,

"C. NAPIER.

"I think an attempt may possibly be made to rescue the Beloochees on their way here. Their chief now says

they are not Sobdar's men, but Meer Mohamed's. I like the fellows' pluck. It will vex me if you have to lay violent hands on them, but they must be obedient."

The Murree chiefs were handed over to the Light Cavalry, but they had thought better of it before the squadron brought them in and surrendered their arms. It turned out that they had left 500 followers at a village only four miles from Jacob's camp, and the whole were on their way to Hyderabad to join the forces of the Ameers. It seemed probable that their audacious intrusion was a political reconnaissance to clear up the situation. Narrating the incident, Jacob adds in a note : "The seizure of these men was considered by the Ameers and all the Sirdars of Sind as the first blow on the part of the British, as an open declaration of war, and as the immediate cause of all the hostilities which ensued."

The term of grace expired on the 6th of February, when the General made a short movement in advance. He was assured that Roostum had promised to meet his commissioner, but his answer was that such promises had too often been broken to be regarded. The hot season was coming on, and action must be taken at once. He wrote to Outram, "This will not do. The Governor-General's orders are positive. I have no time to lose : my own troops must soon disperse with the heat : I will not lose the cool weather.

"Say, then, to the Ameers of Khyrpoor thus : You were told in December, 1842, to disperse your armed bands, yet you have kept, and still keep, them together. Disperse them instantly, or I will fall on them.

"To the Ameers of Hyderabad say thus:—'If you permit the bands of Upper Sind to assemble in your territory I will treat you also as enemies. And if you let them go to your fortress of Omercote in the desert, I will first assault Hyderabad and then Omercote.'"

We may accept Sir Wm. Napier's account of Outram's dealings with the Ameers with some distrust, but undoubtedly their fair protestations seem to have deceived him, otherwise he would hardly have ventured into Hyderabad when the Princes were actively preparing for war. The warriors they had summoned were daily coming in. They professed their readiness to sign the treaty, and doubtless would have signed, as Roostum had done, for their desire was to gain time. Each day was strengthening their forces, while those of the British were stationary or dwindling, and the increasing heat was all in their favour. The treaty was to be signed in Durbar on the 12th; when the Commissioner attended there were ominous signs that the murder of the English officers had been contemplated. They are said to have been saved by a casual intimation that the General was to come to Hyderabad in person, when the conspirators preferred to wait in the hope of a more effective *coup*. Be that as it may, nothing was further from Napier's thoughts, for now his suspicions were thoroughly aroused and he had made up his mind to the ordeal by battle. He wrote on the 13th: "I have delayed from first to last at the risk of the lives of the troops and my own character as an officer till not the eleventh but the twelfth hour. If men die in consequence of my delay, their blood may be justly charged to my account." That day Lieutenant Fitz-

gerald, distinguished by his gallant exploits in the coming campaign, rejoined the Sind Irregulars from Balmeer, passing boldly by Shere Mahomed's desert fortress of Omercote. On the following day the General called in the regiment, and it joined him on his march. The same evening, with two guns and a small contingent of infantry, Jacob was sent forward to Hala on the Indus, in charge of ammunition to be forwarded to Outram by steamer. The following day he returned to headquarters at New Hala, and on the 16th the whole army was concentrated at Muttaree. Meanee, where the decisive battle was to be fought, is about equidistant from Muttaree and Hyderabad, and directly between them.

The General might well be anxious, but he had committed himself too far to retreat. He went on the principle that when facing barbarians the only safety was in attack. His information as to the numbers opposed to him was vague: all he knew for certain was that they were overwhelming. Some of the chiefs had made secret overtures, but he had no faith in the offers of traitors. The strength of the enemy was variously estimated at from 60,000 to 100,000, though probably the lowest estimate was excessive. But the character of the country, though cut up by ravines and canals, was in favour of the action of the wild cavalry, and the Ameers were stronger in field-batteries, though their gunners might be inferior. We had none of the quick-firing guns and magazine rifles which mowed down the dervishes by swathes in the Soudan. "I will fight," said Napier with a certain swagger, "if the Belooch be a hundred thousand." Yet, with thoughtfulness as

great as his courage, he took precautions in case of a reverse. If he won, the way would be open to Hyderabad. If he were beaten, he could fall back upon Hala and entrench himself with his back to the river. There he would await succour and stores from Sukkur, and these he had already sent for. On the 15th he wrote to Outram, "I am marching on Hyderabad. I will make no peace with the Ameers." He ordered the Commissioner to come away if possible; if not to entrench himself and stand on his defence. And, with an assurance like that Clive sent in a similar crisis to Meer Jaffier, he added, "I will be with you the day after to-morrow."

The Ameers had already thrown off the mask, and on that same day the Residency was assailed in force. There was no more chivalrous episode in the annals of the great Mutiny than Outram's heroic defence with his little garrison of 100 against 8,000 of the Belooch, with six cannon. Aided by two armed steamers, which the General had sent to his assistance—though the ammunition had unfortunately been left behind—he beat off the assailants and embarked his men. The steamers slowly stemmed the current, followed closely on either bank by swarms of sharpshooters and by field guns, which kept up a warm fire. Outram, after his almost miraculous escape, joined the army at Muttaree.

At sunset on the 16th the Sind Horse were sent forward to look out for the enemy and reconnoitre the shikargahs—wooded hunting grounds of the Ameers—which they were supposed to have occupied along the Hyderabad road. Jacob came back before dawn to report that he had seen nothing of the enemy. That

morning the army marched for Meanee, the Sind Horse forming the advance guard. Firing was heard to the left of the column, and about seven o'clock the General again sent Jacob on a scouting expedition. He soon came on the Belooch army, to the number of about 20,000, with fifteen guns drawn up in a strong position in the bed of the Fullaillee River, protected by its rugged banks. There was a dense shikargah on their left flank, while the right rested on the village of Kuttree, entrenched skilfully, and prepared for defence. On the approach of the Horse the artillery opened on them. Jacob formed his line at about 500 yards' distance, sent back information to the General, and remained halted under a lively cannonade, while he closely reconnoitred the positions.

The total strength of the British force was but 2,600 of all arms, officers included. It had been weakened by 200 men detached under Outram on the previous evening to explore and burn the shikargahs skirting the Indus. The measure is said to have been suggested by Outram himself, and Sir William Napier condemns it as a grave error, in which his brother's better judgment was overruled by personal friendship and importunity. As it happened it proved useless, for the enemy had shifted their positions, but Sir Charles's despatch to the Governor-General tells a very different story. He accepts full responsibility, and bestows unstinted praise upon Outram. "I detached Major Outram with 200 sepoys in the steamers to set fire to the wood in which we understood the enemy's left flank was posted. This was an operation of great difficulty and danger, but

would have been most important to the result of the battle. However, the enemy had moved about eight miles to the right during the night, and Major Outram executed his task without difficulty at the hour appointed, viz., nine o'clock, and from the field we observed the smoke of the burning wood arise. I am strongly inclined to think that this circumstance had some effect on the enemy, but it deprived me of the able services of Major Outram, . . . together with 200 men, which I much regretted for their sakes and my own, for I much wanted the officers."

At nine, when the smoke of the shikargahs was seen rising in the distance, the General had brought up his forces and was forming his line of battle. Sir William says there were at the least 30,000 of the Belooch; Jacob, as we have seen, estimated them at 20,000. At the lower computation they were eight times the number of their assailants, and very skilfully posted. Their front stretched for over 1,200 yards, lining the deep, dry river-bed, and the rugged bank sloping towards the open plain served as a rampart. Their cannon were in two batteries, in front of the bank and protecting their flanks, and their guns, which had opened upon Jacob, were now pouring shot into our battalions as they formed up within range. The wings of the Belooch rested on shikargahs, stretching forward on either side of the plain, so as to flank the British line when it should advance. These thick woods were full of sharpshooters; that on the Belooch right was cut up by nullahs running back at right angles to the river-bed; in that angle were the Ameers' camp and their cavalry. As the position had

been well chosen, it had been deliberately strengthened, for all the tributary nullahs were scarped and so rendered impassable for guns and cavalry. The shikargah on the left was nearly as formidable; in the river-bed were some feet of mud and water, and moreover the wood was skirted by a wall, half-way between the hostile positions, having only a single opening. Behind the wall several thousands of the enemy were posted, with the apparent intention of making a sortie to fall on our flank when we should advance to the frontal attack. On the extreme Belooch right and on the edge of the wood was the retrenched village of Kuttree.

The General deemed an assault on either flank impracticable, nor was there time for wide turning movements, which after all might confront him with obstacles as formidable. He decided, therefore, for the front attack, though his little force had been further enfeebled by telling off a strong baggage-guard to protect the crowd of camp-followers and baggage-animals. Two hundred and fifty Poona Horse and four companies of foot had been assigned for the duty; the heterogeneous mob was confined in a circle, surrounded by the camels, who were made to lie down, while bales of stores distributed between them formed breastworks to fire over. The 1,800 men left him were formed up in line about 1,000 yards from the enemy. The artillery—ten guns—were posted on the right, with the Bengal Cavalry. "Covering the left," says Sir William, "were the Sind irregular horsemen, fierce eastern swordsmen led by Captain Jacob, an artillery officer and a scientific one, but also of singular ability

for cavalry service." Jacob was sent forward on the plain to try to draw the enemy into showing more distinctly their strength and numbers. In that he only partially succeeded, and meantime the line was advancing from the right in echelon of battalions, refusing the left to avoid the fire of Kuttree. The General's despatch is succinct as it is spirited. "Our fire of musketry opened at about 100 yards from the bank in reply to that of the enemy, and in a few minutes the engagement became general along the bank of the river, on which the combatants fought for three hours or more, with great fury, man to man. Then, my Lord, was seen the superiority of the musket and bayonet over the sword, shield, and matchlock. The brave Belooch, first discharging their matchlocks and pistols, dashed over the bank with desperate resolution; but down went these bold, skilful swordsmen under the superior power of the musket and bayonet. At one time, my Lord, the courage and numbers of the enemy against the 22nd, the 25th, and the 64th Regiments bore heavily against that part of the battle. There was no time to be lost, and I sent orders to the cavalry to force the right of the enemy's line."

That crisis, according to Sir William, came at the end of the three hours. On the left, Major Clibborne is said to have misconceived his orders. Instead of leading them to the storm of Kuttree, he had held his sepoys back. Sir Charles was hard pressed both on the right and in the centre, and could send him no help. The Belooch were gaining fresh courage, and the tide of battle was turning against us. "Yet the battle," writes Sir

William, "must be lost or won within twenty minutes. Already Jacob, with the intelligence of an officer able to see beyond his own immediate work, had endeavoured to make his way through the shikargah on his left, hoping thus to turn the village and get on the flank of the Belooch position, but the frequent scarped nullahs, the thick jungle, and the appearance of matchlock men soon convinced him it was not to be done, and he returned." It was then Sir Charles gave his orders to the cavalry to carry out what Clibborne had been instructed to do, and force the enemy's right at all hazards. There has seldom been a more dashing feat of horsemanship. Avoiding the wood, the Bengal Cavalry and the Sind Horse rode straight at Kuttree, reckless of the matchlock fire. When leaping the ditches and nullahs many of the troopers lost their seats, yet they galloped through the guns, riding down the gunners. They cleared the high bank of the river, plunging down into the rocky bed and scrambling up the opposite scarp. There they parted. The Bengal Cavalry broke the hostile infantry on the left, and Jacob with his Sind troopers charged into the Ameers' camp sabring to right and left, and spreading confusion along the lines of the enemy who saw these fierce horsemen in their rear. The despatch says: "The Sind Horse took the enemy's camp from which a vast body of their cavalry slowly retired, fighting. Lieut. Fitzgerald gallantly pursued them for three miles, and, I understand, slew three of the enemy in single combat. The brilliant conduct of these cavalry regiments decided, in my opinion, the crisis of the action."

The Belooch were beaten, but not disheartened: they slowly and sullenly withdrew from the scene of carnage, and it seems strange that those hardy and savage warriors should have succumbed in close fight to a comparative handful. Sir Richard Burton hints at bribes, and suggests that their steadfastness was shaken by suspicions of treachery. One body of their foot, more numerous than all the British, who had been passed over in the cavalry charge, continued to hold their ground, and seemed disposed to renew the battle. But when the guns were brought up to bear upon them they reluctantly followed the rest. The slaughter had been great, for quarter was neither asked nor given, and the wounds inflicted by the keen-edged swords wielded by the powerful arms were terrible. It was a succession of single combats, in which some of the officers specially distinguished themselves. McMurdo, the General's son-in-law,[1] had his horse killed under him, in the bed of the Fullaillee, regained his feet, met one of the most famous of the Belooch chiefs hand to hand and cut him down in the midst of his followers. "Captain Jacob, though slight of person, meeting a horseman at full gallop, passed his sword with such force through shield and body, that the hilt struck strongly against the former." Where so many showed themselves equally brave, it would be invidious to award the palm for courage. But Fitzgerald of the Horse, of gigantic stature and Herculean strength, at Meanee as elsewhere, made his name a terror by deeds that remind us of the Paladins of romance. He literally clove men to the teeth by the

[1] Afterwards Sir M. McMurdo, G.C.B.

downward blow against which shield and turban folds were no protection.

A passage from Jacob's report to the Assistant Adjutant-General gives a vivid idea of the charge on the village of Kuttree and of the obstacles his horsemen surmounted. "The good conduct of these three native officers"—he names them—"was most conspicuous throughout the day, and particularly on one occasion when the regiment was moving over ground rendered nearly impassable by watercourses, hedges, and deep ruts filled with thorns and lined with matchlock men. In advancing at the gallop over these obstacles so many falls took place that more than fifty of our horses were lying on the ground at once: this occurred under a very heavy fire from the villages and nullahs on the right of the enemy's line."

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CHAPTER VII

HYDERABAD

THE battle had been fought within sight of Hyderabad, and that evening the camp was pitched beyond the Fullaillee. During the night the wounded were sent forward towards Hyderabad, Jacob's Horse with the Bengal Light Cavalry forming the escort. On the 19th the remainder of the troops followed, and all were encamped around the Residency which was on the river four miles from the city. Shere Mahomed of Meerpoor, who was to give us no little trouble, had been on the march to join the main army, but was still some miles from the field when the contest was decided. Sir William Napier says that it had been the General's intention to attack him at once, but that he was dissuaded by Outram. With Hyderabad swarming with armed fugitives, many of them rather infuriated than daunted by their defeat, it is certain that much was to be said on both sides. Be that as it may, Shere Mahomed was left unmolested, and the General turned his attention to the reduction of the city. He had lost no time in sending the Ameers a summons to surrender; the only terms he offered were their lives. "I want your decision before twelve o'clock, as by that

time I shall have buried my dead and given my soldiers their breakfast." Panic-stricken, six of the Princes rode into his camp, dismounted, and tendered him their swords. On the 19th he entered their capital, and next day the fortress was occupied, a place of immense strength. The Belooch mercenaries were hot to defend it; they had been reinforced by 10,000 fresh combatants after the retreat, but their masters had no stomach for more fighting. Only one of them is said to have shown any spirit in the battle. Then most of the bravest of the Belooch went off to join Shere Mahomed; others had gathered about the zenanas as guards to the women, and many still lingered sullenly in the bazaars.

Sir Charles had conquered, but his position was critical. His little force was further reduced by 500 men, detached to garrison the fortress: with the rest he was entrenching himself at the Residency with his back to the river. He was expecting the reinforcements he had ordered from Sukkur, and he had resigned himself to write for assistance from the Punjaub. There he had been anticipated by the Governor-General, who on the first rumours of probable fighting had warned three regiments for service in Sind and despatched them to Sukkur with a handful of irregular horse and a battery. But each day Shere Mahomed was gathering strength, and the hot season was approaching. If Napier had cause for anxiety, Shere Mahomed had everything in his favour. In a few days he had seen his 10,000 men doubled or trebled, and all were clamorous for a chance of revenge. He had his strong capital on the border of the desert for a base of operations, and in case of reverse he could retreat to

Omercote, the stronghold in a distant oasis which he had armed and provisioned. But though time was pressing, the fiery commander showed his great qualities as a general by knowing how to curb his impatience. Even in that audacious campaign, which set ordinary rules at defiance, it would have been insanity to march out to attack Shere Mahomed, leaving turbulent Hyderabad in his rear. But if Shere Mahomed could be tempted to come on, he was eager to meet him. It is said it was his plan to make ostentatious parade of timidity and an exaggerated show of weakness for the enemy's spies. Yet to prevent these false impressions being communicated to his troops he made them camp out on the open plain beyond his entrenchments. His dispositions won the highest praise from Wellington, and it was thus the Duke summed up his eulogium : "He manifested all the discretion and ability of an officer familiar with the most difficult operations of war."

He had been puzzled how to deal with the captive Ameers, consigned to a palace close to his camp. Virtually prisoners at large, and surrounded by their own Belooch guards, they were in constant communication with their countrymen in the field. On the 12th of March Lord Ellenborough settled the matter by a proclamation annexing Sind and ordering the prisoners to Bombay. That proclamation was the charter of our possession, and it must be admitted that it was open to the strictures passed upon it, as it was the justification for the ground afterwards taken up by Outram and Jacob. It charged the Ameers with breaking the treaty which had been forced upon them. It set forth further that they were

foreigners in Sind, with no claim to hereditary affection or obedience. But doubtless it was essential to the pacification of the country that the Princes should be dethroned and expatriated, and for them there was no disputing the settlement by the sword, unless Shere Mahomed should prove strong enough to upset it. Napier, who had resolved not to go behind the earlier treaties, expressed himself thoroughly satisfied with this one, and he prepared to give it effect. He had argued that the Ameers were guilty men, and he seems to have been hurried into needlessly harsh measures by his prepossessions and readiness to believe the worst. His treatment of Shadad is a case in point. He had condemned him for the murder of a Captain Ennis on the lower Indus and would have "hanged him on the highest tower of Hyderabad," had not Lord Ellenborough interfered. "Misplaced leniency," is Sir William's comment. Jacob, in his manuscript notes on "The Conquest," gives a different colour to the affair. "There was no proof whatever against Shadad : there could be none, for he knew nothing of the murder of Captain Ennis—Sir William, by the way, misspells the name—of which he was no further the instigator than in having when hostilities commenced sent to proclaim war against the British among his distant subjects."

Rumour always magnified the hostile forces, and Shere Mahomed might have from 20,000 to 40,000 men. He had advanced to within ten miles of Hyderabad, and professed himself confident of victory. Napier's inactivity had lured him on, but it had also encouraged malcontents all over the country. The hill tribes, excited

by hope of plunder, were preparing for descents on the plains. The most powerful of the chieftains in Southern Sind were actually threatening the cantonments at Kurrachee. Shere Mahomed had accurate knowledge of the strength of the reinforcements on their way from Sukkur, and it was feared he might use his whole strength to intercept them. In that case the General would have been compelled to follow, abandoning his camp and hospitals and isolating the little garrison in the fortress. Anxious and oppressed with cares, the captive Ameers gave him infinite trouble. They were continuously intriguing with Shere Mahomed: indeed, they would have been more than human had they not done all in their power to help him. The General addressed them in a letter, stern almost to brutality, which was afterwards severely criticised, but which the situation went far to justify. They were told that if they persisted in their duplicity they would be sent on board ship in irons, and subsequently they were sent on board, although not in irons.

Shere Mahomed was a fair strategist, though, thanks to the indiscipline of his levies and the incapacity of their leaders, he failed to carry out his combinations. His friends kept him informed of our numerical weakness. His plan was to attack the fortress with a part of his army, and when troops had been sent to the assistance of the garrison, to fall on the camp in irresistible force. He became more enterprising from day to day. He ravaged the country up to the gates of Hyderabad, and swept away camels from the pastures within sight of the British pickets. On the 18th of

March he sent his insolent ultimatum: "Leave the country and all the property you have taken, and your lives shall be spared." The message was delivered as the evening gun was fired. Napier's answer was to turn his back on the envoy, saying, "You hear that sound: it is my answer to your chief." Like Lord Ellenborough, he was always theatrical, and perhaps it was wisdom in dealing with Orientals.

Though he carried it off bravely, he was anxious enough, for Shere Mahomed had already surrounded the camp, and had detached besides a body of 8,000 men in the direction by which the reinforcements would arrive. But he had not advanced to the Indus, and reinforcements were already dropping in. Some recruits with ammunition and provisions had come down by water, and the 21st Native Infantry had arrived on the very day that Shere Mahomed sent his defiance. The regiment brought news that Major Stack was following with 800 sepoys, several squadrons of cavalry, and a battery of horse artillery, but he was marching on the left bank of the river, and in ignorance of the menacing movement of Shere Mahomed's right wing. On the 21st Stack was at Muttaree, within a long day's march of the camp. There he received orders by a native messenger to press forward. Then came news that the Belooch were directing their whole forces to their right with the intention of crushing Stack next day. Clibborne, who was head of the intelligence department, and who apparently did not communicate with his chief, not unnaturally sent Stack a warning. "Halt, for God's sake; you will be attacked by at least 40,000 men

to-morrow." Stack, sorely puzzled by contradictory instructions, sent back the General's *cossid* with a message concealed in a quill, asking for positive orders. As it chanced the messenger returned safely when the General was giving a dinner to his officers. He read Stack's note before the guests had gone, and seems then to have been informed for the first time of Clibborne's message. It increased his extreme anxiety, for his hope had been that Stack's steady advance would bring him within easy reach of succour. But then, as throughout the war, he was playing a game of bluff, and he carried himself with a bold affectation of confidence. He read Stack's communication aloud, with the answer scribbled in pencil, which he was to return. "Clibborne's army is in buckram. March in." The brief despatch was received with cheers and laughter; the dinner-party separated in high spirits, and the confidence of the officers was communicated to the camp.

Casuistry, on the ground of necessity, may justify the sending false assurances to an officer who was marching into mortal peril. If Clibborne had exaggerated, his information had been correct in the main, and it was fully confirmed during the night. But the General's bluff was always backed up by bold actions, and his strategy was based on shrewd calculation. In this case he had to forecast and baffle the scheme of Shere Mahomed. There were three points at which the Ameer might make his attack. The first was at Muttaree, but it was far distant, and in all probability Stack had already left it. The second was at Meanee, but it was unlikely that the superstitious Belooch would risk a second battle on the

ground that was strewed with the bones of their bravest warriors. Consequently it might be expected that they would defer their onset until Stack was in the more immediate vicinity of Hyderabad. He decided that Loonar would be the likely scene of action, and thither he resolved to march with all speed.

Yet as his message might miscarry, or the Ameer strike more quickly than he presumed, he took his measures to strengthen Stack at Muttaree. His son-in-law, McMurdo, was sent out with 250 of the Poona Horse; his orders were to feel for the enemy, and if he found the way open to push forward towards Muttaree and urge Stack to hasten his march. McMurdo did find the way clear, and joined Stack on the morning of the 22nd. That day the General sent Jacob and his Horse along the same road, following himself with the Bengal Cavalry and some guns, being followed in turn by his main body. Stack had marched from Muttaree in the forenoon of the 22nd; he had been met by McMurdo and had passed Meanee without interruption. Already he had learned that the head of the General's column must be within a few miles. His one idea seems to have been to get forward, and he neglected ordinary precautions. He knew that the Belooch must be on his left flank, and in that direction the country was covered with jungle. Yet he sent his guns to the front, massed his force in a single column, threw out neither scouts nor skirmishers to his left, and left his long baggage-trains to straggle in the rear. In reality the Belooch were lying hidden in the shikargahs. They waited to let him go by, and then when their

matchlock men crossed the river-bed to fall on the baggage-train, the main body was seen moving in masses to assail the flank of his column. The baggage was saved by the gallantry of McMurdo, who charged the matchlock men with his handful of Horse while sending forward for supports, and subsequently galloping off in person to bring back some guns, with which he secured the safety of the train. Meanwhile Stack had halted, showing a bold front to the enemy. At that critical moment Jacob came up with his cavalry, the baggage-train closed up, the column resumed its march and reached the camp at midnight.

Sir Charles was something of a predestinarian, with great faith in luck, and now his luck seemed to have turned. He had re-opened communications with Sukkur: stores and provisions in abundance had come down the river, and, almost contrary to expectation, he had brought Stack safely into camp. Already he was becoming master of the military situation, for Shere Mahomed had been exhausting his treasure, his mercenaries were getting impatient, and he would be forced either to fight or retire. Napier would willingly have fought on the 23rd, but Stack's troops were knocked up, and a day's rest was imperative. The delay was fortunate, for though the General expected reinforcements from north and south he had resolved not to wait for them. Sir William tells the story dramatically. On the morning of the 23rd Sir Charles, sitting at breakfast with his staff, remarked, "Now my luck would be great if I could get my other reinforcements either down from Sukkur or up from Kurrachee; but that cannot be, they will not be

here for a week." Scarcely had he spoken, when an officer exclaimed, "There are boats coming up the river!" The whole party rushed out of the tent, when another officer shouted, "There are more boats—a fleet coming down the river." Then there was a disembarkation of 500 recruits, of heavy howitzers, and of artillery officers and skilled gunners, precisely the arm in which the army was weakest. Sir Charles sent the recruits to hold the fortress, thus reinforcing his fighting strength with the 500 veterans in garrison.

That evening he passed his forces in review. Impatient of their enforced inactivity, all ranks were full of fight, but he knew he had to face desperate men in formidable superiority of numbers, and he took his precautions accordingly. He had the fortress and his entrenched camp to fall back upon, where he could hold out till fresh reinforcements arrived. While the parade was still in progress, came other envoys from the Ameer. No doubt they came as spies, but they brought a second summons to surrender. This time the brief answer had the ring of real assurance. "If the Ameer meets me when I march out to-morrow, and surrenders unconditionally, his life shall be safe. If his chiefs swear obedience to the Governor-General, they may return to their villages with their followers and their possessions shall be assured them."

At daybreak 5,000 men were under arms. Of these 1,100 were cavalry, and there were seventeen guns. The march left Hyderabad on the left, because it had been reported that the Ameer had returned to his headquarters to the south of it. But news was received that he had concentrated his army in positions previously entrenched

at Dubba, which was eight miles to the north-west of the city. Thither the army turned, moving in a compact body, Jacob's Horse, as usual, leading the advance, their duty as *éclaireurs* being arduous and responsible, for though the ground was level, it was covered with gardens and shikargahs traversed by nullahs, where any number of enemies might lie concealed. The army had marched ten miles, and Jacob as yet had seen nothing, when one of his scouts came back on the spur. The Ameer had marshalled his whole force at Dubba, two miles to the left. Again, as at Meanee, Jacob was sent forward to observe: again, as he states curtly in the Records, he halted and formed line within gunshot of the enemy, whose position was again well chosen. The right rested on the bed of the Fullaillee, empty of water but deep in mud, and skirted, as at Meanee, by a dense shikargah, only to be turned by a wide movement. Along the front ran a broad and deep nullah, with high bank that had been scarped into parapets, bending back at an obtuse angle, within which the Belooch left was posted. The wing, thus refused, was masked besides by thickets and smaller nullahs which screened the sharpshooters. The cavalry were massed behind the left; behind the right the village of Dubba had been filled with men. It had been retrenched and the houses were loopholed; the guns were to the left, behind a second nullah, and all along, in front of the line, the low jungle had been cleared away. Nothing could be more skilful than the dispositions, said to have been due to the military genius of an African slave—a freedman of the Ameer Sobdar—who, fortunately for us, fell in the battle.

The march of the British, diagonal to the Belooch front, brought the head of the column near the right of the enemy. They promptly deployed into line in a similar slant, the cavalry being on either wing, and the guns in the intervals between the infantry. Jacob's observation had necessarily been imperfect. He could neither survey the whole of the enemy's position nor estimate his strength; he could not even tell whether Dubba was occupied. But he could tell the General that we were outflanked on the right, and that there the Belooch horsemen were held in reserve. When the General had deployed, seeing Belooch in numbers, hurrying to their right, he came to the mistaken conclusion that Dubba was undefended and the ground behind only partially occupied. Hastening to anticipate them, he attacked, and the enemy being in force, the attack was a failure. Yet all the time he had been looking distrustfully at the wood on his left, from which he apprehended a flanking movement. The Sind Horse and the Bombay Cavalry, under Stack, had orders to keep a jealous eye on it. At nine the artillery opened fire, and the line advanced in echelons from the left, the attack, which resulted in the repulse, beginning on the side of Dubba. Meanwhile Stack and Jacob, seeing the Belooch still in movement from their left, believed they were retiring before the cross-fire of our guns. Without losing a moment, they made what the General's despatch describes as a brilliant charge upon the enemy's left, crossing the nullahs and cutting down the fugitives in a chase of several miles. Sir William says it was a mistake which might have proved fatal had the wood been held in strength, but he

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does eloquent justice to the gallantry of the charge and to the leader whom, in heat of controversy, he was actually to accuse of timidity. "The whole body of cavalry was at full speed, clearing the nullahs without a check, the riders' spurs deep in their horses' sides, their different war-cries pealing high and clear, their swords whirling above their heads in gleaming circles : there was the fiery Jacob and the terrible Fitzgerald careering alike in the same path of error, while the splendid troopers of the 3rd Cavalry and the red turbans of the wild horsemen of Sind speeding through smoke and dust, streamed like meteors behind them." Meantime the Bengal Cavalry, far to the left, had turned the enemy's other flank and were likewise slaughtering and pursuing, while the infantry, returning to the attack, had carried Dubba by desperate fighting. And all along the line, as the troops rushed forward under fire of the guns, there was raging a murderous hand-to-hand struggle. The bank had been breached here and there and as the stormers leaped down among the Belooch swordsmen there were renewed the scenes of Meanee with similar result. The General says his men marched up to the entrenchments with the steadiness and precision of a review. His brother writes, "The fiery Jacob, with his usual impetuosity, had pushed so far ahead that he caught sight of the elephant which was bearing Shere Mahomed away. He might have caught the Ameer and ended the war, had not Colonel Pattle, the second in command, deemed it prudent to stop the pursuit."

A passage in the General's despatch is significant of the ruthless character of the fighting : "It gives me

great satisfaction to say that some prisoners have been taken."

A few days after the battle Jacob received the gratifying announcement that he had been appointed honorary aide-de-camp to the Governor-General in recognition of good service at Meanee.

CHAPTER VIII

JACOB FINISHES THE CAMPAIGN

THE Ameer had fled: his followers had scattered, and the General hastened to follow up his stroke before they had time to rally. With what troops remained to him, the Ameer had fled to Meerpoor, though it was probable he would make no stand there, but retreat to Omercote in the desert. Though it was but the end of March, the heat was already intense: the mercury had risen to 110° on the day of the battle. A desert campaign was a sore strain on the troops, but the longer the delay, the more severe it would be. On the morning of the 26th the army was marched back to Aliar Ke Tanda, and next day it was directed on Meerpoor, Jacob leading the advance. As was expected, Shere Mahomed had abandoned his capital, and with his family and treasure had sought safety at Omercote. Lieutenant Fitzgerald, who had distinguished himself at Dubba as at Meanee, was at once detached with a squadron to reconnoitre the fortress. The gates of Meerpoor were thrown open, and the populace professed to welcome the British as deliverers from their Belooch tyrants. The Ameer's place of arms was strongly fortified and amply stored; had he stayed to defend it he might have given us infinite trouble, for it

could not have been carried by storm, and a siege through the hot season would have been impracticable. But brave as he was, like all Orientals, he was subject to panic, and he had lost his good military genius at Dubba. At Meerpoor there was a parade, when the standard they had taken at Meanee was formally presented to Jacob's Regiment.

Fitzgerald, in his reconnoitring expedition, had halted between Meerpoor and Omercote. On the 1st of April a camel battery and a company of sepoys were sent out in support, and when the little detachment moved forward, Jacob had joined it and taken the command, leaving the rest of the regiment at Meerpoor. There is an entry in the Records. "After much uncertainty, marching and countermarching caused by contradictory reports as to the state of the fortress, Captain Brown proceeded to Meerpoor and obtained distinct orders from the General. Major Woodburn, with a wing of the 25th Bombay N. I. and the remainder of the Sind Horse, joined the detachment on the 3rd of April, and the whole force marched on the 4th of April to Omercote and took possession of that fortress, which was after a short parley surrendered without opposition." The Ameer had again taken to flight, plunging this time with a mere handful of followers into the deserts to the northward. Omercote was one hundred miles from the fatal battlefield, and in ten days he had lost everything—territory, fortresses, treasures, and prestige.

Woodburn's success relieved Napier from great anxiety. Everything had succeeded beyond his hopes, and his precautions against a reverse became needless. Camel-

riders were immediately despatched to stop the troops that had been asked for from the Bombay Presidency. Fitzgerald with his squadron was left in garrison at Omercote and Woodburn led the rest of the detachment back to Meerpoor. The headquarters of the regiment were still at the latter place, which with Omercote was left in charge of Jacob. The Sind Horse, with two companies of sepoys was but a slight garrison for two strong fortresses which had just been reduced, surrounded by deserts which might shelter any number of fugitives smarting under defeat. But the strength was regulated on Jacob's advice. McMurdo writes to him:

"*April 8th.*

"MY DEAR JACOB,—With reference to your letter of the 6th to Sir Charles Napier respecting the force considered necessary to be left at Omercote, I am desired by his Excellency to state that he quite agrees with you, and you will therefore leave thirty sowars there; and he requests you will make any arrangements you may deem expedient for quieting the country."

That day the General had returned to Hyderabad, and the note was written from the palace of the chief Ameer, where he had installed himself as master of Sind. The rule of the Belooch was at an end, though there were to be sporadic outbreaks of "rebellion," and the fierce borderers on the northern frontiers were to be brought under the yoke. Jacob was soon to have some trouble in quieting the country. On the 23rd, having heard that insurgents were mustering near Omercote, he led a squadron to his subaltern's assistance. It seemed to

have been a false alarm, and an express recalled him to Meerpoor.

The movements of the fugitive Ameer were now the immediate cause of anxiety. He was the only one of the Princes at large, except Ali Moorad, our ally and *protegé*. To Jacob was assigned the duty of hunting him down. The General wrote on the 2nd of June : "My dear Jacob, if I send you four companies do you think you could do anything in rear of Shere Mahomed ? He is now some few coss from Sukkurund." The answer was as brief : "My dear General, I think we could make a most effective demonstration from Meerpoor. If you could give me a couple of guns with four companies, it would have the best effect, as Shere Mahomed's people would then consider us an army." The General wrote again, saying that the guns and infantry were to start immediately, explaining his plan for surrounding and if possible seizing the Ameer. Colonel Roberts,[1] coming from Sukkur, was to approach Sukkurund from the north ; and while Jacob was manœuvring to cut him off from the desert, troops were to be pushed towards Aliar Ke Tanda to bar his retreat to the south. "I am very doubtful of being able to do this, as if these wild horsemen disperse, no regular troops can stop them ; however, we may try." Then follow three notes from Sir Charles in four days, fired off like snap-shots, all in most characteristic style :—

"*June 6th.*

"I hear that 3,000 Belooch are at Nussurpoor. . . I have therefore halted the 400 infantry and the guns. Remain quiet till you hear from me."

[1] Afterwards General Sir Henry Gee Roberts, K.C.B.

"*June 7th.*

"We have information that there is not a man at Nussurpoor. . . I shall order the guns and your men to join you directly."

"*June 9th.*

"I think you may as well advance, as soon after this reaches you as you can, say to-morrow night.

"We hear a story that the Ameer is at Hala. If so, he is dodging out of Roberts' reach, and cannot make up his mind to quit the river.

"I would like, generally speaking, to make my enemy do what he does not like. On this doctrine I would try to force him to the desert, but stronger reasons make me prefer pushing him towards the river : if he gets into the desert, he may perish for want of water ; but if I get him down on the river, I shove him into it and finish the war at a blow. I do not want to drown him and his people if he will surrender, but I would rather drown them all than let them escape, which would produce a much greater loss of life in the long run."

Roberts, who had reached Sehwan in the end of May, had orders to cross the Indus on the 9th of June, and march on Khoomhera, while Jacob from Meerpoor, and the General from Hyderabad moved simultaneously on the same point. For various reasons the combination broke down. Roberts was engaged elsewhere ; the General was compelled to delay his march, and there is an entry in the Records : "Captain Jacob was thrown completely on his own resources, no assistance being within effective reach."

Shere Mahomed had been marching and counter-marching, now headed south-east by reports of the proximity of Roberts, now turning northward again, as he heard of movements from Hyderabad. Napier appears to have been baffled, rather than misled. His information as to his nimble enemy was accurate, but always came too late. Consequently he had been led into making a détour to the southward, where, though the marching was by night, the intense heat of the Sind midsummer wrought havoc even with his seasoned troops. The veteran himself, when suffering from fever, was struck down by sunstroke and had a narrow escape. Hemmed in as he was, Shere Mahomed must either fight or disperse his forces. He resolved to fight, and as his information was excellent, he unhesitatingly singled out Jacob as the weakest of his enemies. So in place of Jacob having to continue his march, it was the Ameer who turned back upon Jacob. His report is a model of military brevity :—

"CAMP, SHEDADPOOR, *June 14th.*

"SIR,—I have the honour to report that yesterday I arrived at this place with the force under my command.

"During the day I received information that Meer Shere Mahomed had marched from Hala, . . . wherefore believing that this place would be an excellent position to intercept the Ameer if he attempted to escape to the eastward, I determined to halt here."

"At about eleven last night a Brahmin servant of Shere Mahomed came to my camp, and informed me

that the Meer was coming to attack me with his whole force, amounting to 8,000 or 10,000 men.

"At about three this morning my picquets perceived the enemy coming on in considerable force, and after sending several parties to reconnoitre, and finding that the enemy advanced very slowly, I left a troop and company to protect my camp, and went out with the rest of my force to attack him. As I advanced, the Belooch formed in considerable strength on the bank of a nullah, with horse and foot, with three guns which immediately opened on us. The ground in front was of the most difficult nature, rugged in the extreme and intersected by deep nullahs; as soon as I had formed my line and our guns commenced firing with some effect, I perceived the Belooch moving off, and on my advancing with the Sind Horse, they broke and fled in every direction, leaving their guns and several standards in our hands. . . . We have taken five prisoners, from whom I learn that Shere Mahomed has fled with ten horsemen back to the river, and I therefore have succeeded in preventing his flight to the desert, though unsuccessful in the attempt to capture his person."

Jacob does not make much of the business, and the Belooch warriors must have been demoralised by previous defeats. But the action crowned the actual conquest, though it might have caused less trouble in the end had the Ameer escaped to the desert. Jacob who was not in the habit of overestimating his enemies, had calculated that there were but 4,000 Belooch in

front of him, the rest having deserted on the march—in reality they are believed to have been less than half that number. But the probability of an unequal encounter had caused the General no little anxiety, and the relief came at a critical juncture. Sir William again tells a picturesque story. The old chief had pushed forward till on the forenoon of the day of fighting he could hear the reports of the guns. It was on that very morning he had fallen senseless under the sun blaze, and had only been saved by copious bleeding. When he recovered consciousness he could still hear the firing, but knew not how the battle was going. He said himself that all was anxiety when a horseman galloped up with tidings of the victory. "I think it saved me—I felt life come back." Describing Shere Mahomed's half-hearted attempt at an onslaught, Sir William says, "That brave and able officer [Jacob] was a dangerous enemy. The Lion found him well able to command, ready to obey, a gallant swordsman, and a skilful leader; he had conducted his column along the edge of the waste with great intelligence and vigilance."[1]

The wonderful old man who had achieved the conquest with a few crushing blows, swiftly delivered, had written to Jacob two days before his illness by the pen of his aide-de-camp. "You have Sir Charles' permission to rob, murder, steal, hang, and anything else to procure

[1] It is almost incredible, but in "The Administration of Sind," p. 43, Sir William asserts that his brother "on the 8th entirely crushed the Lion." Not the slightest mention is made of Jacob, and on the 8th—six days before the battle—Sir Charles was in Hyderabad.

carriage; you may do anything if you can but catch Shere Mahomed. Do this, and all your crimes will be pardoned." The Ameer had not been caught, but Capt. Napier wrote again on the 17th: "The General congratulates you from his heart on your glorious victory. . . . If this be true, you may still catch him, but the General leaves your movements entirely in your own hands to do as you think best." The Ameer had crossed the Indus to seek the hospitality of the hill tribes, who treated him courteously, befooling him with promises, till the last of his treasure was expended. Jacob wasted little time on the bootless quest, but after picking up the fugitive's remaining guns, brought his detachment into Hyderabad. On the 18th of August there appeared an announcement in general orders by the Governor-General that the conduct of Brevet-Captain Jacob is considered to have entitled him to honorary distinction, which cannot at present be conferred on account of his want of rank." The Commander-in-Chief had however announced his intention of recommending him for the brevet rank of major and the Companionship of the Bath, after his promotion to the regimental rank of captain.

CHAPTER IX

NAPIER'S OPERATIONS IN KHELAT TERRITORY

WHEN he heard of the defeat of Shere Mahomed, Sir Charles prophesied that not another shot would be fired in Sind; and so far as Sind proper was concerned, he was right. Scarcely recovered from his illness, but braced by the voyage down the Indus to Kurrachee, he devoted himself to the internal security and civilisation of the conquered province, concerning himself besides with its external relations. His administration was bitterly attacked, but that he showed himself as capable as an administrator as a commander there can be no manner of doubt. There can be no more conclusive testimony than that of his successor, Sir Bartle Frere, who at first was far from approving his policy. It will suffice to quote a single sentence from an unpublished letter intended for a London journal. "I had the best possible means of estimating his capacity as a civil ruler, and I have no hesitation in placing him in the foremost rank of the Indian statesmen it has been my good fortune to meet." He divided the country into three provinces, admirably and economically administered. He overrode with characteristic strength

of will the sullen opposition of covenanted civilians, finding men of his own choosing to do his work. He established everywhere an effective police; their only fault was that they were somewhat too zealous, inclined to deal out summary justice like the civil guards of Spain. But in his high degree he set the example of "standing no nonsense." Great interest was made with him for the life of a powerful chief, condemned for the murder of a wife. "She was his wife, and he was angry with her," was the plea put forward. "Well, I am angry with him," said the General, "and I mean to hang him." But perhaps his energy was most conspicuous in the department of public works. He found money somehow and enlisted paid labour. He undertook extensive harbour works at Kurrachee, and constructed quays on the Indus near Hyderabad and elsewhere. He cleared out the old irrigation canals, neglected under the misrule of the Talpoors, he attended to the sanitation of the towns, building commodious barracks for his soldiers, and he opened up or repaired military roads, bridging the streams and the broader nullahs. Jacob tells us that the taxation was rather raised than reduced; but now the peasant knew what he had to pay, and could till or reclaim his lands in tranquillity. The revenue was increasing, the area of cultivation was extending; dacoity and crimes of violence had almost ceased, and whether we had won it by fair means or foul, Sind seemed entering on an era of prosperity. As for Jacob, his headquarters were near Hyderabad, with a squadron or two on detachment at Kurrachee; and at Hyderabad he had built himself a

comfortable house, on the cheerful site of a disused graveyard.

The one cloud on the fair prospects was a virulent epidemic which had wrought havoc in the British cantonments. Many soldiers were in hospital, many more were enfeebled. That may have encouraged the tribes beyond the frontiers, who could in no case have been expected to keep quiet. Sir William Napier says that the hillmen had been raiding already: Jacob asserts that they never broke down into Sind until after the General's first punitive expedition, but it is certain that trouble was brewing in the North-west. And it must be repeated that it is difficult to discover the truth, when comparing Sir William's "Administration of Sind" with Jacob's elaborate manuscript comments. Jacob's exact knowledge is unimpeachable as to the topography, the personalities of our enemies and allies, and the actual incidents of the campaigns in which he played a leading part. On the other hand, he had been outraged by what he considered the gross injustice of the historian, and by the time the book appeared, he was at bitter feud with Sir Charles. The friendly letters of Sir Charles are Jacob's best vindication in essentials, but his fiery temper had been chafed to an extreme, and it must be confessed he shows consistent animosity.

The year 1843 had passed quietly, but from the beginning of 1844 disturbing intelligence was constantly coming in. Nevertheless the situation had greatly improved. In 1843 practically all the British force had been on the sick list; in April, 1844, there were only 900 invalids. Two so-called Belooch battalions had been recruited,

chiefly from Pathans and Hindustanees, and the General believed he could depend upon them. Brigadier Simpson was sent to command in Upper Sind, and all the Sindian chiefs were summoned to Hyderabad, to a durbar for the celebration of the Queen's birthday. The durbar, chiefly intended as an ostentatious display of confidence in doubtful loyalty, went off satisfactorily, and the chiefs had made fair promises, but their kinsfolk on the frontier were more restless than ever. The hill tribes had ravaged Cutchee and were threatening the border. There Mahomed was said to be stirring up the Afghans, and the Khan of Khelat was a mere boy who could not control his tributaries, and who had no reason to love the British after the cruel and unjust measure meted out to his father. Beja Khan, the bold leader of the Doombkees, was in the field, and secretly supported by Khelat Sirdars. Then an unfortunate affair occurred which swelled the ranks of the raiders. Fitzgerald with a troop of the Sind Horse, and Captain Tait with some squadrons of Bengal Cavalry, by consent of the General made a daring attempt to seize Beja in his fortified town of Pooljee. Sir William Napier and Jacob give irreconcilable accounts of the affair; it was undoubtedly a failure, though the British officers saved their reputation by their spirit and conduct in a difficult retreat. Sir Charles had made up his mind that he must undertake a campaign in the hills, though it was to be deferred till the season was further advanced, but he had laid his plans and was making his preparations. As a preliminary, in the autumn of 1844, he undertook a march through North-Western Sind, to confirm the wavering chiefs in their allegiance, and to secure assist-

ance from those who lay nearest to the territory he was to invade. In the latter object he succeeded, but Jacob, writing after the publication of "The Administration of Sind," severely blames it as a mistaken policy. He says it was fostering the savage clan feuds which it was our duty and interest to suppress.

In October the 78th Highlanders were sent up the Indus to Sukkur. On the 22nd, the Sind Horse at Hyderabad were warned to hold themselves in readiness. The same day came a private note to Jacob, "Look over the arsenal and tell me if you can fit out two three-pounders to go on camels—the gun on one, the carriage on another." The guns were found, and on the 26th the regiment crossed the Indus to Kotree. Thence Jacob wrote to McMurdo a letter which is characteristic but cryptic, and it illustrates the difficulty of Sind campaigning.

"What is that 'unintelligible' joke? The fact is that Sir Charles has established a most terrible funk here, the people eat bread in fear and trembling, doubting whether it is lawful to eat at all, or whether they can do it without displeasing the governor. . . .

"As the General has deferred his day of departure, I wish you would ask him to allow me to go at once to Sehwan, where we can abide in plenty till he thinks proper to proceed. To halt at Kujjoor we must take everything with us for horse and man. The squadron at Ahmed Khan left Hyderabad with the horses in superb condition, but the miserable forage and bad water has completely taken the shine out of them. A month at Ahmed Khan would ruin the best cavalry on earth. . . . With regard to provisions beyond Sehwan, everything abounds till we

get to the desert. It will be only necessary to take two or three days' for man and horse, to be used on emergencies."

The answer gave Jacob *carte blanche* to halt where he pleased. On the 5th he marched into the hills, and on the 24th was encamped at Pokran, but the Governor still tarried. Thence he wrote the Assistant Quartermaster-General another letter of warning.

"It is proper it should be explained to the Governor that so long as we may be in Sind, we shall have no difficulty in feeding man and horse, but that in several places in Cutchee we shall not be able to obtain supplies, and if we go into the hills everything *must* be carried. We shall be able to procure whatever we want at Larkhana, &c.; and if we take sufficient camels with us, we can always supply ourselves at these places for as many days as we may require to be in parts of the country where no food is obtainable. Now as a Silidar of mine gets twenty rupees a month to provide and support his horse, it is plain that whatever his wishes, he cannot pay nineteen rupees a month for camel hire to carry his grain, so that unless he be assisted from the public stores he must go without. A sowar cannot pay more than eight rupees a month for horses' grain, and be the quantity procurable ever so small, the horse can get no more. . . . We will of course do our best under any circumstances as I trust his Excellency knows. . . . Starve or not, I shall trouble him no more on the subject, but the truth is as I have stated." [1]

[1] By the Silidar system, a man undertook to supply so many horses to the regiment—from 200 to two or three. He was paid twenty



KHOZDAR IN BELOOCHISTAN. *From a photograph in Sir Henry Green's collection.*

The General came to Pokran, where Jacob had an opportunity of conferring with him in person, and while Sir Charles proceeded to Sukkur, the regiment was halted at Larkhana, and there it remained till the commencement of operations. Jacob had written strongly about transport and supplies, but it must not be supposed that he and his chief were then on any but the most cordial terms. On no one did the General more absolutely rely for information as to local matters. From Sukkur he addressed to "my dear Jacob," a long string of questions as to roads, routes, wells, the character of the country, the tribesmen, &c. "Beja is said to be in the hills, and I think I shall put him to his shifts, and the Boogtees also. However, whether I plague him or not, a march through their country will be of use. I have prepared light guns for you and the Camel Corps; practice your twelve artillerymen with those you have, and when we meet I will give you the choice of all we have."

The Camel Corps had been formed by Fitzgerald eighteen months before. Each camel carried two men: one to fight from its back and the other a foot soldier. The mounted men were armed with musket-bored carbines, sold by Jacob as having been found too heavy for his troopers. The infantry had light muskets. The camels carried packs, cooking utensils, and beds, tents

rupees *per mensem* for the forage of the horse, and ten for the food of the rider. He was bound to replace the horses cast at inspection. Consequently there was no regimental commissariat train. The march was generally followed by grain dealers from the bazaars at the stations. Wellington introduced the system, when he contracted with Mahratta chiefs.

and other baggage being dispensed with, so that the corps could march sixty miles a day, or even ninety on a stretch. When attacked, the camels were trained to kneel in a circle, heads inward, and the corps did invaluable service as scouts, or in following a flying enemy.[1]

Jacob sent a minute answer, carefully distinguishing between personal knowledge and what he had gathered from hearsay. Events proved how exact his information had been. He pronounced none of the "roads" practicable for artillery, "properly speaking," though as his experience under Billamore had shown, "it was very possible to transport guns through that country by dint of much previous provision and immense labour." "I do not think that it would be wise to march through the hills with less than 1,000 infantry and six guns. If the fellows fight it will be in places where cavalry cannot move. A good body of pioneers will be invaluable, and plenty of artificers should accompany the artillery. . . . There is scarcely a blade of forage within the hills, and no supplies of any kind are procurable, except perhaps sheep and cattle. . . . Good guides will be required. The Khyberee Abdulah Khan will be one good man: he was with me in the hills before, and knows them sufficiently well."

In January the General, as Governor, issued his declaration of war. The troubled state of the Punjaub decided him to respect the neutrality of Sikh territories, and to concentrate on the skirts of the desert to the south-east of the enemy's hills. He wrote Jacob on the 8th :—

[1] Jacob, however, was of a different opinion, and says in "Views and Opinions," that in practice it had proved worthless.

"Your letter told me what I wanted to know. My plan is to persuade Beja, if possible, that Wullee" (the chief of the Chandias, whose district lay to the south) "marches against him unsupported, and with the hope of getting a large reward if he catches him. That the great sickness prevents me going against him with our troops till the next cold season.

"The moment Wullee has a fair start, of about a day, do you march with the Sind Horse and the Camel Corps. . . . Take also your guns. . . . When I hear you have started, I shall move with the headquarters by regular marches (or forced marches if you send back to hurry me) to Pooljee. The necessity of keeping all quiet at present makes me avoid making much preparation, for all depends on your rapidity. . . . This is my outline as far as I can see my way as yet. Ali Moorad's rabble, I shall, if possible, send across the desert from Shikarpoor. . . . My old advance guard and its commander will bring his old luck, I hope.

"P.S.—I would much rather that you made no attack till I come up, as I want to prevent bloodshed, but I must leave this to your discretion, in which I place perfect confidence."

"*January* 11*th.*

"MY DEAR JACOB,—The enclosed will put you all right. I know we shall not catch Beja at first, and to catch him is a secondary object with me; but there is no harm in trying."

"SUKKUR, *January* 11*th.*

"SIR,—Charged with an especial duty as you are, which admits of no loss of time for reference to higher

authority, I hereby invest you with the fullest extent of power I possess, and all officers of whatever rank or station are to render you whatever assistance you demand. All commissariat arrangements are to be executed by you direct, and you are to be obeyed by everybody to whom you issue orders, as if I issued them myself, up to the date of my joining you.

"(Signed) C. J. NAPIER,
"Major-General, Governor.

"To Captain Jacob, Commanding Sind Horse."

On the 13th the General issued an explanatory proclamation, and headquarters left Sukkur for Khangur—the future Jacobabad. McMurdo wrote next day: "My dear Jacob, How have you been getting on? Well, I hope! Some of those volunteers must have lost leather a bit." And the General, like his Quarter-Master, kept up the correspondence in the same light-hearted and familiar style.

"JAGUN, *January 14th.*

"MY DEAR JACOB,—The Governor of Sind arrived here this morning, and shall be at Khangur at eight to-morrow. . . . I am sorry the Europeans are tired, but it is without remedy. If you have sufficient conviction against Azun Khan that he acted with treachery, you may give him a sound flogging and still keep him a prisoner for further punishment, for his life is forfeited; but as you did not shoot him at once, I cannot do it now, unless your proofs are very clear."

The day the General reached Khangur, Jacob had

pushed forward to Rojan, nine miles to the west. It was, says Sir William, a terrible march, for the camel train had preceded the horse and exhausted the wells. Jacob says there were no wells, that the Camel Corps lagging, trammelled the march, though some of the horses gave out. Having refreshed his men, and ridden thirty-five miles further, he learned, when within two miles of Shahpoor, that a son of Beja was holding the village with a strong force. He says in his report, "I pushed on at a trot and completely surrounded the village before the alarm was given or any one could escape. Knowing the place well, I at once galloped into an enclosure on one side of the village. . . . The enemy now opened a heavy fire upon us from a high tower and from the houses. I immediately picketed a troop and took the men into the village on foot, when all opposition ceased and the robbers were only anxious to hide their arms." The report is modestly worded, but the General thought the affair deserved a separate order. He praises "the prompt and dangerous attack for cavalry of a village in the highest degree defensible and built for defence and which was defended"; adding that "Jacob and his men carried it with the rapidity of lightning, and while losing men did not injure one of the defenders, but captured them all. This is a very rare and a very glorious instance of perfect discipline as well as courage on the part of the Sind Horse, and in the mind of the Governor, it stamps both the Sind Horse and its commandant as first-rate soldiers—prompt, resolute, obedient, and humane."

Jacob was now sent to occupy Pooljee and Lahree,

and to act in concert with the Chandias to awe the Khelat tribesmen. Ordered to procure supplies for the army, he had to write that there was no food in Pooljee, that all the grain had been hidden, and that it was impossible to obtain information as to its whereabouts. Then he had instructions to secure the passes leading down to the plains, in order to cut off Beja's possible retreat. But on the 22nd the Governor sent a more momentous communication: and the importance he attached to it is shown by his writing at most unusual length. The leader of light horse was to be turned into an administrator, and that was the *rôle* on which he prided himself, for he was wont to say he was no soldier. "My dear Jacob, fancy my making a political! Yet such I am going to make of you." The substance was, that he desired to settle friendly Chandias in the Boogtee country, as a barrier against the troublesome tributaries of Khelat: though the old Boogtee chief might still remain, if he gave satisfactory pledges for his loyalty. He wished Jacob to carry out the plans and to tender his best advice. "I have not entered into this long story to alter any opinion of yours, still less to ask what yours are: whenever I feel unequal to the work entrusted to me, I will immediately ask to be relieved of my command. . . . You will know how to assist me in carrying that part which I entrust to you into effect by the means you judge best." Some of the governor's political views were still more forcibly conveyed. "There is no man in India more opposed than I am to the damned nonsense of keeping Indian Princes on their thrones within our frontier. . . The old Indians, for whom I confess con-

tempt, as a set of old bitches, whose God is mammon, do not see that the interest of every Prince within our frontier is to send us to hell."

Jacob answered in similarly serio-comic vein : "My dear General, I fear that I shall never make a successful political. I have failed in the present business at the commencement." The Chandia chief and his sirdars had positively refused to emigrate into what they feared would prove a hornet's nest. He added that the Murrees were the only tribe that might be persuaded, and, in fact, that was the measure adopted.

The General replies : "My dear Jacob, send home the Chandias with all sorts of butter : as there are no parsnips in Sind, fair words must do for the present, as the money and parsnips are together." Meanwhile the operations went on leisurely, with a view to hemming in the enemy and forcing him to fight or surrender. The Murrees, hereditary foes of the Boogtee tribe, did good service in closing the passes to the north. General Simpson was coming up from the Punjaub : Ali Moorad was moving deliberately westward, having stopped to celebrate the feast of Mohurrum. Jacob never put any faith in him. Napier only trusted him so far and so long as the British arms were successful. Sir William says that Jacob occupied the forts to the south. Jacob in his notes remarks contemptuously that Pooljee and Lahree were no forts, but mud-walled villages, and that he held the country as at Khangur, with his troopers camping in the open. *À propos* of that system of offensive defence, he reports an incident eminently illustrative of his frontier patrolling.

"LAHREE, *March 5th.*

"I have to report for the information of his Excellency the Governor, that a patrol of twenty men of the Sind Irregular Horse under Jemadar Guffoor Mahomed, to-day fell in with a party of twenty-five marauders on foot. The men were well armed with sword, shield, and match-lock: on the approach of the patrol (who did not at first suppose them to be enemies) they fired a volley and drawing their swords, rushed at the horsemen. The latter thereupon charged them, and as they fought to the last, refusing quarter, killed them all. One sirdar and four horses were killed in the fight, and two horses and two sirdars wounded, the latter mortally."

"Honour be to their courage," wrote the General in orders; "more honour to their conquerors. Another laurel leaf has been added to the rich wreath of Jacob's Horse. Quarter was repeatedly offered to those stern gladiators, but they refused and every robber bit the dust." He added in "after orders," "Soldiers, there are different kinds of glory—the glory of battle and the glory of endurance. Of the first, the little to be gleaned was carried away by Salter, Jacob, and their companions." The campaign had closed with the practical blockade of the central stronghold of the enemy. Sir William Napier represents Truckee as shrouded in mystery, on which Jacob dryly remarks that he had been there repeatedly in the Billamore expedition. The hostile chiefs came into camp to surrender, and Beja, who had escaped for the time, afterwards gave in his submission.

CHAPTER X

JACOB'S MILITARY FRONTIER METHODS

THE Sind Horse returned to Hyderabad in April, after an absence of seven months. Jacob had previously formulated proposals for doubling the corps by recruiting a second regiment. These proposals had been favourably entertained by the Governor-General: in the main they were strenuously backed by Sir Charles Napier, but minor points were to be weighed and the decision had been deferred. Now the negotiations were resumed in earnest. The chief difficulty had been Jacob's persistence in claiming the command of both regiments. He realised the value of his own commanding personality, and went so far as to threaten to resign, rather than accept divided responsibility. That the supreme authority, with great reluctance, assented to his wishes, opposed as they were to all military precedents, is the best proof of the estimation in which he was already held, and of the ascendency he had asserted over the men most capable of appreciating his merits. The correspondence between Hyderabad, Calcutta, and Bombay is lengthy and involved. Jacob puts his views very clearly in a letter to Napier: "What I want is to be the real com-

mander, on whom everything centres, or else to have nothing to do with the matter. . . . I do not write hastily, but have considered the matter well. Let us be a regiment of eight squadrons: you can always detach as many of these squadrons as you please, but whatever distance may separate the corps, let us be one as regards command, with one chain of authority throughout." Another point he pressed was more open to exception and it was put more tentatively. He *considered* that four European officers would be sufficient for the whole corps. Seeming to bear a charmed life himself, he appeared to *consider* that every one else was invulnerable and immortal: and moreover, he had a firm faith in those native officers whom he had deemed deserving of promotion. That was the blot his enemies were keen to note, when he was broaching those unpopular schemes for the reorganisation of the Bengal army, which, if they had been adopted, with modifications might have averted the Mutiny. Such, at least, was the opinion of experts like Frere and Outram.

Sir Charles announced, on the 28th of November, that the matter was practically settled, and it will be seen that the advice he gives had been anticipated in Jacob's ultimatum: "You are now the real commander and everything centres in you; in fact, the two regiments form the two wings of one regiment which takes all its orders from the chief. You should give nothing to the second except as the second in command. . . . I would go further; I would order your two seconds to fall in, sometimes in command of one regiment, sometimes of another. . . . If you like, to give more unity, I will order them to be

called Jacob's Sind Horse, which, in fact, is correct, for they are not to be united except under you. I am inclined to order you to recruit at once."

But that day the single regiment had sudden orders to march to Roree, in consequence of war having broken out on the Sutlej, and so the recruiting was deferred. It remained for some months in Bhawulpoor, when, on the breaking up of the Indus field force, it returned to Hyderabad. But while at Bhawulpoor the order had been received for raising the new regiment, and the Governor-General "deemed it expedient that for the present it shall be under the command of Captain Jacob that he might superintend the formation and drill." The "for the present" was well understood to be a concession to precedents, from which, as the Governor-General observed, "he had been induced in this single instance to depart, out of regard to Captain Jacob's reputation and services." For be it remembered that all this time, and with the many practical proofs of the esteem in which he was held by the authorities, Jacob had not even a brevet majority, as he had in vain applied for the Companionship of the Bath. No sooner had the regiment returned to Hyderabad, than Lieutenant Malcolm was sent to recruit in the Deccan. Jacob had already come to the conclusion that Belooch and Pathan were "untrustworthy and abominably vicious," and thenceforth, as he repeatedly insists, his corps was invariably recruited from the fighting races of Central and Southern India.

In January, 1847, there is a curt notice in the regimental Records which indicates the turning-point of his career. The dashing leader of light horse, temporarily

turned into a political by Sir Charles Napier, was permanently transferred to the sphere in which he was to make his mark as statesman, diplomatist, and administrator. "Under instructions from Colonel Forbes, commanding at Shikarpoor, and General Hunter, C.B., commanding in Upper Sind, Captain Jacob assumed command of the frontier." He was to establish his headquarters at Khangur, and the whole of the frontier was to be under his orders, from the Punjaub as far as Shahpoor in Cutchee. He was to do his utmost to cut off marauding parties, but was to respect the territories of the Khan of Khelat and Ali Moorad, unless he entered them in pursuit of robbers. Colonel Forbes added that further instructions were unnecessary, "for I feel confident that with the knowledge you possess of the country and its inhabitants, as also, with your experience and judgment, our frontier will be but little infested by the hill tribes in future."

These sanguine hopes were speedily realised, but it was high time that a strong man was sent to the frontier. Everywhere were desolation and dismay; there was no security for life or property; irrigation was neglected, the canals were choked, and consequently cultivation had almost ceased. The British garrisons, shut up in the mud forts, looked on in impotent inaction. They did not attempt to forage or find food in the neighbourhood: supplies were brought up from Sukkur and Shikarpoor, and the convoys were in constant peril. Sir Charles Napier, after the surrender of the Doombkees and Jekranees, had assigned them lands within the Sind border, in the hope that they would keep watch on the frontier; but the

experiment had been a total failure. The new settlers made plundering expeditions against their hereditary enemies, and these naturally retaliated. Things were at the worst when Jacob reached Khangur in January, and he says that the Boogtees had been in no way weakened by Sir Charles' operations.

Since then they had been outlawed, and a price of five rupees put on the head of every man in the tribe.[1] Having nothing to fear from our garrisons, Sind lay temptingly open to the inroads of the foragers, and their audacity grew with impunity. A month before Jacob's arrival, a body of 1,500 had swept down upon Sind; they passed between the British outposts, marched past within fifteen miles of Shahpoor which was garrisoned by a regiment of Bengal cavalry, and made a clean sweep of all the cattle in those parts. They had counted on the result with such justifiable confidence, that they brought 500 unarmed followers to herd the cattle. Troops tardily came from Shikarpoor to repel the invasion, but the raiders were so strong, and the retreat so orderly, that the pursuers did not venture to attack. It was that scare and loss which caused the sudden determination to send Jacob to the frontier. The very evening before he arrived the Boogtees had plundered a detachment of the

[1] It was a proceeding of which he entirely disapproved, and Sir Henry Green tells a highly characteristic story. He was riding as Lieutenant with the Commandant when they were met by a man with a sack on his shoulder. The sack was opened and the bearer produced a couple of heads, waiting with complacent satisfaction for payment in ready money. "Tie him up and give him two dozen lashes," was Jacob's acknowledgment, and a very independent act of discipline it was, considering that the man had only responded to a proclamation of the Governor.

Baggage Corps, and this, he says, was their last successful exploit at pillaging in Sind.

At Khangur there was neither village nor bazaar, but a half dozen of miserable huts sheltering twenty-four souls. "The cavalry detachment was found locked up in the fort, the gate not being opened at eight o'clock in the morning, and this was the normal state of things." A more dismal quarter, as it then was, it is impossible to conceive. It was on the edge of an almost rainless desert, with scarcely a sign of vegetation stretching over an area of some 4,000 square miles, and where showers, when they do fall, are followed by fever. The atmosphere in the summer is like the blast from a furnace, and the summer lasts for a full half of the year. The monsoon never reaches Upper Sind. The thermometer has been known to rise to 145°, and in the cooler nights the average temperature is 94°. The district was visited by such dust storms as have been described, not unfrequently accompanied by the deadly simoon. Yet it was there Jacob spent nine years of his life, completing a service of seventeen years in Sind. Never once did he ask for long leave, and indeed he had neither the leisure nor the money for recreation. Each shilling of his modest pay and allowances—no soldier ever more disinterestedly pleaded for an increase—was spent on the regiment, on gun experiments or on books, or in the city which was springing up under his supervision.

Jacob summarily revolutionised the system. By his first order all idea of passive defence was to be abandoned; each detachment was to be posted in the plain without defensive works of any kind; the country was to

A Chief of the Boogtees, with his two Sons, and other noted Border Robbers.

From a photograph in Sir Henry Green's collection.

be patrolled in every direction from which an enemy might be expected, and those patrols were to cross and meet so often that support was certain to be at hand if wanted. The patrols kept guard along the frontier line and were sent to distances of forty miles within the desert. Jacob says, in a memoir on his proceedings up to the close of 1847—

"Wherever a party of the Sind Horse came on any of the plunderers, it always fell on them at once, charging any number, however superior, without the smallest hesitation.

"Against such sudden attacks the robber horsemen never attempted a stand; they always fled at once, frequently sustaining heavy loss in men and never succeeding in obtaining any plunder.

"These proceedings, and particularly the tracks, daily renewed, of our parties all over the desert and in all the watering-places near the hills, far beyond the British border, alarmed the robbers and prevented their ever feeling safe, and they soon ceased to make attempts on the British territory, though still plundering all Cutchee."

He remarked in another memorandum that frontier works against predatory tribes were most pernicious. "They proclaim that we are afraid and provoke attack. A frontier cannot be so protected. Unless indeed, like the Romans in Britain, you can afford to build a wall from end to end, and defend your fortifications as the Romans did, with some 400 men for every mile."

He had paid minute attention to the mounting and equipment of his men. The regiment's reputation had been established; there were numerous applicants for any

vacancy, and dismissal from the ranks was so severe a punishment that offences were almost unknown.[1] It was organised on principles that seem absurdly economical, though provisions and horseflesh were cheap. The men, as we have said, had to provide everything for themselves, and the pay was but thirty rupees a month. They mounted themselves and had no extra allowance except for a horse killed in action. They had to arrange for the transport of their own baggage, and as the baggage animals were their own property, they took the best possible care of them. There were regimental transport animals besides to carry bedding, cooking utensils, and tents for the few sybarites who indulged in them, with a certain amount of food and forage, but no vehicles were allowed. "No wheeled carriage is to be *hired* under any circumstances." Jacob reported to the Adjutant-General in 1853, that he had never restricted the amount of baggage as he compelled officers and men to provide their own transport. "My rules are enforced by heavy fines, but for many years everything has worked perfectly smoothly, and the last instance of a soldier being fined occurred more than five years ago, the offender being an officer lately received from the Regular cavalry." Within an hour after the trumpets had sounded, the men would be ready to march, and even when ordered on a distant campaign, no preparations were necessary. For example, on September 25, 1848, orders were received to detach 500 sabres for service in Mooltan, and the regiment had

[1] At a later period sons and nephews of the troopers were understood to have priority of claim, and it may be added, on the authority of Sir Henry Green, that as much as £800 was offered for a place in the ranks.

started at daybreak next morning. On one occasion a staff officer arrived at Khangur bringing an order to march immediately, when Jacob and his officers were sitting down to tiffin. "After tiffin," was the answer. The officer reminded him that the order was to march immediately. "After tiffin," was repeated brusquely. And after tiffin the assembly sounded, when in a few minutes the force was mounted and *en route.*

The arms were a double-barrelled carbine slung to the saddle—the native officers had double-barrelled pistols besides—and a well-tempered sabre broad and curved. Jacob had discarded thrusting weapons, for he had proved by personal experience that when a man is run through the body the sword will either break or unhorse the swordsman before it can be withdrawn. The uniform was a stout green coat coming below the knee, with pantaloons of the same material, and long jackboots of English leather. In the winter the men wore sheepskin jackets. Each trooper carried his ropes, pegs, &c., with three days' provisions for horse and man. Above all and most indispensable in the flying desert expeditions, under the belly of the horse and attached to the girths, was a leathern mussack containing two gallons of water.

The water supply was, indeed, the first consideration at the posts as on the march. It is the subject of Jacob's first despatch to the commandant at Shikarpoor on the day of his arrival.

"KHANGUR, *January 9th.*

"I have the honour to report that I this day arrived at Khangur. . . . I have the honour to bring to your notice

that the wells in this place are quite incapable of supplying water for the number of men and horses here. . . . I shall lose no time in doing my best to improve the supply, but meanwhile I fear my horses will suffer much."

From the brackish well that yielded most freely they drew up the body of an old woman. Another passage is suggestive of the prompt measures he adopted to guard against surprise. "Two men, by name Dil Morad and Meeral, have been engaged at twenty rupees per month, with fourteen horsemen, to watch the watering-places between Meerpoor and the hills, and if they do their duty properly no party of robbers can move towards Sind without timely information to the different posts. These men's posts are dangerous, and their duties can only be performed by bold men of the same habits and appearance as the robbers, and not generally known to be in our service." Jacob had absolute discretion in everything except expenditure, for the authorities always kept a tight hand on the purse. What he did was accomplished with most inadequate means. The wells at the outposts were immediately put in repair, but his next trouble was with the Belooch settlers. These incorrigible marauders had been plundering on an extensive scale, "unknown to the Commissioner residing among them." Jacob was as unsparing in his criticisms of the incompetent civil officers as of the soldiers who had shut themselves up in the strong places. Sir Charles had hoped he had drawn the teeth of the settlers by forcing them to sell their horses. Jacob discovered that the sales were fictitious, for the

ownership of each horse was a joint-stock concern. So the nominal vendor remained a sleeping partner, knowing where to put his hand on his horse when he wanted him. The men slipped across the frontier by twos or threes, to find the horses ready and gathered to a trysting-place. Mustering to the number of a hundred or more, they made a dash into the hills, dividing the spoil beyond the border and returning peacefully after concealing their arms, to their homes.

"The existence of these proceedings had never been suspected, and when pointed out at first they were thought impossible; but having good information, Major Jacob"—he is writing in the third person—"caused the places of these predatory rendezvous to be suddenly surrounded just after the return of a body of plunderers from a foray; the robbers were all secured, with their horses, arms, and a large quantity of stolen cattle. Concealment was no longer possible, and Major Jacob received permission to disarm every man in the country, which was at once done.

"At the same time Major Jacob set 500 of these Jekranees to clear the Noorwah Canal. They were very awkward at first, but were strong, energetic, cheerful, and good-natured. They soon became used to the tools, and were then able to do a better day's work, and earn more pay than the ordinary Sind labourers. . . Soon afterwards the settlers took to manual labour in their own fields, with spirit and even pride. From that time they were really conquered and reformed. They were now"—this was written in 1855—"the most hard-working, industrious, well-behaved, cheerful men in all Sind.

. . . For three years past not a man of them has been accused of any crime, great or small, yet seven or eight years ago they were the terror of the country, murderers and robbers to a man."

At first there were sundry sharp skirmishes, and the robbers had disagreeable surprises. Within ten days a patrol of eighteen sowars, under a Duffedar, came on a party quietly seated, but they had taken the precaution of posting a vidette, and had timely notice to mount. The Sind horsemen charged, but they had to leap a nullah where three of them came to grief. "The Duffedar with the remainder of the party, getting over as he could, fell boldly on the marauders, who fled without striking a blow. The sowars pursued for about seven miles, cutting down or shooting five or six of the robbers, but night coming on no more could be done." These Boogtees belied the tribal reputation for pluck, as they numbered nearly 200. They broke and rode for the hills in three bands, throwing away their matchlocks to lighten their flight. No sooner did Jacob hear of the affair than he was in the saddle, sending out two troops and heading in person the squadron which, making a long circuit, sought to cut off the fugitives from the upper hills. As might have been expected, he missed his men, but the display of energy was not wasted. A leader who would pass a day and a night on horseback on the bare chance of making a capture, was a novelty, and a man to be dreaded by robbers who had with impunity been driving cattle within sight of the British stockades. General Hunter wrote acknowledging the report: "Dear Jacob, I was very much delighted at the success of your people, for last

year I believe the 3rd Cavalry never sent out a patrol. No wonder looters came in every direction, but I feel quite satisfied that they will now give over troubling our frontier; let them go elsewhere if they please." The Duffedar got full credit, and was thanked in public orders. These native officers were all picked men, promoted for merit, and, except on a single point, their commandant trusted them implicitly. Many of them were of good birth and means, sprung from a race of robber chiefs who regarded guerilla warfare as the chief pleasure of life. Where they were apt to fail was in their headlong impetuosity; in moments of perilous emergency they got drunk with the joy of battle, and risked their men in deeds of reckless foolhardiness.

Another characteristic incident was the recovery of some stolen camels. The camels were carried off from a watering-place thirty-five miles from the nearest post, so that the thieves had a long start. They did not reckon with the promptitude or persistency of the pursuit. The Jemadar came on the tracks and followed them for seventy miles over stone and rocks, for the Sind trackers are almost equal in skill to the Australian blacks. Then they sighted and recovered the camels, though the robbers saved themselves in the hills. Shut out from Sind, the irrepressible marauders had been making incursions on the plains of Cutchee. Jacob stretched his commission from General Hunter—who had, indeed, left everything to his discretion—and did not let them altogether "go elsewhere if they pleased." Merewether from Shahpoor gave support to the Khyberees, and inspirited them into standing on their own defence. At last he had an oppor-

tunity of making a terrible example. Seven hundred Boogtees came down from the hills to plunder. He started immediately with 130 troopers to intercept them. The robber force was literally annihilated ; 600 men were slain and the rest taken prisoners. The strength of the tribe was completely broken, and the surviving chiefs came into Khangur to surrender at discretion. With the greater part of their tribe, they were transported to lands near Larkhana. Jacob observes in his report : "The loss of life has been terrific, but it is satisfactory to know that the men slain were robbers and murderers, who were the terror of all peaceable persons within their reach, and whose cruelties were sometimes fiendish." Many of the exiles, on their urgent petition, were permitted to return to their native hills three years afterwards, and some of the best of the fighting men were enlisted in the British service. Jacob drew up a "Memorandum on the principles of his procedure." The main points were :—1. Always acting on the offensive. 2. Robbery and murder treated as equally criminal whether the victim be a British subject or not. 3. Blood feud considered an aggravating circumstance as proving deliberate malice. 4. The highest moral ground always taken, treating the depredators as disreputable persons with whom it is a disgrace for respectable persons to have any dealings, and whom all good men must, as a matter of course, look on as objects of pity, not of dread : of hatred possibly, but never of fear ; and the feeling to be instilled into every soldier that he was a good man against a criminal. 5. So far as possible, a perfect system of intelligence. 6. The strictest justice. "And this," as he

THE SIND IRREGULAR HORSE.

From an engraving after a picture by H. Martens, 1849, *in Sir Bartle Frere's collection.*

sums it up, "is the essence of the whole business." "Our first year on the border," he says, "was one of enormous bodily labour. With only a single regiment on the frontier, we had literally to lie down to rest with our boots and swords on for many months together." At first he pushed his outposts up to the hills; but as the country was quieted he withdrew them, with the exception of some Belooch guides. "Having by the use of force made ourselves feared and respected, we were able to apply better means and appeal to higher motives. This I had in view from the first."

The country, as he found it, he described as a desert, wholly destitute of permanent inhabitants, and a great part of the year without water: the water naturally in the soil being as salt as that of the sea, while the average rainfall did not amount to an inch per annum. "The difficulties to be overcome were great; but knowing the excellence of my officers and men, and confident in the support of all under me, I thought them not insuperable, and the result has justified my opinion." He could write in 1854: "On the formerly desert border there are now always supplies for an army. . . . Where there was formerly only sufficient brackish water for a squadron of Horse, there are now tanks and wells affording an unlimited supply of excellent fresh water. . . . Roads and bridges have been constructed by me all over the country, amounting altogether to 600 miles in length. Canals have been excavated which are bringing great part of the desert under cultivation. Peace, plenty, and security everywhere prevail in a district where formerly all was terror and disorder on the one hand, or a pitiless, silent desert on the other."

He had obtained permission to supplement his corps with 100 Belooch guides, so as to have reliable information as to what was going on beyond the frontiers. He had obtained it with some difficulty, for he was hampered by parsimony at headquarters. He asked to be allowed to enlist them from the various tribes as he found best, so as to be assured from some personal knowledge of having none but qualified individuals. But though he valued these Belooch as local intelligencers, latterly, as has been said, he would never enlist them in the regiment. There is an interesting memorandum as to his recruiting system which expresses his views with his accustomed decision.

"Supposing recruits to be obtained from the *élite* of the Brahooees—the Bolan mountaineers—and the Afghans, I am of opinion that enlisting such men would be found in the highest degree injudicious and injurious. Close association with these people for more than fifteen years, with opportunities of observing and trying them in every way, enables me to write with confidence and certainty. Every Brahooee whom we enlist is certainly a coward, a thief, or a traitor, or probably all three combined. The Afghans are more ferocious, but have far less real courage than the Hindustanee. They have more cunning and less intellect. They have more muscular development with *far less* endurance. Both are absolutely faithless and untrustworthy, whereby they are *never* to be depended upon as soldiers in war. Both are quarrelsome, unruly, and murderous in quarters in peace, and in domestic life are given to most detestable vices, which lead to all manner of evil.

"It is certain that the Mussulmans of Hindustan are altogether superior beings in every way, and incalculably better adapted by nature to make good soldiers. In my opinion, not rashly formed, one good Hindustanee soldier carries as much military power with him as any three of the best of the others. These Afghans are also utterly *faithless*, and we can never feel a just confidence that they will be true in the hour of need. The Hindustanee Mussulman has a high feeling of honour—these men have *none whatever*. Their absolute faithlessness and treachery appear incredible to those who do not know them, and form a startling contrast to the frank open manner, the free, manly bearing, the burly forms and fair faces of these Afghan men. . . . Formerly, when they were in our ranks, I have seen these great, strong, fair-faced warriors *throw themselves from their horses and weep like children* in fatigue, difficulty, and danger, amidst the derision of the Hindustanees, who were always ready to dare or to endure, without a murmur."

He instances the battle of Goojerat where 4,000 picked horsemen of Dost Mahomed, "splendid men on splendid horses, were overthrown, beaten to pieces, and driven from the field with tremendous loss, by 243 Hindustanees of the Irregular Horse," leaving their leaders slain, and losing their standards. Jacob's fiery and impulsive temperament may be noted in his feminine habit of underlining his words. Undoubtedly as he held strong opinions, he was a man of strong prejudices, and his ideas as to the fighting inferiority of the Pathan seems to be traversed by the experiences of his brother Wardens of the Marches in the far North-west. But his own

observation of the natives had been close and interested, and as to the faithlessness of the Pathan he has been in some measure justified, for our old Pathan soldiery, as we have found to our cost, have been fighting against us in recent campaigns, whereas there was never a case of desertion from the Sind Horse,—or an exception proved the rule. He was interested in his observation because it would have been cheaper and easier to enlist the Belooch under his hand than to have sought recruits in Hindustan. We have adverted to the low scale of pay, and it says much for Jacob and the high reputation of his crack cavalry corps that for a time he kept his troops contented. But when shifted to the frontier, in the reaction of spirits after the conquest, the trying service was wearing alike to men, clothing, and horseflesh. He sympathised, and sent a confidential report to headquarters, with cogent reasons for asking an increase of pay. At the same time that report gives an excellent idea of the constitution of the force with which he had achieved so much, after only two or three years of very rough-and-ready training. It is long, but may be condensed in a few sentences. He had raised two irregular regiments and made them virtually regular. They had been organised to combine the mobility and independence of irregulars with the solid strength and steadiness of regulars. He had striven to make them fit for service anywhere, and within his means had succeeded. But his best native officers had been formed in the wild school of the Mahratta war, with the attractions of perfectly irregular service and a higher scale of pay. Many of them in spite of old prejudices and habits were men of much common sense,

and realised the advantages of discipline, freedom from debt, &c., and "seeing the success and honour to which these things lead, they have entered heart and soul into the new order of things." But as many even of the privates were men of family with some private means, they began to be dissatisfied. He does not hint that it was personal attachment which kept them true to the colours, but he implies as much when he says that we may look in vain for a succession of such men at the present rate of pay. "That we have hitherto succeeded so well is owing to the high character we have been so fortunate as to obtain, . . . but there is a limit to this and that limit I think the Sind Horse has attained."

But raising the pay by 50 per cent., as he suggested, was a serious consideration for the Treasury, and there was no immediate decision. Meanwhile as an alternative, and as honours cost nothing, he asked that the designation of the corps might be changed to "Silidar Light Cavalry" —"a distinction which I may say with honest pride and without presumption, we have fairly earned."

CHAPTER XI

CIVIL ADMINISTRATION, AGRICULTURE, AND ENGINEERING

IN the summer of 1848 the troubles in the Punjaub came to a head. There was excitement in all the frontier tribes, yet the Sind border had been so far quieted, that Jacob had orders to detach his 500 sabres to place themselves in communication with the Mooltan field force. They were to be inadequately replaced by a handful of mounted police, yet the detachment marched immediately for Bhawulpoor. Within a day or two came an appeal from Herbert Edwardes, who was mustering what "Lumsden of the Guides" called his wild and irregular army, and from such a man any appeal meant utmost urgency. He announced briefly that the sudden departure of Shere Singh had compelled General Whish to raise the siege of Mooltan, and that the British were standing on the defensive while awaiting reinforcements. "The evil is so serious that I have no hesitation in applying for the services of Jacob's Irregular Horse." The despatch was forwarded with an intimation that had the Horse been under the immediate control of the officer commanding in Upper Sind, the request would have been immediately complied with, but in the

circumstances all must be left to Major Jacob's discretion. Jacob answered that under existing arrangements he dared not further weaken his force, but that by changing his dispositions he believed he could spare for a time not only 500 but 1,000 sabres. Already his administration had borne fruit. "The road lately completed by me along the frontier line, with the posts established at regular distances, have so simplified the business of guarding this frontier generally, that I have no doubt that the above-mentioned arrangement would be found quite sufficient for the temporary protection of the frontier." And the force he considered sufficient was 200 Sind Horse, the 100 raw Belooch guides, and eighty of the Mounted Police. But the opinion of the more cautious heads at head-quarters was that his zeal had outrun his discretion, and with reluctance leave was refused to double Lieut. Merewether's 500 horsemen. Nor was another proposal of his more successful. When he had decided that he could send the bulk of his regiments to Mooltan, he had proposed to take command in person. His offer was refused, though in flattering terms; his services on the frontier were far too valuable to be dispensed with. On calmer reflection he had come to the same conclusion. He wrote that the rumour of his approaching departure was unsettling all minds along the border and beyond, and that consequently he could not quit his post without the full permission of the Commissioner. "But I trust that if the Commissioner can make any satisfactory arrangement to set me free, he will do so, as it is a source of unspeakable mortification to me as well as of injury to the corps, that for the first time during the seven

years I have had the honour to command the Sind Irregular Horse, my men should proceed to active warfare without their Commandant at their head."

No such arrangement could be made. There were increasing unrest and trouble, and with the reduced frontier guard his hands were more than full. Merewether had gone in command of the detachment, for Malcolm, his senior, had been invalided, with a warm tribute to his services. But the news of the march reached Bombay before he embarked; he threw up his sick leave, and more fortunate than his chief, hurried back to lead the detachment to Mooltan. His letters from the Punjaub, accompanying his formal reports, show the cordial relations between the Commandant and his subalterns. One of these letters was scribbled the day after the battle of Goojerat, and describes the dashing exploit which has already been adverted to. Jacob, devouring his heart in relative inaction, must have read it with very mingled feelings.

"DEAR JACOB,—Yesterday we were under arms at seven o'clock. The battle commenced at eight, and the Sikh was in full flight by two o'clock. The cavalry and artillery followed him up for fifteen miles until sunset, and we did not get back till ten o'clock; we are off again, so you must excuse more. Our men behaved splendidly; were ordered by Sir Joseph Thackwell in person to charge and turn the enemy's right flank, who was then attempting to turn our left with some 4,000 horse and some guns. We did this with our 240 men, and I can assure you our conduct was the admiration of all. They

sent the Afghans to the devil—cutting them down and potting them with their carbines. . . . We were an hour after the charge complimented by Sir J. Thackwell in person, and Lord Gough is in raptures."

But when his Lordship's despatch as to the battle appeared, the excited officers were proportionately disgusted, and on that occasion it was Merewether who, in boiling indignation, addressed his sympathetic commander. The hot-headed Irish Commander-in-chief was no great scribe, and probably one of his staff was responsible. "A more tame production I have seldom seen—cram-full of lies as usual—and most things that really happened have been fearfully perverted. General Thackwell, though fully aware that none of the 9th Lancers charged with us, deliberately says one squadron did and a second acted as a reserve." Thereupon ensued a warm correspondence as to the apportionment of glory with which we need not concern ourselves. The detachment marched with the army of the Punjaub to encamp through the hot season at the mouth of the Khyber, returning to Khangur in January, 1850.

Outram sent a note of warm congratulation from Aden; he was then on his way to Egypt on sick leave.

"*March 28th.*

"MY DEAR JACOB,—I was never better pleased than when I read the despatches on the last battle to see that your brave boys had had the opportunity to show what they are made of, or rather what you have made of them. The *result* was matter of course. I was sure they would attack and cut their way through *any* enemy, whether

Sikhs or Afghans. Gloriously they did so, showing even her Majesty's dragoons how to do their duty. I have written a short note of congratulation to Malcolm. Oh, how I wish I had been up with Lord Gough as an amateur; I certainly should have been at Malcolm's side on that charge."

The temporary weakening of the frontier force was followed by the natural consequences. Unsatisfactory reports came in from all sides, and for the first and only time one of Jacob's posts was attacked and nearly surprised. While his attention was directed towards Cutchee, a muster of the eastern mountaineers marched on Kusmoor by unfrequented routes and assailed the feeble detachment there. The onset was repulsed after sharp fighting and with considerable loss. Jacob received something like a reprimand, which touched him on a sensitive point. He wrote to the Commissioner: "However humble my ability, it has been my constant endeavour to remedy its defects by the utmost exertion of vigour and ability. Since I have commanded on this frontier I have never been absent from duty for an hour. I trusted that the invariable success which has attended the Sind Horse in guarding the border would have sufficed to have convinced Government that the leader of the troops was not wanting in the qualifications for dealing successfully with such clever, enterprising, and ever-watchful enemies as are the predatory tribes; and I cannot adequately express my regret at finding that Government considers that in performance of the duty, neither vigilance nor caution have been displayed on our part."

With the Government as with the marauders, it was his habit to carry the war into the enemy's country, and indirectly to convict unfriendly officials of gross ignorance. "Government does not appear to be aware that the neighbourhood of Kusmoor is covered with forest and tall reeds, so that as the posts are sixteen miles distant from each other, no amount of vigilance or caution could have prevented what occurred on the occasion. If want of conduct has been shown, it is chargeable to me only, not to the native officers and men, who have done all that men could do." But the officials had learned that it was dangerous to enter into controversy with a man whose exhaustive local knowledge was backed up by incisive arguments. They hastened to make the *amende honorable*, and soothe his wounded feelings. Not long afterwards a brigadier came to inspect the regiment. He reported it was "perfect, the *beau ideal* of a corps of irregular cavalry; that in every single respect, without exception, he finds it absolutely perfect; that there is no room for improvement."

We have seen that Jacob identified himself with his corps and always accepted absolute responsibility. We have said that though he appreciated and encouraged zeal, his difficulty was in restraining headlong impetuosity. The year 1850 was uneventful for the frontiers of Sind, but an incident is reported which gives a good idea of the determined spirit which the leader had imparted to his troopers. In December a party of plunderers had carried off a number of camels from the jungle near Kundkote.

"On the information reaching the post, the officer in

command of the detachment there, Jemadar Doorgah Singh, proceeded in pursuit with a Duffedar and fifteen men of the Sind Horse and four of the Belooch guides. The Jemadar having found the tracks of the robbers, followed them at a rapid gallop to Sunree, near which place he came in sight of the marauders, about fifteen in number, who abandoning the camels, continued their flight. The Jemadar had now proceeded thirty miles at a gallop, and at such speed that already seven horses of his party had fallen dead, he having himself ridden two horses to death; but not content with recovering the stolen camels, he now mounted a third horse and determined to continue the pursuit; accordingly he kept up with the rest of the party till he had arrived far within the hills; the enemy now again appeared, augmented by a fresh party of horsemen and forty or fifty men on foot, while the Jemadar had with him but two sowars, and one of the Belooch guides, the horses of all the rest having failed long before. The guide entreated the Jemadar to give up the pursuit and return, as the enemy were very numerous, while he had no men with him, and the ground was such that even fresh horses could scarcely move among the rocks and ravines. Doorgah Singh replied that if the guide were afraid he might retire; but for himself he should be ashamed to show his face to me, if after coming in sight of the robbers he should retire without killing some of them.

"He then, with his two sowars, and followed by the guide went straight at the enemy. The latter surrounded them in overwhelming numbers, pulled the Jemadar and sowars from their horses and literally cut them in pieces,

RISALDAR MOHBUT KHAN, OF THE SIND IRREGULAR HORSE.
From an engraving after a portrait by A. Svoboda, 1852, in Sir Bartle Frere's collection.

though not until they had killed or disabled some fifteen of the mountaineers. The Belooch guide alone contrived to escape, very severely wounded, as also was his mare, and was, with the dismounted men and others of the party, together with the recovered camels, brought back by parties from the other posts, who had also proceeded in pursuit."

The reckless chivalry of the Jemadar appealed to Jacob, and although as a veteran soldier he disapproved the insanity of the venture, after all, it was but an exuberant excess of the spirit he had successfully fostered. He remarks in his report: "The Jemadar was a most excellent and intelligent officer. I cannot account for the excessive and almost mad rashness of his proceedings on this occasion; he was an old soldier, he came to me very highly recommended, and deserved even more than was said of him. His death is a serious loss to the service, and while lamenting the folly of his conduct, I cannot help feeling the highest admiration of his invincible determination and undaunted courage."

With the enfeebled frontier guard matters of police would have sufficed to preoccupy most men. But Jacob, from the first, had thrown himself into the work of pacifying the country by promoting prosperity. It was no light task to turn hereditary marauders into peaceful tillers of the soil and to persuade them to earn wages by honest work; yet his efforts, wonderfully successful as they were, had not met with the encouragement he might have hoped for. During a sort of interregnum between the departure of Sir Charles Napier and the arrival of Sir Bartle Frere, Upper Sind had been

administered by Mr. Pringle, a well-meaning civilian of long experience, but a slave to routine, and slow to appreciate the unfamiliar conditions of a wild and unsettled territory. Jacob's relations with him had been unsatisfactory, and it was no matter of regret when he resigned. Jacob had good reason to congratulate himself on relief from friction with the choice of a successor. Lord Falkland, the Governor of Bombay, with rare intuition had pitched upon Mr. Frere in the face of strong opposition. For Frere was comparatively a young man, and he superseded some sixty seniors who conceived they had superior claims to the most important and lucrative post in the Presidency. But Lord Falkland had his way and was fully justified. Frere was a born administrator, with broad views and far-sighted prescience, deliberate in council as he was decided in action. Like Jacob, when once he had satisfied himself as to the capacity and experience of his subordinates, he was willing to give their suggestions the most generous consideration and accord them unflinching support. There was nothing of penny-wisdom in his policy—the fault of which Jacob had hitherto to complain. The arrival of the new Commissioner gave him fresh spirit. They might differ occasionally on minor points, but now he was sure of sympathy and support in all well-considered schemes for the amelioration of his subjects. At first only formal communications were exchanged, but very soon they dropped into unreserved correspondence.

Frere had disembarked at Kurrachee in January, 1851, and losing little time, he paid a visit of inspection to

Khangur. Jacob had taken the opportunity to interest him in public works, and the report the Commissioner sent the Governor of Bombay was to urge the claims of canals and irrigation. He pressed them by bearing cordial testimony to what had already been achieved. The districts within our borders were absolutely pacified. Single and unarmed travellers were safe, villages had been rebuilt, and heavy crops were being raised by peasants who had hitherto feared to stir out of their villages. The progress of the past gave promise of prosperity in the future with assurance that the administrator's estimates might be trusted and that enterprises apparently speculative were sound. What Frere was pushing now, on Jacob's recommendation, was the deepening and widening of the Begaree Canal so as to extend the area of irrigation or rather to re-extend it, for, as Mr. Frere writes, if Jacob's proposals were adopted, the district between Shikarpoor and the desert might become again, as in more prosperous times, a sheet of cultivation. So just was that calculation, that Jacob could report a year or two afterwards, that the hard-and-fast margin of the desert was no longer to be traced, for arable fields and rich meadows had been everywhere encroaching on inhospitable sand. Mr. Frere points out that the soil though naturally good was sterilised, when untilled, by the impregnation of salt, so that the very wells had become either salt or brackish. The remedy was in tillage and irrigation with fresh water. Expenditure would be more than repaid by increase of revenue. "But it is not only in increased revenue that the benefit will be felt; the better supply of drinking

water and better grazing of pasture will tell indirectly but very decidedly on the prosperity of the cultivators. Still more decided will be the moral effect on the people, and it will give the means of subsistence to many thousands, and thereby strengthen our Government, more especially with the colonists from the reclaimed hill-tribes." He gave one striking example. A notorious robber chief taken in the Truckee campaign had been liberated and had settled near Khangur. He had obtained a great grant of waste lands. Thither he had summoned all the idle Belooch from his old domain, setting them to work on digging out old canals and damming. "This has been done by men who ten years ago would rather have starved than touched a spade or hoe, and yet, when visited by Major Jacob, they seemed as proud of their work as they would formerly have been of a successful foray."

Such were the facts as Jacob had grasped them from the beginning, and he only wanted a backer like Frere to assist him in carrying out his schemes. It was a great thing that Frere had the ear of the Bombay Government, for the financial difficulty was for ever cropping up, and involved an infinity of wearisome correspondence. The keepers of the purse naturally desired to work remote and semi-barbarous districts with severe economy, striving their utmost to balance the budget from year to year. Jacob and Frere were alike persuaded that wise liberality was the best economy. So it was that they set their faces to put down forced labour, and to encourage reclamation and trade by moderate taxation or bounties. In his "Views and Opinions" Jacob has left elaborate

arguments in explanation of his methods. He is always decided as to forced labour. "I would respectfully observe that the advantages and disadvantages appear to me to depend on those laws of political economy which are as well established as the truths of geometry." A certain amount of labour has to be performed by the inhabitants of a country to make it productive; in Sind the labour is canal-clearing and irrigation work. The capital of the country may be represented by the labour available. "Forcing men to work without pay, or with insufficient pay, disgusts them with labour; drives them into idleness; excites ill-feeling; produces a great amount of crime, disorder, and disaffection, and thus destroys a great proportion of the capital and therefore of the revenue of the country."

With so much to pre-occupy him, he showed his habitual capacity for detail. In place of dealing with a headman, leaving opportunity for abuses and embezzlement, he made a practice of dividing the works into small portions of some ten rupees' worth, and contracting for each with a simple labourer. "So a man and his family can get through a surprising amount of work, while the least possible superintendence is required. Even the little children do something, while each member of the family works at any time of the day he pleases; and I have often observed the people continuing their task all night." In fact, he diverted the acquisitiveness of the tribes from predatory into peaceful channels, "and the more they got the more they coveted, now that their little property was secured to them." The development of the irrigation automatically increased his revenue, for a

water rate was levied on the lands reclaimed. At the same time the Zemindars were encouraged to clear out their own canals, for in that case no rates were exacted.

His roadmaking involved the construction of bridges, exercising his talents as architect and engineer. Sir Charles Napier had complained that there were no skilled workmen to be found in Northern Sind. If Jacob did not find, he speedily formed them under his own personal supervision. "I set to work, after a fashion of my own, without establishments, without any aid whatever, and with the people of the country alone. The result is that now (1854) a country which was almost impassable, is traversed with ease, at all seasons, in every direction. And the work has been accomplished in one year at very trifling cost." As lime was scarce he had generally to work without it. His bridges were built of bricks, fitted and morticed with mud. Forced to dispense with concreted paving as too costly, he covered his bricks or masonry with solid earth. The most frequented bridges near camps or towns were thickly strewed with stable litter; consolidating with the earth into an elastic mass, it stood the wear of traffic better than anything else, and that ingenious idea was all his own. But though his reforms were far-reaching they were sagely regulated. His roads sufficed for camels or horses, but they were unsuited to wheel carriages with iron tires. On such a soil, with the torrid climate, wheels would soon have ground his highways into impalpable powder, many inches in depth. Moreover, iron-tired wheels must have revolutionised native society; they would have necessitated the establishment of forges in each little village, with

the skilled smiths who were not forthcoming: "It involves also the existence of increased capital, new wants and improved habits." All that might come in time; meanwhile he was content to wait. The rough carts of the country suited it better than any he could have substituted. "They are rude and noisy; at first sight they seem ridiculous; but they can be constructed in any village at a cost of four or five rupees, while the loads they carry are as heavy as could well be drawn by a pair of bullocks."

With all his indefatigable energy, his motto was *Festina lente;* he had his decided views on political economy as on everything else, and he drew the line in accordance with his fixed opinions. He encouraged the agriculture that had been neglected or abandoned, by giving the peasants assurance of peace and supplying them with a sufficiency of water. But having done so much, he left them to themselves, and would not push paternal government so far as to offer premiums for special produce— such as indigo or linseed in particular districts. He held that interference of the sort disorganised natural markets, and by disturbing the free adjustment of demand and supply, tended in the end to defeat its object. "The fair profits of farming in an open market are the sole legitimate stimulants of an extended cultivation."

The peasants of the plains paid water rates on their crops and could well afford to do so, now that they were protected from raids. But the hillmen in their barren uplands were chafing against the curb, and might break loose again, and at any moment, in one of the periodical forays. They lived or starved on their precarious crops

and the produce of their half-wild cattle, like the Scottish highlanders before their last rebellion. Jacob began by exempting them from any tax on their fields, and then gave his collectors special charge concerning them, remarkable for its benevolent sagacity.

"I instructed the collector . . . that I should not deem it advisable to levy any tax, even should cultivation be extended; but that the hill tracts were chiefly valuable as grazing-lands, and that we might do something towards ameliorating the condition of the hillmen, by assisting them to construct a few wells or bunds for supplying their cattle and themselves with water; by endeavouring to introduce into their villages or grazing districts some form of patelship; by ascertaining, registering, and *perhaps* levying some slight capitation tax upon the cattle; and by opening up roads through the more frequented villages, to enable the hillmen to bring the produce of their flocks and herds readily to market.

"With the object of more accurately ascertaining the social statistics of this region, I supplied the collector with a form of statement, showing the name of every village, tract or valley; the names of the chief men, and approximate estimate of the numbers of inhabitants; the size and description of boundaries; the number of flocks and herds; and the number of wells. But, above all, I impressed on him the necessity of bearing in mind throughout these proceedings with the people of the hill tracts, that they are essentially a pastoral, and, therefore, in some degree a nomadic race, and that no attempt should be made towards compelling them to have recourse to agriculture; on the contrary, that they

should be left wholly free to chose their own mode of life, as circumstances might permit.

"The staple wealth of these districts naturally consists in flocks and herds. These, together with ghee, wool, and other pastoral produce, they can exchange for the more varied commodities of the plains, thereby commanding the supplies of distant markets at a less cost than they could be produced for at home; and I think that our object should be to promote these interchanges, by means of improved communications, and thus gradually to create, among these half-civilised races, new wants, increased productiveness, and a higher social condition. By thus encouraging its natural development, we should tend to supply wants now much felt in the plains. And as the hill region lies along our western frontier, we should, by civilising and attaching to us its wild people, tend to cause a corresponding extension of wholesome English influence among exterior tribes, and so, permanently and by the most unexceptionable means, to strengthen our front, whether for peaceful or warlike operations."

The water supply was at the bottom of everything—it was a question of health as well as wealth. Even where the wells were fairly copious they were, for the most part, impregnated with salt. Tank-digging to catch the overflow of the inundations of the Indus was tried, and proved a marvellous success. The experimental tank, Jacob writes, "has proved a very great blessing to the people. One of the wells of the neighbourhood into which the river water was not turned, purposely to try the percolation of the tank, has been rendered perfectly

sweet, whereas before it was brackish. The tank itself contained water two months after the subsidence of the inundation, and if dug deeper would never be dry. Of course it is not lined with masonry." The indirect effects of the increased cultivation were remarkable. Jacob writes so early as 1851—a few years later he might have spoken much more strongly:—

"My previous remarks regarding the boundary line on this frontier, and the advantage of having the political to coincide with the geographical boundary of the desert, were founded on the supposed permanency of the latter. No change appeared to have occurred between the time of my first visiting the desert and that of recording my opinion—an interval of twelve years. According to the traditions of the natives, no important change had occurred for nearly a century, and its limits appeared to me to be as permanent as that of the sea shore. It now, however, seems that the desert is partially disappearing, and that its line is no certain boundary. I attribute this disappearance in part to the greatly increased cultivation along the border, which tends to augment the fall of rain. It is true the natives attribute this fall to the blessing of God, which may be true enough; but the secondary cause is cultivation. And I anticipate that if peace and quiet continue, and a few more such seasons as the last occur, a great part of that which was formerly a desert will become arable or pasture land."

No man was more ready with the sword, or swifter to strike in case of necessity; but no soldier was ever more essentially pacific. He laid stress on the truth



TANK AT JACOBABAD, EXCAVATED BY JACOB'S ORDER, AND FILLED WITH WATER BROUGHT BY CANAL FROM THE INDUS, SIXTY MILES AWAY.

that it is moral rather than physical force which is required to control predatory tribes. "Justice, honesty, high principles, unswerving firmness, and force without violence, succeed best with these men. If we imitate their crimes, on pretence of retaliation, we only perpetuate the evil. . . . If the trade of marauder be proved to be unsuccessful and disreputable, it soon provokes the ridicule of all." As he sternly suppressed the trade of marauder, so he gave generous encouragement to all peaceful pursuits. His "Revenue Settlement" was the embodiment of his conviction that the British in India, with the best intentions, are too apt to perpetuate exactions and abuses. The people had been overtaxed, and consequently progress was crippled. "They have no surplus, no room for growth, no spare cash wherewith to indulge any wish, even for the cheapest luxury. Hard-and-fast rules are inapplicable to the circumstances of different districts and soils of varying quality." Therefore he instructed his subordinates to go carefully into detail, and he limited fixed demands to what each piece of land would bear. Above all, he would have no hard-and-fast water-tax; the rent payable was regulated on the returns of the irrigated acreage.

Considering that the whole country had long been desolate and lying waste, the titles to lands might have caused infinite trouble. Many of the landowners had been slaughtered years before, and most had abandoned the fields, where, if they sowed, they would seldom reap. Jacob solved the question by a common-sense settlement. He classed all lands under three headings:—1. Those that were waste and derelict. 2. Those lying waste, but

wholly or partially claimed. 3. Those that were still under some sort of cultivation. The first he appropriated as representing the Crown, instructing his officers to grant longer or shorter leases under certain conditions. As a rule the leases were short, in the assurance that rents must rise. As to the second class, there should be examination into the validity of titles, and the claimant should either undertake to cultivate himself or to find lessees under his guarantee of the land tax. Failing such pledge, and if the land had lain fallow for six years, the whole or the part should be ranked in the former category. Yet in the case of impecunious but willing owners, much was left to the revenue officer's discretion. For, as Jacob demanded a free hand for himself, he was always ready to give it to trustworthy subordinates. The third class, whether under crop or lying fallow, had special interest for the political economist. He held that the Government could only fairly tax the surplus produce, after liberal allowance for capital and labour. Never should the claims on the surplus be allowed to fall upon the means indispensable for production. That proviso was rather in conflict with his rule-of-thumb laws, and reminds one of the proposals of Irish Home Rulers. For it either put implicit faith in the cultivator's honesty, which was absurd; or necessitated an almost impossible *surveillance* on the part of the revenue officers. That it suited the circumstances and worked well, on the whole, is demonstrated by the steady increase in the revenue.

One other matter may be mentioned which nearly interested him. He had to import the horses for his

regiment as well as his troopers, and he had thought of forming a *haras* at Khangur with good Arab stallions, to which the native breeders might send their mares. But in a despatch to Mr. Frere he confessed his doubts as to the success or value of the experiment. "The Sind horse is a wretched creature, which it is scarcely worth while to attempt to improve when so many good breeds of horses exist in the neighbourhood of the province, and are brought to the market in such numbers." Good sires would be useless where the mares were bad and their foals half starved. And he quotes a case in point which illustrates not only the difficulty of stimulating wealthy zemindars to enterprise, but the lavish generosity of this soldier, who lived on his pay, when he could do anything for the welfare of the districts he administered.

"One of the richest Jaghireedars expressed to me his wish to breed horses and his great desire to possess an Arab stallion. The man's parsimony prevented his purchasing one for himself, though his income exceeded £10,000 a year; but thinking that he was in earnest, and that the thing might ultimately be of public use, I presented him with a very handsome Arab." The horse got more than fifty foals, but so poor were the mares and so miserable the keep, that the stock proved worthless. Some of his experiments failed, if most succeeded, but though sometimes disappointed, he was never daunted.

CHAPTER XII

WORKING UNDER FRERE

THE arrival of the new Commissioner, replacing the unsympathetic Mr. Pringle, had infused fresh spirit into Jacob's undertakings, as it moderated the fiery zeal which had brought him into conflict with his superiors. Mr. Frere's reputation had preceded him, and Jacob was ready enough to recognise the statesmanlike sagacity of the new Commissioner. It was easy to lead Jacob by his judgment, though all attempts at driving only hardened his heart. He saw that the Commissioner had intuitively mastered the problems which he had been so successfully striving to solve. With ever-warming mutual regard their intimacy grew apace. The formal "Sir" soon passed into "dear Mr. Frere," then the "Mr." was dropped, and Jacob fell into the extremely informal style which had marked the friendly correspondence with Napier. Frere, as he felt, had a thorough comprehension of everything, and would make generous allowance for inevitable shortcomings. And after having adverted to the work of pacification, we can give no better idea of the system which Jacob was directing, as he had

SIR BARTLE FRERE.

From a photograph by the London Stereoscopic Company.

in great measure originated it, than by quoting from Frere's despatches. There is a private memorandum, which he drew up in 1876 at the request of Lord Northbrook. The Governor-General confessed himself very ignorant of the difference between the Sind and Punjaub systems—a question brought under his notice by Jacob's reports and letters — requesting Frere to enlighten him. Frere explains the Sind system exactly as he found it in 1851, adding that after the death of Jacob it had been changed and greatly for the worse. But in noting the course of policy in Sind, some reference must be made to contrasts in the Punjaub.

Briefly, there we were neither at peace nor war with the tribesmen of the Afghan highlands. They owned no sovereign or master, and we had refused even to recognise the Ameer's supremacy. In Sind our diplomatic relations were well defined. We treated all tribes beyond the border as subjects of the Khan of Khelat. His authority might have been merely nominal, but it was acknowledged. The policy in the Punjaub was *Divide et impera*. In Sind it was our cardinal principle to support the Khan's authority over the tribesmen. All appeals of the chiefs were referred to him, though some pressure was put on him to redress grievances. The Khan being our independent ally, the practical consequences of the theory were important. In the Punjaub we could follow no marauders across the frontier, except at the risk of provoking a border war ; and retaliation for injuries perpetuated turmoil. If we caught robbers when we hunted them from Sind into Cutchee, we were policing the States of a friendly ally. The culprits

were handed over to the Khan, and our Resident saw that they were brought to trial and fairly dealt with.

In Sind, said Sir Bartle, it was our main object to concentrate all power and responsibility, civil and military, in a single hand. The Commandant was also political agent and superintendent of police; he was chief magistrate, judge, and engineer, fiscal officer and director of irrigation works. The plan had its obvious disadvantages, for its success depended on a fitting man being forthcoming; but it had worked admirably under Jacob, and now Jacob had set it fairly agoing. In Sind the limit of our interference beyond the border was purely military. The Commandant was to use his troops for the protection of all peaceable people, not only in our own territory but in that of our ally, when "within our reach." Our troops were never to move without adequate supports, and were to be handled cautiously, so as not to compromise us. In following up an enemy beyond the frontier civilised rules of war were to be strictly observed; there was to be no burning of villages or destruction of crops. The actual evil-doer was to be punished, if possible; but neither his family nor tribe. No excuses were to be admitted on the ground of tribal feuds or time-honoured customs. No allowance was to be made for the excuse that robbery or murder would have been venial under native government.

Consequently, as crime was treated as a public offence, not as a private wrong, and as the State undertook the protection of persons and property, it was unnecessary for any one to carry weapons. Only soldiers and servants of Government were permitted to go armed. As it was

essential to maintain a friendly undertaking with Khelat, every aid was to be given to the Khan's subjects to obtain redress for injuries inflicted from Sind territory.

These principles which had governed Jacob's policy having been consistently acted upon, without fear or favour, Frere sums up the state of the frontier as he knew it during his commissionership. "The result was, after a very few years, entire freedom of the frontier districts from raids and perfect security of life and property. The Bolan and other trade routes were open for travellers: there was greater general security through the Khan's territory than had been known for ages. . . . The Murrees were the only exception. They were partially supported in an independent position by being partly within the Punjaub frontier jurisdiction, and by the refusal of the Government to allow them to be brought to order by an expedition." Frere admitted that there was something to be said against cumulating all charges in a single hand. Virtually it was a question of capable or incapable administration. But he remarks that Jacob as frontier Commandant had competent assistants in every department, giving them the liberty of discretion he claimed for himself. And writing his memorandum in 1876, he asks why the Sind border was then almost as disorderly as when Jacob took it in hand? "Simply," he answers, "because we have forsaken the old system"—because we had resorted to "a dual system of mismanagement."

Strong men are naturally inclined to resent interference, and Frere, like Jacob, held for free hands. Above all, the administrators of remote provinces ought to have liberty

corresponding to their graver responsibilities. The absurdity of fussy intervention from distant head-quarters on presumptuous advice, was indicated by a costly and uncalled-for demonstration against Ali Moorad of Khyrpoor. It had been rumoured that he meant to assume the aggressive when the Ameer had his hands more than full at home. However, towards the end of 1851 Jacob was ordered to take the command of a field force assembled at Roree; he knew from the first that he had been sent there on a fool's errand, and wrote to Frere from his camp: "Our little force is ready for anything: poor Ali Moorad is in a dreadful state of alarm." Ali prayed abjectly for an interview, and demonstrated to Jacob's entire satisfaction that he not only had made no hostile preparations, but was destitute of the means of self-defence. He confirmed his assertions a few days afterwards, when he hurried off a message to Jacob, praying for immediate help against a mutiny of his handful of mercenaries. The picket of the Sind Horse, which chanced to be on duty, sufficed to bring the mutineers to reason. Far from invading Sind, the Ameer had to be saved from his small guard of household troops, but Jacob knew how easily in these parts a spark may spread a conflagration. He wrote to Frere: "I am glad you approve my proceedings with regard to the Yaghee Pathans. Had the fellows not been stopped at once they would have plundered the wretched Ali and caused disturbance and alarm all over the country. I know the rascals well," &c. Another humorous incident in the comedy of gratuitous bluster was the drawing of the Ameer's teeth. The formidable feudatory who was

to attack us had half a dozen guns, but no teams could be found to draw them. Before Jacob could store them in Bukkur arsenal he had to send over oxen from Roree. He got some little credit, though he won no laurels. The Commissioner commended him at headquarters for the promptitude which had suppressed the *émeute*, and more gratifying was the tribute of the Adjutant-General to the excellent conduct of the field force. "That I have not heard a single complaint of any kind on the part of the country people in the neighbourhood of the force must in a great measure be owing to the strict discipline Major Jacob has enforced." He added, letting down the Government gently, "I have equally little doubt that the absence of all necessity for active operations, in carrying out the measures directed by the Government of India, is in no small degree to be attributed to the character he has established among all within reach of Upper Sind."

In a letter from Roree, Jacob had expressed the hope that he might soon wait on Mr. Frere, as there was much he wished to talk over. But he added that he was anxious to return to Khangur, where many matters demanded immediate attention. His letters in the first fortnight after reassuming his command show the variety of his preoccupations. On the western frontier and on the side of Khelat he could dispense with some of the local levies of irregular horsemen; on the east the disarming of the Ameer of Khyrpoor ought to involve a considerable increase of the Belooch Horse attached to his regiment, as he had to extend his frontier patrols. Canal-digging and irrigation works had been going briskly forward; sundry new schemes were in contemplation, and as hill

marauders had been raiding the Boogtees under his protection, his edicts against tribal wars must be enforced. These various communications were formally answered by the Commissioner; but Frere, in a private letter, warmly pressed Jacob to take furlough and come on a long visit to Kurrachee. He urged that human strength had its limits, and that Jacob ought to take a holiday on public grounds. Moreover, as they had not met at Roree, there were many subjects it would be well to talk over. Jacob's answer is one of the few letters in which he is frankly outspoken as to his private affairs. As a rule, except to Outram, Frere, and Sir Henry Green, he never says a word about himself, though often when his liberality had outrun his pay, he brings inadequate allowances to the notice of the Government.

"KHANGUR, *May* 15, 1852.

"MY DEAR FRERE,—I am very much obliged to you for your kind note of the 10th. I should be glad enough, God knows, to get down to Kurrachee, and will not pretend to maintain that pleasant society and change of air would not be beneficial both to my mind and carcass. But there are many objections, and I fear I shall not be able to get away at all. . . .

"I do not mind telling you privately between ourselves, that one serious objection to my going on leave is the loss of pay, and what is taken from me will not be given to my *locum tenens*.

"I care little for money, and though I have never owed a farthing, I have always lived up to my means and have nothing in reserve: my own fault it may be

said ; be it so, but still it is the fact. Since the death of my father two sisters have been mainly dependent on me for support, and under these circumstances I do not think that it would be right to expend some £250 on a trip to Kurrachee, unless it were really necessary that I should take one. I think it right to tell you this, that you may know how I am situated and not attribute my proceedings to stupid obstinacy.

"The Sirdar has, I think, treated me most unfairly. During twenty-four years' service I have had two months' leave only, yet now I am told I must pay 1,200 rs. or 100 a month for the indulgence, and this though I have done five and a half years' political duty for them, free, gratis, for nothing.

"The General might with propriety, at the request of the Commissioner, direct Major Jacob to proceed to Kurrachee on special duty, handing over command of the frontier to Lieut. Merewether, just as he ordered me to Roree.

"Yours very sincerely,

"JOHN JACOB."

Twenty-four years' service, more than half of it passed in burning Sind, and with no holiday! and with incessant strain on mind and body! Yet he did not obtain the indulgence he hinted at. Perhaps in reality he was happier at Khangur and in harness than elsewhere. Zeal for his duties had eaten him up, as it devoured pay and allowances from day to day. That he managed them so well and made them go so far is a marvel, but though his hand was open to any claim

that increased the efficiency of his regiments or the prosperity of his district; though he kept a hospitable table for his officers and guests, his personal expenses were trifling. The zealous soldier could sacrifice himself and his future for the good of the service, but it is a revelation to find that he helped to support his sisters in England, when family affections might well have been chilled by a quarter of a century's absence. That proof of his good and warm heart is only incidentally disclosed in a confidential letter. Nor was it merely to members of his family and to officers in his regiments that he generously opened his purse and his heart. We have come upon a letter from Outram, dated Bombay, January 18, 1852, and Outram, although he had met with much ill-luck, had been in enjoyment of posts with large emoluments.

"MY DEAR JACOB,—Your most kind letter has affected me more than anything that has happened to me since I left home a boy—even to tears, a proof of emotion I can only recollect three occasions of having given way to during that long interval; but, my dear friend, I cannot avail myself of your most generous offer of pecuniary aid. God knows how long you yourself may be far from requiring it, for it is impossible that human nature can stand the climate you have so long been exposed to, without requiring a change sooner or later. It was not, however, the offer of your *pence* which so affected me—it was the undoubting, staunch faith in my honour and the rights of my career which I felt most deeply, and indeed it was refreshing to my spirit, which has been much depressed of late, for I have but few friends left."



SIR JAMES OUTRAM.

From the painting by T. Brigstocke in the National Portrait Gallery.

He grudged each rupee spent upon himself, but he fretted over his straitened means and was constantly appealing to Government against the mistaken parsimony which set limits to his self-denying profusion. About the time he reluctantly declined the invitation to Kurrachee, he sent one of these formal applications to Frere as Commissioner. It referred to others which had never been answered. Five years before, as he represented, he had been appointed Political Superintendent, as well as Frontier Commandant. For these civil and political duties he had never received one farthing, though the mere bills for stationery mounted up to £180. "I feel certain," he added—he must surely have known that the confidence was misplaced—"that this state of things will not be considered by Government to be fair dealing towards a hard-working servant, and that the circumstances have only to be properly brought to its notice to ensure its being remedied."

That the grievance had not been redressed was no fault of Mr. Frere's. He backed the application with a strenuous minute, concluding with the most flattering compliment any public-spirited official could have desired. "I can only state my conviction that such indulgence as Major Jacob seeks will tend greatly to prolong the period during which he may hope to serve in his present situation, and that so highly do I estimate the value of these services, that were your Lordships in Council to withdraw men from this frontier for service elsewhere, I should consider the province safer were the three brigades reduced to two, Major Jacob retaining his

present position, influence, and efficiency, than I should with three brigades if he were absent, and his place filled by an officer of but ordinary influence and abilities."

Trade routes and frontier-fairs, in both of which Frere was deeply interested, seem chiefly to have occupied Jacob's attention in that year, till in the autumn he made an expedition through the mountains, to inspect the uplands where the Doombkees had been settled. It is seldom he found the leisure to expatiate from æsthetic points of view, and the long letter he dashed off to Frere must be quoted in parts, to show his keen appreciation of the sublime and the picturesqueness of his facile style.

"JUNGAR, *Sept.* 11, 1852.

"MY DEAR FRERE,—I arrived at Kujjoor on the 6th. . . . I was just seven hours in doing the distance from Kujjoor to the bed of the river under the small interior fort or citadel, the journey from the main fortress having occupied about one hour of that time. A more desolate-looking place it has seldom been my lot to see. Indeed the whole country, after crossing the first considerable range of hills, is most savagely picturesque. There is a pass through one high range of hills in which the road presents a most extraordinary aspect: the upheaved strata of the rocks are inclined at an angle of about 60 degrees with the horizon, and these strata project on each side of the chasm, ultimately in regular straight lines and planes beyond each other, a distance of ten or twelve feet, each layer or wall of rock being about twenty feet in thickness. The effect on a large scale is most strange. The hills from base to summit from Kurrachee to Kujjoor

are covered with verdure and grass of all sorts, while all these ranges I am now wandering about are almost totally bare of vegetation. More grim-looking places can hardly be imagined, though it is difficult to give an idea of them in words. The interior of the fortress is the most ghastly spot of all—'crags, knolls, and mounds confusedly hurled'—desolation, horror and destruction everywhere around. The rocks, not content with mere barrenness, look as if they had been burned: there are quantities of a white earth, and these mixed with red clay and ironstone which have the perfect resemblance of ashes among the heaps of black stones which have the exact appearance of cinders and scoriæ from a thousand Cyclopean furnaces.

"There are some magnificent-looking places, too, even within this grisly-looking fortress of Kunnee. One enormous rock especially struck me. . . . I had not time to measure anything, and the eye among these stupendous masses and chasms loses its power of judging accurately of heights and distances.

"Having looked about a little, I reclined under the best bush I could find near the water. It was a fearfully hot day: the thermometer in a thick padded case kept closed and in the shade stood at one o'clock at 130 degrees. I believe that it was much higher afterwards. At two I returned, in pursuance of my intention to return by the other road to Pokran, whither I had sent the baggage on leaving Kujjoor, but had hardly mounted when a respectable-looking Sirdar gentleman, an official of some kind, made his appearance, saying he had just come on foot one part of the way from Pokran. This man, with

the most friendly intentions, frightened my guides out of their wits, by telling them that the road was wholly impassable, in fact that there was no road in that direction, the heavy rains having entirely carried the old parts away, and brought down rocks, banks, and all manner of *débris;* that to attempt to get animals along would be madness and death. The men begged, prayed, and remonstrated, but I do not think it is a good plan to swerve from difficulties because your neighbours are afraid of them, therefore I insisted. So on we trudged, amid grumbling and muttered imprecations. . . . Nothing could be worse than the path, the difficulties of which had not been at all exaggerated. However, after struggling, toiling, wading, rolling, stumbling, clinging, shouting, pushing, and diving for an hour and a half, we all arrived in safety outside the post, where for the present the road offered no further serious difficulty. By the time we were all out of the pass, the long-continued labour in the intense heat made me feel something more than half-dead; I thought my heart would jump out of its case altogether. However, I lay under a bush, the people threw water over me, and soon all came right again.

"We continued our journey steadily till about sunset we arrived at the great range of hills, the ascent of which must always be very difficult, by reason of its great length and steepness; but now that all the old paths were destroyed or blocked up, the place looked very bad indeed; in fact it was a shocking bad place for man or horse. I managed to get up pretty well, dragging my horse and making a man drive him, but before the rest

of the party could accomplish the ascent it had become quite dark. You may imagine what an agreeable journey we had down the long, steep, rugged descent on the western side and along the deep, dark, craggy ravine below. I myself, with two of my orderlies, reached Pokran at nine at night; the other people I was obliged to leave to bivouac at a pool of water. It appears wonderful that none of us were dashed to pieces. . . . The Jekranee, who had professed to know all about the country, . . . was dead beat; he did not arrive till that evening, he and his mare sorely tired. He had never, he said, been over such hills before. I am glad that I took the man, for it is well to astonish these folk occasionally, and it is not proper to allow them to suppose that they can work harder than ourselves. The very lies they tell about their adventures do good. I was seven and a half hours coming to Pokran, but the direct distance cannot be more than six miles."

The formidable stronghold of Kunnee excited his archæological curiosity, and he was surprised at the comparatively modern works, constructed in what he had always believed to be a semi-barbarous country. He had some faint recollection of the name, as mentioned by Todd as a Rajput fortress; but he sorrowfully adds that he has no books to consult, and begs Frere to send him any information on the subject. Salamander as he was, he ends the record of adventure with another remark on the temperature. "It is a jolly heat (thermometer in my tent at 108°). I will write again about roads and what not, when I can do so more coolly."

CHAPTER XIII

AFFAIRS OF KHELAT

PEACE and prosperity in the territories under Jacob's charge depended on tranquillity and firm rule in Khelat. As philanthropist and administrator, he had been greatly troubled by contagious disturbances beyond his borders. So far back as 1841, Outram and Colonel Stacy, who was then the British Resident at Quetta, and virtually the guardian of the boy Khan had negotiated a treaty sufficiently stringent. It recognised the Khan's vassalage to Cabul, but stipulated that the reigning Prince should always be ruled by the British Resident; that British troops might occupy any positions in any force; and that the Khan's foreign relations should be absolutely at the discretion of our Government. On the other hand, we guaranteed him his dominions, and undertook to assist him in preserving internal order. That treaty, however, as Outram wrote twelve years afterwards to Lord Dalhousie, had long been waste paper and worse than useless. The Khan had faithfully fulfilled his engagements, but the British Goverment had given him no help against his rebellious subjects. In 1851, when Jacob took up the question in earnest, the Khan was powerless

and at the mercy of his Sirdars. His council was presided over by a Vizier who was labouring to undermine his throne; and the northern tribes, and notably the Murrees, had thrown off the reins and were raiding everywhere. When injuries were inflicted on British subjects, and demands for redress were made at Quetta, evasive answers were received. Jacob was the last man to endure that sort of thing; but he could take no steps which involved a change of system and a new treaty without the assent of Government. It was a matter which even the Commissioner in Sind must refer to Bombay and Calcutta. Frere and Jacob were agreed on the main points. They did not blame the Khan, who was impotent and not unfriendly. The policy of both was to see Beloochistan well governed and amenable to English influence. Jacob put the points tersely in a despatch to Frere dated in July. He would give the Khan sufficient support to enable him to repress the plunderers who troubled his territory: he would have him treated as "a humble subordinate but most friendly ally," and induce him to encourage traffic by protecting the caravans, and either reducing or abolishing the transit duties, levied not only by himself, but by a number of rapacious petty chiefs. Meantime the raiding went on, and as matters went from bad to worse, he wrote in September, suggesting decided measures. The Khan was to have a subsidy of £5,000 on condition of marching into the hills and reducing the predatory hillmen. Then he was to establish such a police on his frontiers as would protect the British border from inroads. If necessary he was to be aided by British troops. The

Court of Directors, after mature consideration, approved of any small advances that might develop trade, but would not hear of military interference. On receiving the minute, Jacob wrote the Commissioner: "With regard to assisting the Khan . . . my opinions are unchanged. If the fire consuming our neighbour's house did not—would not spread to ours, we might perhaps let it burn unheeded; but as matters are, it might be prudent, in my opinion, to assist in extinguishing it."

From these fixed views he never deviated till his wishes were carried into effect, although for three years he had to possess himself in patience. As circumstances changed somewhat for the better, he was brought to the conclusion that a punitive expedition was no longer necessary, though on all the other points he persevered and succeeded. But with him, subsidising and so subjugating the youthful Khan was only inserting the thin end of a wedge. His far-sighted political genius foresaw and advised, *mutatis mutandis*, all that has happened since. His views are stated at length in a paper, written probably towards the close of 1854, and after his negotiation of the second Khelat treaty. He dwells on the superiority of the Bolan to the Khyber as a trade route and as the easiest military road to Candahar and Herat. "There should be a good British force at Quetta, a good road from that place through the Bolan to Dadur, and thence through Cutchee to the British frontier to connect with the roads in Sind. The road from Dadur to the sea must eventually become a railway." The railway has since been carried through the Bolan, with stupendous works, at enormous cost. Established at Quetta, he would enlist

a body of the Khan's subjects, "for the wild irregulars are invaluable when there is a certain force of our own soldiers to form a nucleus of strength and give a tone to the whole." He believed that if we won the confidence of the Belooch we might extend our influence to the more intractable Afghans and subsidise their chief with the assent of their Ameer. But he was not optimistic or inclined to premature intervention. "However well disposed they may be, neither Afghan nor Belooch will obey and live at peace with their equals; the tribes have deadly feuds with each other, and if left to themselves or only supplied with arms and money from a distance, they could not be kept to any combined purpose or sustained effort. . . . The English mind, to whose leading all these wild spirits will bow, must always be present." Then follows a passage which shows the pious and conscientious spirit of the man. "In the arrangements proposed, we should act in no respect otherwise than we might be prepared to justify before all good men or before the throne of God;" and those entrusted with the work should be "men with some conscience in what they do, than which nothing has more influence on Oriental minds."

In the spring of 1851, Mahomed Hassan, the Khan's intriguing Vizier, had come to Khangur. He was a plausible scoundrel, and actually succeeded in imposing on Jacob, who sent him home with civilities and presents. Next year he repeated his visit, to meet with a different reception. Jacob in the interval had found him out, and when he cautiously broached his project of usurping the Khanate, he was bluntly told he was a villain. Thence-

forth Jacob was urgent in his demands for his dismissal, but the Vizier had the ear of his young master, who was not to be persuaded of his treason. Jacob naturally lost patience with the puppet who sent evasive answers, dictated by the man who was at the bottom of the mischief, and in his letters he did not mince his language. It is amusing to note the imperious attitude assumed by the subordinate British functionary to the independent Prince.

"TO THE KHAN OF KHELAT.

"*December* 14, 1852.

"Out of friendship and goodwill alone I wrote to your Highness with regard to treachery in your councils and some secret influence at work, which counteracted all I had been endeavouring to effect. . . . The letter in reply was not such a one as was proper or becoming in you to write to me. . . . Your late proceedings with regard to these mountain robbers convince me that it would be useless to attempt to aid a government which rejects good advice, despises good order, secretly encourages rapine and bloodshed," &c.

"If your Highness prefers the advice of self-interested traitors to that of the British officers, and the friendship of robber tribes to that of the British Government, the road is open to you—you can please yourself. But I shall certainly not recommend that any friendly aid be offered to you."

These vigorous remonstrances had their effect, and the obnoxious Vizier was dismissed. Jacob, although he had

written so roughly to the Khan, knew he had been more sinned against than sinning. Weakness was his worst fault, and it was unfair to press him to attempt the impossible. In a letter of April, 1853, Jacob begs permission of the Commissioner to co-operate with Khelat levies against the robber Murrees. "I am certain I could get the business effectually done if I were allowed to expend 50,000 rs. and to arrange things with the Khelatees personally. I must be allowed to have a personal interview with the Khan and such of his chiefs as he can trust. I would bring down on the Murrees every tribe of hill and plain around them and crush them so far more effectually than any regular force could do." He would have had prompt action taken before the season for hill warfare had slipped by. As time went on in successive letters he urged on the Commissioner the propriety of his having a personal interview with the Khan, who would assuredly be much impressed thereby and his sirdars as well, even if no active assistance were afforded. If Frere were prevented by engagements from coming to Khangur, he asked again to be allowed to meet the Khan himself, with a certain discretion as to arrangements. Frere was not unwilling, but before committing ourselves to a campaign beyond our borders, reference had again to be made to Calcutta. In Jacob's papers is a remarkable letter from Lord Dalhousie to Outram, which must have been forwarded to Khangur, with a copy of Outram's minute in reply, which throws light on our relations with Khelat from the man who of all our political agents was most familiar with them.

"GOVERNMENT HOUSE, *October* 7, 1853.

"DEAR COLONEL OUTRAM,—I am anxious to take advantage of your presence here to consult you on two questions connected with the Sind frontiers. . . .

"The second concerns Mr. Frere's and Major Jacob's policy towards Khelat and the Murrees. I cannot believe in the expediency of subsidising the Khan, either in the hope of obtaining renewal of transit duties or to sustain his power. . . . With regard to the Murrees, I can't see the reason of attacking them because they have attacked other people, or the justice of attacking them when they have not attacked us.

"Major Jacob says: 'There is peace, quiet, and protection on the British side.' Why should we make war on those who leave it so and will leave it thus, so long as we are vigilantly on the defensive? Nevertheless, being (as I hope) a reasonable man, I should be glad to hear your observations, who know the scenes and the actors so well.

"Yours very truly,

"DALHOUSIE."

Outram's memorandum tells the whole story of our early transactions with Khelat—as it gives cordial support to the policy advocated by Frere and Jacob. It is noteworthy that the opinions of the three experienced administrators coincided on all essential points.

"We were bound by treaty to support the Khan of Khelat against foreign enemies, when it was our interest to secure through him our communications with Candahar.

"On our withdrawal from Afghanistan, I suggested a money payment (50,000 rs. per annum, I think) in substitution for the pledge of armed protection, on the condition of the Khan keeping open the Bolan Pass, abolishing tolls on the great road to Candahar through his dominions, and protecting Kafillas, &c.

"This the Khan would readily have agreed to at that time, and thus the inconvenient treaty would have been abandoned with his consent, which I could not have supposed would have been abandoned without—he having faithfully fulfilled his part of the compact, during the time of our greatest need.

"It was with the view to disentangle us from embarrassing engagements, rather than from any confidence that the Khan could effectually protect the road, that I proposed the measure, which, while it did give some hope that the latter object might be attained, at the same time secured us from pecuniary outlay if it failed — for the payment for a coming year would depend on the fulfilment of the conditions. The Khan was, however, wholly abandoned when no longer necessary to us, the treaty being cast aside as waste paper—on what plea I know not.

"But were the treaty in force, we should not be bound to interfere between the Khan and the Murrees—his subjects, not foreigners. And I merely advert to the above subjects to show that though the Khan may not rightfully claim the aid of our arms to coerce his rebellious subjects, it would tend to the honour and good name of the British Government in that quarter, were we to afford some pecuniary aid to him in his present

extremity, and thereby give him a chance of recovering his power. . . .

"The delays that would occur before the orders for hostile operations could be conveyed to Major Jacob preclude any possibility of their being entered on in time this season. The Khan, with the proposed pecuniary aid, would have one year to make good his promises, if he can; on failure we should be freed from his claims in future. And it would be seen through the ensuing year whether the evils which Major Jacob deprecates, arising out of the unchecked license of the Murrees, increase to such an extent as to impose on us the duty of chastising them.

"If this should then become necessary, I should confidently rely on the entire success of our military operations if left to Major Jacob's sole responsibility. That officer's prudence and foresight are as remarkable as his gallantry and enterprise. And so thoroughly impressed am I with the superior qualifications of Major Jacob for such an undertaking, that I would confidently leave him to conduct it when and how he thought best—satisfied that he would accomplish the end with the smallest means necessary for success."

It had been suggested that a contingent from the Punjaub force should co-operate with the Sind Horse in repressing the troublesome Murrees. A letter from Jacob to Frere, written in August, 1854, opens characteristically. "If we were to be associated with Messrs. Hodgson and Co., of the Punjaub, in any expedition against Murrees, nothing but folly and disgrace will follow. All these people, military and civil, are minus quantities of large

amount. Their proceedings now, close to us, are in defiance of all common sense, and are calculated to do us much injury, even on our border. My Murranees are already becoming insolent in consequence, and are attempting to recommence a plundering life of 'retaliation,' as the Punjaub Commissioners have it."

Then he gives his own ideas of the proper mode of proceeding, and maps out a hill campaign in minute detail, in conjunction with the levies of the Khan. But as money must be forthcoming, "the Khan shall be subsidised to the modest extent of 50,000 rs., secured on frontier villages to be put in pledge." Had Jacob been his own master, he might have dealt more generously with our ally, but he knew that to obtain Government's approval the first step must be to conciliate the Treasury. He disapproves the wars of "retaliation" on the Punjaub frontiers, but nevertheless he proposes to enlist their neighbours against the offenders. For it must be admitted that his acts did not always correspond with his prepossessions or convictions. Theory was one thing and action another when the shortest way must be sought through a troublesome undertaking. His suggestions were so far accepted that roads were repaired, and that intelligence of transport and other arrangements were duly reported to the Murrees by their spies. So his foresight was fully justified when he wrote: "All this supposes that the Murrees will resist, but it is very probable that directly they see we are really in earnest, they will submit to our terms."

Then he adverts to his own position, which was for ever fretting him—to his futile applications on behalf of

his corps, and to the inadequacy of his pay and allowances.

"If Government does not answer soon, I shall be compelled to resign." Whether he would have had the resolution to carry out the threat may be doubted, for it would have well-nigh broken his heart to leave his work in Sind half-done. But it is certain that at that time he proposed to Lieut. Henry Green that both should throw up their commands and emigrate together to Australia. And there was another reason, seldom suspected, which tended to keep him aloof from the world. A sensitive man, he suffered cruelly from the stutter which impeded his speech. Speaking on the subject to Henry Green, when he first assumed command of the frontier, he told him he meant to end his days there. In fact, if he shrank from society and seldom or never asked for leave, it was owing in some degree to that morbid sensibility. But the last paragraphs of the letter go far to explain what seems an exceptional fit of depression. He had received the unexpected news of the engagement of a valued subaltern. He held very decided opinions as to the marriage of frontier officers. He deemed that it unfitted them for their dangerous work and restless life; that the Sind frontier with its fearful climate was a most undesirable place of residence for any English lady, and must cause her husband ceaseless anxiety. "It came like a thunderbolt." "It was a crushing blow." "It involves such a complete overthrow of so many cherished ideas that I seem to be in a dream." Such are the expressions he uses when surprised out of self-restraint. Not that he was opposed to matrimony in general. On the contrary,

he often regretted that his lines had fallen where existence could be sweetened by neither wife nor child.

But he expresses his views at length in a letter to one of his subalterns who had asked advice before engaging himself. He seems to have considered that the perfect soldier, like the cloistered monk, should forswear the sex and renounce domesticity.

"I must now approach your momentous question, and a most momentous one it is. To say that I am not able to answer it would be absurd, for I have thought much about such things, and my convictions are fully formed, distinct and clear.

". . . First then, no greater happiness can be imagined by man than loving and being loved: this in its highest sense includes all mental perfection in time and eternity. Where it exists between man and woman in real marriage, both being worthy of the high and deep feelings and respect which I imply in the word love, it perhaps always makes amends for all worldly ills and compensates for all evil that can happen. But such marriages are very rare, not so much, I believe, from any real defects on either side, but chiefly from the man, or possibly both parties, *not knowing themselves beforehand.* Few human beings steadfastly preserve their equanimity when real trials and troubles come upon them, and in good earnest the cares and anxieties of a married life in this country, without a fixed home, are most formidable —perhaps even the more trying because many of them appear to be petty troubles. Even under the most favourable circumstances there is frequently a feeling something akin to disgust and weariness, which is destructive

of all happiness, or with minds of inferior grade the loss of individual freedom causes a lamentable degradation in the moral and intellectual position of the husband.

"For a soldier who wishes to be active, to work and to rise honestly and fairly by his own exertion and cultivated ability, marriage appears to me to be moral suicide: it paralyses him at every turn, deprives him of half his strength when his power is most required, and makes him the cause of unspeakable misery to her whom he values as his life, and probably justly so values. . . .

"For an officer in the army, particularly in the Indian army, the chances are fearfully against him. It seems to me a choice of evils at best; there is no necessity to be a soldier."

He goes on to elaborate a variety of almost impossible coincident conditions under which an attached couple—the lover being in the Indian service—would do well to marry, but adds—

"At best marriage must be a fearful risk for both parties. We may try to persuade ourselves to the contrary, but it undoubtedly is so. . . . I have not written a thousandth part of what I have to say on this matter, and often and often have I felt the crushing effect of ——'s marriage on him.[1] He was frequently shorn of half his force by it."

It may have been partly that Jacob was embittered on the subject by a sense of the painful physical defect to which allusion has been made. We should hardly have suspected a man who led so stirring a life of the morbid feelings which made Byron's club-foot a fretting thorn.

[1] One of the most distinguished officers in the Indian Army.

In this same letter he speaks with unusual frankness of one of the circumstances which gave the Sind marches their best administrator.

"I would certainly not leave the S. I. H. under any circumstances, if I could help it. I am not indeed fit for much, save in some such post. I do not mind mentioning to you that *it is impossible for language to express*, or for any one to imagine who has not felt it, the crushing effect which my defective speech has on me. No amount of bodily deformity could equal or approach this curse. Were the bond unloosed, I sometimes feel I could force my way to anything: as it is, I frequently wish I could hide myself in the earth."

He had insisted on the pacification of Beloochistan as essential to prosperity in Sind. But while treating the Khan with wise severity and addressing him in frank language unfamiliar to Oriental potentates, he showed him every sort of toleration and set his face against the imposition of harsh or impossible conditions. The territories of Mekran lie to the south of Khelat, stretching from Sind to the frontiers of Persia. Persia, prompted from St. Petersburg, was casting longing looks at them, and the internal troubles and misrule offered the Court of Teheran fair pretext for intervention. The robber chiefs of Mekran recognised the shadowy supremacy of Khelat, but notoriously the Belooch Khan was powerless to control them. Outram, Frere, and Jacob were agreed that the province was without the sphere of our interests. It had been proposed to put pressure on the Khan to bring the Mekranees as well as the Murrees to reason. Jacob was irritated by the ignorance at headquarters, and

maintained that it was cruel and absurd to ask the Khan to attempt the impossible. He wrote in November, 1853, to the Assistant-Commissioner :—

"I have the honour to observe that in my opinion it is highly injudicious to meddle or interfere with the political or social state of the inhabitants of Mekran at all.

"1st. Because we have no right to do it.

"2nd. Because in respect to the benefiting of the trade, our best course is evidently to draw the commerce to our own port Kurrachee, so that it would be a private advantage if the port of Guadir did not exist at all. . . .

"It seems to me that it would be unreasonable to call on the Khan of Khelat to exert his influence in controlling the people beyond, or on the outskirts of his territory, who owe him only a nominal or doubtful allegiance, while he himself is continually and hitherto in vain begging the British Government to afford him aid in reducing his subjects close at hand to obedience, and in restoring order and good government to his territory, even when it is in close connection with our own."

And Outram, in that memorandum which we have quoted, had told the Governor-General that if the Persians sought to make trouble in Mekran, we could not do better than let them have their way. They could not support troops in that sterile country without exciting bitter hostilities in all quarters, and that occupation would bring them within easier reach of our arm. As for our taking the country, Outram said with Jacob that the only thing worth having was the harbour of Guadir, and that it would be foolish to raise a commercial rival to Kurrachee.

Consequently the Khan was authoritatively reassured on a matter that had been worrying him considerably, and in the beginning of 1854 Jacob was arranging the much-desired meeting between the Belooch Prince and the Commissioner of Sind. Already Jacobabad was becoming a place of importance, and the Commandant was housed in a spacious mansion built rather for our glorification with the natives than in accordance with his simple habits. He writes to the Commissioner that "there is plenty of room in the house for you." But it was more embarrassing to accommodate the Oriental Princes with their suites, for Ali Moorad of Khyrpoor had invited himself to the Durbar. "A cunning fellow," remarks Jacob parenthetically, "but with the cunning that is apt to defeat itself." The Princes were to be received with becoming hospitality, and we hear nothing of any lack of provisions. Beeves and sheep there were in plenty, and already in all the adjacent country the Sindees were raising rich crops of grain. But it is characteristic of the desert capital that in one of the letters to Frere, written when Ali Moorad had announced his visit, Jacob expresses anxiety as to there being sufficient water for his people. However, the receptions passed off successfully, and political affairs were settled to the entire satisfaction of the English officials. Jacob arranged another meeting by order of his Government, and at Mastoong, in the first week of May, the treaty was signed by which the British Government undertook to subsidise Khelat. In return, the Khan sacrificed his independence. He resigned the control of his foreign policy: he engaged to suppress raiding and robbery, to reduce the oppres-

sive duties on merchandise, and above all, there was such a condition as had been enforced on the Sind Ameers—he was to suffer our troops to occupy his territory. In fact, the wedge was then fairly inserted which was subsequently to be driven home.

Jacob drew up a long memorandum of the personal communications made at Mastoong to the Khan, and the minute was transmitted to the Government. After explaining at length the causes of complaint and the whole course of proceedings which had led up to the convention, he told the Khan all that was expected of him, enforcing it by one of the metaphors which he was in the habit of employing.

"By the terms of the new treaty your Highness engages to prevent all outrages by your subjects on British territory, but to cause the country to be prosperous and wealthy and the government of your Highness to be respected it is necessary to do much more than this.

"Measures should be taken to protect life and property within your Highness's own dominions also, and I strongly advise your Highness, as your very true friend, to adopt measures to secure this result.

"No oppression or violence should be allowed, whether very great or small.

"Justice should be strictly administered to all men. Cultivators and traders should be encouraged and protected: roads should be made safe and easy, and no private transit dues or such like exactions should be allowed. All this cannot be accomplished without exertion, but if your Highness attend to this advice and act on it, the state of Khelat will, under your Highness's

rule and with God's blessing, become rich, powerful, and respected. But without some such arrangements and efforts from within, no amount of external assistance alone will make it really great and flourishing. . . . The pecuniary aid now to be afforded to your Highness will, with proper arrangement, materially assist your Highness in establishing a strong government of your own, in improving your own resources in various ways, and in making such arrangements as will cause your country to become rich, flourishing, and powerful, as it is the wish of the British Government that it should be.

"The matter stands as if a man, being sick and weakly, were assaulted by an enemy, and a friend at hand strike that enemy down : in this case one enemy may be overthrown, but the weak man is no stronger than before, nor in any way permanently benefited. But if instead of acting thus, the friend, when the other is threatened, administers food, medicines, &c., and thus cause the weak man to become healthy and vigorous, and able to support and defend himself by his own strength, the assistance thus afforded is far more important than the other, and the benefit is infinitely greater."

The results of the interviews with Frere and Jacob were excellent. The Khan had been strongly impressed by personal intercourse with the Englishmen, and had become amenable to Jacob's advice and suggestions. Jacob wrote in October : "The Khan and his officers are doing all that men can do to carry out our wishes, and in doing so have been bullied and insulted by those insolent Afghans." He added that he was not sleeping over the affairs of the Khelat trade, but very naturally there was

procrastination in giving effect to those drastic reforms. Indeed, the Prince and his ministers had reason to feel aggrieved. True, we only asked them to reduce exorbitant impositions, but that involved a serious reduction of revenue, to say nothing of the suppression of peculation by which the officials enriched themselves. And all the time, as Jacob never ceased to insist, with flagrant inconsistency and folly, we were levying transit dues in districts ceded by Khelat, which crippled trade, excited discontent, and did not repay the costs of collection. Nor did he rest until he obtained their entire abolition.

In a letter from Calcutta, in which Outram addresses Jacob as his "most tried, most trusty, most chivalrous and most valued friend," he writes : "Battye will have sent you copy of a most kind letter I had from the G.G. offering me the honour of having my name placed on the same roll as yours, viz., being a brother aide-de-camp of *yours*, which you will well believe gratified me much."

There is another, dated from Aden, in the summer of 1854, in answer to one of Jacob's, reporting the success of the negotiations with Beloochistan. "I was indeed glad to hear that you had suffered no bad effects from your trip to Khelat, regarding which I was apprehensive, as it must have been hotter this year than usual. I almost envy you your frame of iron to be able to stand such weather. I can no longer do so. . . . Courtenay lost no time in communicating to me the happy issue of your mission, and how gratified Lord D. was with what you had done. . . . Is not our Governor-General a *glorious, generous* chief ? How gladly he seizes the opportunity to

convey his personal thanks to one who has served the state as you have done ! Would Lord Ellenborough ever have addressed you thus, after having once taken a dislike to you ? The conceited ass —— never once addressed a letter personally to one of his subordinates, except to Bartle Frere, perhaps. Thank God, Lord Dalhousie has had time to judge and learn your true value, and in him you have a real friend."

CHAPTER XIV

TROUBLE WITH THE AUTHORITIES

THE Khelat business had been settled entirely to his satisfaction, but he was seldom out of hot water from one cause or another. Though on the most friendly terms with his immediate superiors, there was frequent friction in other quarters. In 1852 he had been brought into unpleasant conflict with both civil and military chiefs. With his combative temperament he never shrank from controversy, but when his soldierly pride was stung he was touched in a sensitive place. Eight years previously he had begun to interest himself in army reform, and when he felt strongly he could not be silent, nor did he care to measure his words. There was no more indefatigable pamphleteer, and the attacks were answered by sharp retorts. The state of the Bengal Army was the special object of his animadversions—both Napier and Henry Lawrence had said almost the same things—and as we have seen, it was the opinion of Frere that had his strictures received the attention they deserved the Mutiny might have been averted. In the preface to a religious—or rather philosophical—pamphlet he wrote: "The position of the sepoy in Bengal and Madras is that of a spoiled child. Humoured and indulged for years

past, he looks upon humouring and indulgence as his right, and when from any cause these are denied to him he sulks and rebels. Nay, he sulks or rebels, even on suspicion." He entered his protest *in toto* against the whole system which had grown up, and when he had been nursing his wrath and his indignation had become uncontrollable, he was apt to express himself in unguarded language. He indicates categorically the most serious faults he found existing in the Bengal Presidency, and it must be admitted that whether true or the reverse the animadversions were well calculated to give grave offence. He touched the martial pride of a great body of brother officers and raised for himself a host of bitter enemies. He condemned the officers for "loss of moral tone and of vigorous Anglo-Saxon honesty in dealing with Asiatics." He blamed the Commander-in-chief and the Government for not giving them sufficient confidence and support. He declared there was no sort of confidence between the officers and the sepoys. He averred that pernicious attention to caste excluded the best material and enlisted the worst. Especially he objected to the system of promoting native officers by seniority. "The effects are crushingly ruinous. If a man keep clear of actual crime and lives long enough, he becomes a commissioned officer, however unfit." And he closed his sweeping indictment with the assertion that there was "entire absence of a proper discipline through the native part of the army."

It appears to have been in the autumn of 1853 that he first gave voice in the Press to these views. He signed his name to long letters which were published almost

simultaneously in the *Times* of London and the *Times* of Bombay. He went so far as to say that the normal state of the Bengal army was a state of mutiny. He had himself seen the men "leave the ranks by hundreds to cook, to pillage, or what not." If the charge was well founded it was none the more welcome, and naturally the letters raised a storm of indignation from Government House to the remote outposts.

In February, 1854, he received an extract from General Orders by the Commander-in-chief, forwarded from headquarters in Bombay, and was intensely disgusted thereby, though it can hardly have been unexpected.

"The attention of the Commander-in-chief having been called to a paper . . . under the signature of 'John Jacob,' which appeared in the *Bombay Times* and containing observations and sentiments of a most objectionable nature, relative to the organisation, order, and discipline of the native army, his Excellency feels himself called upon to express his marked disapprobation of the way in which Major Jacob has chosen to make his opinions known to the public. All officers have a perfect right to form opinions on the organisation and order of the army they may have the honour to serve in, but they are not to publish their opinions in their official capacity. . . . Major Jacob had no right to reflect upon his superiors, &c. . . . Grieved as his Excellency is to have been obliged to make the foregoing remarks, his Lordship is still more so from having to censure Major Jacob for having pointedly used the word 'refuse,'[1] as applicable to the

[1] The passage is as follows :—" Every officer of a native regiment of the line now endeavours to get away from his corps, to escape

regimental officers. . . . The Commander-in-chief deeply laments being forced to observe that the conduct now so strongly condemned emanated from one who has most justly received honours from his sovereign and the approbation of the Government he has the honour and good fortune to serve."

Lord Dalhousie had expressed himself with equal severity, and in due course came a despatch from the Court of Directors. Couched in very similar terms it conveyed identical censure. The snubs were severe and Jacob was furious. He vented his feelings to his friend Frere. "The Commander-in-chief has told me I am unsoldierlike." (The Commander-in-chief did not say so. He said the officers were soldierlike, whom Jacob had attacked.) "Under the accusation I feel something like Imogen accused of being untrue to her husband,—but if the wish to use as little physical force as possible and to be fully impressed with the enormously greater power of moral influence be unsoldierlike, then I am assuredly most guilty. . . . I send a copy of my reply to the reprimand. Pray tell me what you think of it. They shall not say I have lost my temper or retired one inch from the position I assumed." He goes on to dwell on the good service he had done, and that service the Commander-in-chief had fully recognised. It will be seen that in a passion of indignation he evades the point at issue. Better fitted, perhaps, to command than to obey, he had undoubtedly

from regimental duty, by every effort in his power. The 'REFUSE' only remain. All proper feeling is thus totally destroyed between the native soldier and his European superior." Jacob called attention to the fact that the word "refuse" was quoted. It was taken from a work by Sir John Malcolm.

been guilty of a breach of the discipline he sternly enforced.

But in his censures on the Bengal army he had gone to the root of the evils in which the Mutiny originated, when he condemned the exaggerated consideration of caste. He had learned in his first hill campaign that high-caste Brahmins could be brought to disregard the prejudices which made soldiers of inferior castes insubordinate. Recognising caste, he says, is ruinous to discipline. "By reason of this"—and he underlines the passage—"a native soldier in Bengal is far more afraid of an offence against caste than of an offence against the Articles of War, and by this means a degree of power rests with the private soldier entirely incompatible with all healthy rule." Nor did he speak without proof or reason: he had made no account of caste in the Sind Horse regiments, and yet they were largely recruited from high-caste Hindoos. A striking example was to be given in Jacobabad in this very year of 1854. Already in the rising city there were more than 10,000 bigoted Mohammedans, and the feast of the Mohurrum had hitherto been celebrated with no little pomp and ceremony. But the riots and disorder in which it resulted were becoming dangerous with the increasing population, and Jacob resolved to suppress them. Accordingly he published the following regimental order:—

"JACOBABAD, *October* 5, 1854.

"The camp at Jacobabad has been, for the last week, the scene of wild disorder, such as is in the highest degree disgraceful to good soldiers.

"A shameful uproar has been going on day and night, and this under the pretence of religious ceremonies.

"The commanding officer has nothing to do with religious ceremonies.

"All men may worship God as they please, and may act and believe as they choose, in matters of religion ; but no men have a right to annoy their neighbours, or to neglect their duty, on pretence of serving God.

"The officers and men of the Sind Horse have the name of, and are supposed to be, excellent soldiers, and not mad Fukkeers.

"They are placed at the most advanced and most honourable post in all the Bombay presidency. The commanding officer believes that they are in every way worthy of their honour, and would be sorry if, under his command, they ever became unworthy of their high position.

"The commanding officer believes it to be the greatest honour to command such soldiers, but that it would be a disgrace to be at the head of a body of mad and disorderly Fukkeers and drummers.

"He therefore now informs the Sind Irregular Horse, that in future, no noisy processions, nor any disorderly display whatever, under pretence of religion or of anything else, shall ever be allowed in, or in the neighbourhood of, any camp of the Sind Irregular Horse.

"This order is to be read on the first of every month until further orders, and is to be hung up in the Bazaar in the town of Jacobabad, and at the Cutchery.

"By order,

"(Signed) W. L. BRIGGS, Lieut.

"Adjutant 2nd Regt. S. I H.'

It might have seemed a perilous piece of work to interfere with a fanatical populace and the most solemn of their festivals; but the order was obeyed, and ever afterwards it was rigidly enforced. The soldiers submitted docilely, nor was there a murmur in the ranks, though doubtless some allowance must be made for the Commandant's magnetic personality.

Next to the exaggerated consideration for caste he had condemned promotion by seniority. "As to natives, the man who keeps clear of crime is advanced in due course. His incompetency cannot stand the test of action, and his juniors have nothing to stimulate them to exertion. Having nothing to do but to live, they lose all soldierly pride, and go through their duties with listless stupidity." "Confidence and pride in each other, between officers and men, cannot exist." As for the Europeans, the most capable and energetic used all their interest to obtain staff appointments, and when they succeeded they took long leave of their regiments. Those who remained—the refuse, as Sir John Malcolm had called them—grew grey in the dull rounds of routine before being gazetted as field officers. When the explosion came there were senile commanders, with nothing of the nerve to face an emergency; and officers who were only in regimental communication with their men were startled out of delusive security by the volleys that shattered the windows of the mess-rooms.

Jacob had written in 1853: "Time will show the justice of my views and conclusions." And this was the emphatic warning he emphasised with capital letters—

"THERE IS MORE DANGER TO OUR INDIAN EMPIRE FROM THE STATE OF THE BENGAL ARMY, FROM THE FEELING WHICH THERE EXISTS BETWEEN THE NATIVE AND THE EUROPEAN, AND THENCE SPREADS THROUGHOUT THE LENGTH AND BREADTH OF THE LAND, THAN FROM ALL OTHER CAUSES COMBINED. LET GOVERNMENT LOOK TO THIS; IT IS A SERIOUS AND MOST IMPORTANT TRUTH."

Throughout the year, as always, he was in closest correspondence with Outram; it was a year of no little anxiety to both, and sure of mutual sympathy, they unbosomed themselves with entire unreserve. Outram's interests were all in India, and readers of his Life will remember that his sudden transfer from Baroda to Aden came as a disagreeable surprise. He had suspected that it was a courteous fashion of shelving him, and previous experiences of recalls and disappointments had made him painfully sensitive. In a former letter he had expressed his fears, and Jacob had answered, reassuring him. On the 12th of May Outram hastens to forward a letter received the day before from Lord Dalhousie: "It will show you how entirely satisfied he is with my proceedings here, and that he is determined I shall not be shelved. He alludes to my being dissatisfied with the transfer. I merely told Courtenay (the Governor-General's secretary) that I saw no great cause for his congratulations on my appointment, for at any other time but now, when there is a possibility of war extending eastward, my charge at Aden was after all but that of a mere coaling-station. . . . I am delighted to hear of your great doings in turning

the desert into a garden—your canals and your roads. It is astonishing what you have effected. Eighty miles of canal, and that navigable for boats! All that I wish now is to see you with independent political powers over all the foreign relations of Sind; and up to Dera Ghazi Khan at least, communicating direct with the Governor-General, and with increased salary. This I know Courtenay is trying his utmost to get for you, and the G.-G. seems well disposed to do all he could. As his Lordship's letter is marked 'private,' pray consider it confidential."

As we believe the letter has never appeared in print, some extracts may be quoted, as showing that Outram had come out of the Napier controversy unscathed, and was held in higher consideration than ever at head-quarters.

"GOVERNMENT HOUSE, *May* 2, 1854.

"MY DEAR OUTRAM,—The rapid fluctuations in the aspect of affairs at Baroda determined me to wait for the ultimate issue before adding any fresh instructions to you.

"This issue has arrived in a form entirely satisfactory. . . . You have taken at every turn the best course, and you will find your proceedings entirely and cordially approved. The mingled sternness and consideration with which you have treated the Guicowur will, I hope, have a lasting effect on the Guicowur himself.

"I am concerned to learn that the transfer to the new appointment at Aden is not agreeable to you. The

triumph to you seemed to me so great, and the post was one I thought so much to your mind, that I supposed it would be very acceptable to you.

"The despatch will show you that not only your pecuniary interests have been saved from harm, but that a strong opinion has been recorded that your acceptance of the transfer, far from being an impediment to your promotion to higher office hereafter, greatly strengthens your claims. I hope this provision will remove some of your distaste. At any rate, you must accept my personal congratulations and thanks in regard to the complete success of your return to Baroda. I shall probably hear of you again before you go to your Patmos. "DALHOUSIE."

Neither could foresee how fully these pledges would be redeemed, when, recalled from political to military duties in the height of the Mutiny, Outram was charged with the grave responsibility of administrating Oude and leading the scanty reinforcements from the sea-base at Calcutta to the relief of the beleaguered garrisons in the Upper Provinces.

He had neglected no opportunity of enforcing Jacob's appeals for more liberal treatment. In a letter from Aden, which announces the departure of the French and English armies for the Crimea, he intimates that he was informed from the India House that no objection was raised there to what seemed to be a very reasonable claim. Hitherto the hitch had been at Calcutta, where Jacob's outspoken frankness had excited the enmity of the financial department and irritated the Governor-

General. In fact the department had inflicted a heavy fine for what was regarded as unbecoming criticism of his superiors. "However, I know that now the Governor-General is very cordially disposed towards you. But if you think I can be of any service towards effecting any arrangements you desire, you have only to write to me at Calcutta, where I expect soon to be. You may well believe I rejoice to get away from this wretched place." And in the autumn he wrote again from Calcutta that the Governor-General had been entirely satisfied with Jacob's explanations of his frank criticisms, and severely blamed the Bombay Government for delay in forwarding the documents, although the material question of increased pay and allowances was still in abeyance. In fact he was making tardy reparation for a hasty and stinging expression of disapproval. Still more stinging was Frere's comment in an unsigned article in a Calcutta periodical. "Lord Dalhousie's censure of the criticism was a model in its way, quite sufficient to annihilate an ordinary man, but in proportion to its official effectiveness is the damage it must inflict on the reputation for statesmanship of him who could devote his skill to muzzle his watch-dogs." As he wrote in 1857 to Sir John Kaye: "John Jacob went to the root of the matter in his published criticisms, and left the rulers of India no room to say that the truth had not been preached to them."

Meanwhile the new arrangements with Khelat were working well, and the Khan had so actively bestirred himself to re-establish order that the last of the notorious border robbers had been compelled to give himself up.

Sunjur Rind was a typical survival of the times of general misrule and unrest. Jacob reports his surrender as a notable event.

"During the year 1847–48, this man Sunjur had numerous most narrow escapes from parties of the Sind Irregular Horse. He was supposed to have been killed in Lieut. Merewether's fight with the Boogtees in October, 1847, but as it afterwards appeared, he was one of the two men who escaped on that occasion. He has, during the last two years, frequently written to me to beg to be allowed to come in and receive pardon for his crimes; but the man's robberies, murders, and crimes generally have been so enormous, that I returned no other answer than that I should certainly catch and hang him some day.

"Sunjur then went to the Boogtee chief, and begged him to intercede with me for him, which he did, receiving the same reply as before, with the addition that if the Boogtees harboured such criminals, they would be considered as guilty also.

"The Boogtees then informed Sunjur that if he came to live with them, they would send him prisoner to me.

"He then went to the Murrees, but these people, greatly alarmed at our late arrangements with Khelat, and anxious to avoid giving offence, threatened to imprison Sunjur also, whereupon, in despair, the man came in and surrendered. The man is of diabolical nature and totally irreclaimable; but as he voluntarily surrendered, I have recommended the Khelat authorities not to execute him but to keep him prisoner for life."

His surrender was a striking proof of the success of Jacob's unflinching policy, of the long reach of his arm, and the good results of the treaty. This notorious marauder found his occupation gone; he was a proscribed fugitive among the reclaimed robbers who had blindly followed him, and was driven in his isolation to choose between starvation and submission to his fate. As a sequence to the episode, Jacob sent in a memorandum, in answer to an indirectly aggressive report of the Punjaub Commissioners with whom he was always at feud. He reverts with legitimate pride to the beginnings of the accomplished work.

"Our first year on the border was one of enormous bodily labour: we had literally to lie down to rest with our boots and swords on for many months together. We crushed the robbers by main force, and proved far superior to them, even in activity. . . . The observation of the Punjaub Commissioners about my posts being close to the hills is curious. When the frontier was in a disturbed state, I had my posts close to the hills, esteeming this arrangement to be an *advantage*. Since quiet has been established I have withdrawn them, save as respects some Belooch guides. But though we had succeeded in forcibly subduing the robber tribes, I should have considered our proceedings a failure, had it been necessary to continue to use violent measures. Having by the use of force made ourselves feared and respected, we were able to apply better means and to appeal to higher motives than *fear*. This I had in view from the very first.

"The barbarians now feel that strength, courage, and



SIND FRONTIER FIELD FORCE, MOUNTAIN TRAIN. *From a photograph in Sir Henry Green's collection.*

activity may be possessed in the highest degree by those also influenced by gentle and benevolent motives. . . . The Punjaub Commissioners appear to imagine that the duties performed by my men have been walking up and down from post to post, and such like; but in truth the moral power of their bold and kindly bearing has spread far and wide through the country, and effected what no mere force could have done. Every man of the Sind Horse is looked on and treated as a friend by all the country folk."

He was amusingly susceptible to any strictures or criticism of the discipline and equipment of the cherished corps, organised for prompt service and rough-and-ready efficiency. Frere had intimated an approaching inspection by a colonel of regular cavalry whom Jacob believed to be supercilious and unsympathetic. Jacob writes: "He will not, I fear, much approve of my men, who are soldiers of battle only, and know no monkey tricks with lances, &c." As it happened, he was agreeably disappointed. The inspecting officer, who was hospitably entertained, came to bless instead of blaming, and reported in terms of most cordial approbation.

We have seen how much encouragement he received in the constant correspondence with Frere and Outram. And the two staunch friends, the men best fitted to sympathise in his difficulties and appreciate his triumphs, spoke even more warmly behind his back than when addressing him directly. About this time Frere wrote to Outram, "Jacob is doing more good work than any ten men I know," and seldom has a subordinate in anxious times received higher commendation. Outram

answers : " How gratified I am by your appreciation of John Jacob, who is indeed a wonderful man, and an invaluable public servant. . . . I only wish he had charge of the entire border from the sea to Attock."

CHAPTER XV

MECHANICIAN—ARTILLERIST—THEOLOGIAN

IN 1855 Khangur-in-the-desert had become a name and a memory. The only existing relic was the low single-storied fort of mud and wattles which Jacob had found when he first bivouacked there, and which he breached at forty yards' range with his rifle practice. It had been built beside the single brackish well. On the site had sprung up the city of Jacobabad, so named by the Governor-General in honour of the founder. Sir Henry Green, who so ably seconded his chief and who succeeded him as Commandant of the frontiers, has collected a remarkable volume of photographs, taken for the most part about the period we have reached, and from which we have been permitted to draw most of our illustrations. On the first page is the portrait of "John Jacob," a meditative man of somewhat careworn aspect, with a thick shock of black hair and heavy black whiskers, thinned neither by his anxieties nor the scorching climate. There is not a trace of grey. As the man who always declared he was an administrator and no soldier, he is not in the uniform of his Horse, but wears civilian dress. There are ribbons on the coat-lapel, but to say

the truth, he looks less like the dashing cavalry leader than a meditative man of science. Beneath the portrait is Sir Henry's inscription: "Carlyle's conception of a great man was one who performed a mission 'to establish order where chaos reigned supreme:' if under these conditions there ever were great men, John Jacob was one of them."

On the opposite page is a woodland scene—an enchanting piece of landscape gardening. With the umbrageous trees overclouding a broad esplanade, with a massive stone balustrade in the foreground, it might be a view from the environs of Cairo when the Khedives had been lavishing money on the embellishment of their capital. It is the photographic evidence of the rapid growth of the new Jacobabad, shooting to almost magical maturity like the prophet's gourd, by the action of fiery sun-blaze on free irrigation. There is a marginal note by Sir Henry, "All the trees shown in the book I saw planted." Jacob, in his firm faith in the future, had begun by planting a million of them, and his successor had to thin them before resigning the command.

Planting only needed faith, and was comparatively cheap and easy. The next view shows an almost palatial residence, in the purest style of solid Oriental architecture, and again it is shadowed and overtopped by superb timber. Considering Jacob's chronically straitened means, his building surprises even more than his forestry. Under the photograph is a cutting from some Indian paper: "Jacobabad, our noted frontier station, one monument among many to the brave and in many respects inimitable soldier whose name it bears." Next



IN JACOBABAD. *From a photograph in Sir Henry Green's collection.*

come many views of umbrageous alleys like the lofty chesnut avenues in Bushey Park, with sequestered lawns and glades like those in Windsor Forest. Under the dense foliage is a cool depth of shade that even Sind sunshine could never penetrate, and it partly explains the possibilities of Jacob's indefatigable labours. Then come views, also significant, of the Commandant's house from almost as many points of view as Mr. Pecksniff's studies of Salisbury Cathedral. Like the man, it is massive, strong, and unpretending. He built at Jacobabad as at Hyderabad for the dignity of the ruling race. Simple himself in all his tastes, he never neglected the wisdom of imposing on Orientals, who associate authority with visible signs. Finally, there is the tomb, a plain white pedestal bearing an urn, fenced in from the public promenade by iron railings, and sheltered from sandstorms by the thick coppices and stately trees which the departed founder had planted.

But all that building and planting and ornamental gardening was only the centre of the oasis that had been steadily encroaching on the desert sands. Murrees and Boogtees, who had been crowding towards its markets, were being changed into a population of thrifty farmers. Jacob, who had been sanguine, was himself astonished. He wrote in 1854, "I am quite amazed at the extent of the cultivation here at the tail (? illegible in original) of the Noorwah Canal, ten or eleven miles from Jacobabad, in the very heart of the desert. It extends for five miles in breadth and twenty in length, in one unbroken sheet of junwaree, badjeree, and cotton. The cotton fields are most beautiful." Among the other crops were thriving fields

of potatoes, for he had imported the potato and spread it from his own garden. Above all he was delighted with the quality of the wheat which was raised around the perennial springs of Ooch, now more than ever a place of resort for the wandering herdsmen. And the influence of Jacobabad had radiated to Cutchee, where the rude and primitive agriculturists were excited by the prosperity of the peasants near the British headquarters, and where the best and surest proof of the progress was the ease with which the increasing revenue was collected. The Khan's sense of self-interest was stimulated, and he began in great innocence and ignorance to promote scientific farming and gardening around Quetta. But he was sadly embarrassed by a present of vegetables sent by Jacob; above all he was puzzled by the cabbages and turnips. He tried the cabbages unsuccessfully as salads, and served the turnips among the rare fruits at dessert. There was but one drawback to the diffusion of wealth and prosperity, and that, unfortunately, could not be avoided. With the irrigation came the malaria and the malarious mosquito, which are the curses of Lower Sind during the periodical inundations of the Indus. Jacobabad was exceptionally subject to the visitations, for it lies sixty feet below the level of the upper river. Though safeguarded by strong embankments, the hollows were frequently flooded, when the cantonments, cut off from the surrounding country, arose as islands in a waste of waters.

Quinine and other medicines were supplied, but Jacob seems to have had some idea of making medical use of the mineral springs of Ooch, which gushed forth in profusion. He forwarded the water and the saline efflorescence

AVENUE IN JACOBABAD. *From a photograph in Sir Henry Green's collection.*
At the end of the Avenue was the Desert.

for chemical analysis, but nothing came of it. Strange to say, though these springs were strongly purgative to strangers, and though horses generally refused them, they were drunk greedily by cattle and the natives used them with impunity for months at a time. In fact for the wandering pastorals and for many generations it must have been a case of Hobson's choice, for when all other wells had been well-nigh dried up by the protracted drought of years, these springs of Ooch were never known to fail.

Most men of even phenomenal energy would have found ample occupation in politics, diplomacy, and incessant military duties, in field-engineering, farming, and forestry. Jacob sought his recreation in variety of toil. Like Dryden's Buckingham, though with very different results, he was everything by turns. He was mechanician, inventor, scientific gunsmith and artillerist, and he delighted in abstruse theological studies, as to which he was characteristically heterodox. The question continually crops up as to where he found the means to gratify his manifold tastes. Like Pendennis at the University he had no special extravagance, but the money leaked away through innumerable channels. He supplied his workshops with the best tools to be procured in London, and Holztapfell of the Haymarket told Sir Henry Green that he might have made his fortune as the most skilful of workmen. His *magnum opus* was a wonderful clock, with phases of the moon on the dial, involving a marvellously exact manipulation of innumerable wheels, which he cut with his own hands. That clock was wound up and set going in celebration of a visit of Mrs. Frere

to Jacobabad, and the pendulum was a round shot sent by Green from Mooltan—the first fired by the Afghans against our beleaguering forces. Immediately before that visit he had written to Frere that he was abroad all day doing trigonometry, and about the same time he had been making to order and scale an elaborate sketch map of the country, defining the boundaries of all the frontier tribes, from Cutchee to the Punjaub. When it was completed with infinite trouble, he quietly asks the Commissioner, "Will the Government print it, or shall I?"

In his workshop the deft craftsman amused himself with such trifles as his complicated clock. But his serious attention had for long been directed to more important studies, in which he anticipated the later inventions which were to bring firearms to their present approach to perfection and revolutionise tactics with the use of artillery. In an article contributed to the *Calcutta Review*, Frere describes his friend as "by education and natural bent a mathematician of the highest order,"—unsurpassed as artilleryman, engineer, sportsman and soldier. In the first memorandum formally addressed to the authorities at Bombay in 1854 Jacob says: "Having been a diligent amateur mechanic from childhood, I have for twenty-five years past paid much attention to the improvement of rifled firearms, with which I have during the last ten years been carrying on a great variety of experiments, on a scale almost unequalled, even by public bodies, elsewhere." The experiments had begun in 1844. For some time a range of 200 yards in cantonments sufficed, but very soon he had to betake himself to the open desert, where butts were erected up to a distance of 2,000 yards.

He describes his practice-ground: "It is the best possible, being the perfectly smooth, dead-level plain; the line of targets stretching away in front of the lines of the Sind Horse. These targets are walls of sun-dried brick, which here attains to the hardness of stone. There is a small building for the accommodation of the shooters, and at accurately measured distances the walls are erected from 100 up to 2,000 yards. The 2,000-yard wall is forty feet high, fifty feet long, and three feet thick, with supporting wing-walls and counterforts, whitewashed and plastered on the face. Others are of similar construction, and all are marked with circular black bulls'-eyes, of one inch radius for each hundred yards." In the shed were rests and carriages with horizontal and vertical screw adjustments, but these came to be discarded as giving fallacious results, for the only satisfactory test was found to be shooting from the shoulder.

That statement and the figures will show that Jacob had gone into the business in his usual thoroughgoing fashion, regardless of trouble or cost. He tested rifles of all sizes and calibres; he was always changing the bores or the rifling, and at each step in advance he had a specimen weapon turned out according to his specifications by the first gunsmiths in London.

The earliest trials were made with the two-grooved rifle, and he discovered obvious defects in the rifling and the bullet which "render it quite unfit for the army." If the ball were loose it was at liberty to roll, and so discounted the advantages of rifling. If it fitted tightly, the difficulty of loading was great, and therefore the double groove was rejected. A four-grooved weapon was found

to be wholly free from these defects, but endless experiments were made on the ammunition, and it was only after a long series of comparative failures that what he considered an ideal ball was evolved. Briefly, it was cylindrical at the base, shaping into a pointed cone; it was weighted in front, instead of at the base; even while fitting loosely it gave a strong hold on the grooves of the gun; the charge of powder was reduced in inverse ratio to the weight, and, above all, the twist of the rifling could be increased to any extent, without danger of "stripping"—that is, of the ball being driven from the barrel without following the curve of the grooves. It had a straight trajectory up to a flight of 1,200 yards; and percussion shells of similar shape—"the most formidable missiles ever invented by man"—had equal accuracy. Another invention was an explosive bullet, which fired combustibles at six miles' distance, and burst well up to 1,400 yards. Jacob argued that if his inventions were adopted, the whole art of war must necessarily be revolutionised. "Judging from our practice at Jacobabad, it seems certain that two good riflemen so armed could in ten minutes annihilate the best battery of field artillery now existing."

Consequently the field guns must also be rifled, for then all the batteries were smooth-bores. In that case shrapnel shells shaped like the ideal bullet would be fully effective at upwards of 5,000 yards. He went further. He said, "I am deliberately of opinion, as an old artillery officer as well as a practical mechanic, that a four-grooved rifled iron gun of a bore of four inches in diameter, weighing not less than twenty-four hundredweight, could



SIND FRONTIER FIELD FORCE, MOUNTAIN TRAIN. *From a photograph in Sir Henry Green's collection.*

be made to throw shot to a distance of ten miles and more, with force and accuracy." Afterwards, as his experiments progressed, he increased the possible range to fourteen miles. As usual, his voice from the remote frontier of the far west was as that of one crying in the wilderness. His assertions as to the possibilities of rifled artillery produced an outburst of contemptuous ridicule. He was curtly told from Bombay, though not in so many words, that if the old Minie was good enough for soldiers in England it was good enough for soldiers in India. And when he sent a rifle from Jacobabad with ammunition for official inspection at Bombay, it was condemned on a misapprehension. The experts overlooked his letter of explanation. He had sent one of the old two-grooves, simply to illustrate the superiority of his new ball. His improved four-groove, made in London, was forwarded in due course, but it seems that the sentence had gone forth, and it had no fair consideration. He had the usual fate of great inventors and daring innovators, and so had no exceptional reason to complain. But these experiments, futile and disheartening so far as his personal advantage went, must have been enormously expensive, and again we are face to face with the puzzling questions: Where did he find the money and how could he spare the time? Disappointment, neglect, and rebuffs might well have disheartened him, but though he had abandoned hope of profit under Government patronage, or immediate fame, the man of iron determination persevered. "Since the date of these proceedings, the experiments at Jacobabad have been continued with a great many new rifles, and with curious and important

results, such that the progress made throws all former proposals for improved balls for rifles for the army in the background."

That active brain was never at rest, and only sought relief in change of objects. The practical artillerist was habitually meditating on abstruse questions of theology. About the time he was bringing out the pamphlets on rifles and rifled guns appeared the "Letters to a Lady on the Progress of Being." Like most of his writings, the letters had originally been printed for private circulation; when they had not unnaturally excited no little angry comment, of course Jacob published them in defiance of opinion. In his "Prefatory Apology" he indignantly denied the charge of having come forward as a corrupter of youth. All our religious sympathies and convictions are with his critics, but we are assured that he wrote with perfect conscientiousness. Excessive self-confidence was at once his strength and his weakness, and he begins by begging the question and assuming that he has a monopoly of the Truth. He ignores revelation and goes groping in the darkness by the lights of human reason. Dogmatic in his materialism and in doctrines of Evolution which anticipated Darwin, he argues with an abuse of fanciful analogies from the things of the visible to those of the unseen. For him there must be no mysteries that can only be solved hereafter. All that cannot be demonstrated logically or mathematically must be dismissed as absurd or untenable. If he had absorbed himself in mysticism instead of soldiering and other pursuits, he might have been the founder of a new sect, and impressed his convictions on a following of emotional

Orientals. In his assurance of infallibility, he does not admit for a moment that the great succession of Christian believers, from the Apostles downwards, can have anything to urge for their beliefs. We may sum up his dreary creed in a single passage: "How puerile, how unspeakably contemptible do all the orthodox doctrines regarding divine revelation, a resurrection and a future state appear, when compared to the grand *Truth* of Nature bearing on our minds!" As an example of the confidence of his generalisations and assumption he lays it down, "There is nothing special about our earth; it is one particle among millions. *The same laws affect all.*"

He is hard enough on prophets, priests, and kings of the Old Testament dispensation—on "the cunning and cruel old robber chief David," and on "his sensual and tyrannical son." Naturally he strikes at Jael as ruthlessly as she struck at Sisera. With regard to them and to gradual advances in spiritual teaching, he renounces his theories of evolution, and he adds: "The soul that turns not away sick and indignant from the detestable blasphemy of calling the record of such proceedings 'Holy Scripture' and 'Divine Revelation' must be indeed sunk in folly beyond redemption." At the same time, with the inexplicable inconsistency of many gifted deists, he speaks of the Saviour as the best and the wisest of men, and denounces the blasphemies of the Pharisees who rejected him. Yet clearly there can be no alternative. Either Jacob's "God-man" was what he proclaimed himself, or he was the most blasphemous of mendacicus impostors. So Jacob's shrewdness becomes the extreme of simplicity when he assumes that the Christian Churches in all ages

have successfully kept the secrets of a conspiracy of silence to impose on their credulous proselytes. Sceptics of the innermost circle, cynically contemptuous of their dupes as the Roman augurs, taught ludicrous doctrine to the uninitiated, and time gave a sanction to absurdities. "With that key in our possession, all becomes clear and harmonious."

Naturally those who attacked and answered the pamphlet assumed that the dreamer, isolated on the borders of Sind, had drawn his convictions from his inner consciousness. In that they were greatly mistaken. Whatever may be said against his views, they were the deliberate fruit of profound and extensive study. He appends a list of the books which he had collected at Jacobabad, and it fills three pages of the *brochure*. Beginning with Pagan philosophers and the Christian Fathers, coming down to orthodox commentators and destructive critics of the modern schools, it includes not a few of the rarer works with which few English libraries of divinity are furnished. Among others is "'The Bible,' with an army of commentators on it," and most significant of all, "The Apocryphal New Testament." He founds his faith, such as it was, mainly on the success of his own disinterested efforts for the good of humanity, with no belief of reaping future rewards by preserving his identity in a future existence. It is amusing to remark how the soldier and administrator always reverts, by way of proof, to the perfect efficiency of the Sind Horse, and the evolution, under his wise administration, of order and prosperity out of chaos.

CHAPTER XVI

ACTING-COMMISSIONER OF SIND

EIGHTEEN hundred and fifty-five was the last year of Jacob's strong and beneficent rule on the frontier, before being called away to assume the Commissionership of Sind *vice* Frere invalided. Frere had sent what must have sounded like a warning in January: "It may seem impertinent in any man writing to you about having too much work, but few men have your concentration and firmness of brain. I find it difficult always to arrange my senses, so as to get at once with due vigour from one thing to another." It is probable that Jacob had either actual intimation or a lively presentiment of the impending change, for as the year went by tranquilly and uneventfully, he gave much attention to plans for the future which he had specially at heart. Among minor matters were arrangements for the benefit of travellers—the bungalows, and the ferries which were more economical than bridges. As to the bungalows, he did not confine his recommendations to his own districts; considering the advantage to travellers and eventually to Government, he suggested that they should be erected at reasonable distances along all the

chief lines of communication. The bungalows were intended for the use of Europeans; the native traders had been used to roughing it, but he advised that at each station a roomy shed should be erected for their accommodation, with out-houses for their beasts of burden. "Travellers and traders were attracted by good roads, good accommodation, and safety. The amount they expend among the people is out of all proportion greater than any fees which could be collected from them; one-third of such expenditure finds its way eventually into the coffers of the State; while the free passage of a country excites new wants, new desires, and new efforts to gratify them, and thereby adds to the energies as well as to the means of a people."

The ferries had been farmed at a trifling rent to local monopolists, who kept no boats of their own, who fleeced the boatmen they employed and detained travellers at their convenience. Only apathetic Easterns would have tolerated the nuisance. Jacob recommended and obtained the abolition of the monopolies; he established free trade among the boatmen, and where they failed in their duties he put Government boats, with fixed fares, on the ferries, which not only brought the recalcitrants to reason, but reduced charges to a minimum.

The results of irrigation around the old waterless Khangur had been encouraging beyond all his hopes. His grand project now was to bring into cultivation great part of the desert dividing Sind from habitable Cutchee. Possibly his estimates were over-sanguine, but he did not formulate his proposals without solid grounds. Primarily it was very much a question of levels, and

he had been industriously pursuing his trigonometrical labours. He reported in February that he had made great progress in the surveys, and had erected lines of towers along the frontier, and extending far into the desert. "These towers are absolutely necessary as trigonometrical points; without triangulation all attempts at a correct survey are futile, and all means employed in the attempt would be wasted." It may be mentioned by the way that he had been carrying out his survey with most imperfect instruments, at an immense expenditure of unnecessary labour. He proposed that a broad and deep canal should be taken from the Indus above Kusmoor; with a fall of forty-eight feet for the whole course, it was to be led along the boundary line between British and Khelat territory into the very heart of the desert. The distance was 150 miles; the channel was to be eight feet in depth, the width ninety-six feet. The cost was estimated at half a million rupees, and he professed to give exact details. He calculated the number of cubic feet to be excavated, and stated in detail the cost of labour.

As to the return on the very moderate outlay, he estimated that "1,500 square miles of land now absolutely bare and waste, but capable of highly productive culture, would be brought under the plough." One-third, according to the custom, would be always yielding crop, the other two-thirds lying fallow. And each square mile of cultivated land paid to Government on the existing assessment about 1,700 rupees annually. After deducting the revenue to be handed over to Khelat, the undertaking was to return at least cent. per cent. Moreover,

the canal would be available for navigation and transport. He answered for it that he would find labour sufficient for the works and colonists to cultivate the irrigated area. The report embodying the rough specifications ends with a deprecatory paragraph. "I have been turning this project over in my mind for some years, but the results seemed so startling in proportion to the means required that I was diffident in bringing forward the scheme. However, the more I think over the matter, the more practical does the work appear and the more certain the result."

Officially transmitted to the Commissioner, the report was referred to the superintending engineer for his observations. The conclusion he came to—not unnaturally—was that Jacob was somewhat over-sanguine: that although in essentials the scheme was sound and practicable, he had underestimated the outlay and overestimated the results. He added, however, that the project deserved further inquiry, with more accurate detail and more ample data. Both documents were forwarded by Frere to the Government of Bombay. He remarked that as to facts Jacob might be absolutely trusted. The figures could not be checked so thoroughly. But he expressed his opinion "that the project was so far feasible, and that even doubling the expenses and halving the returns as estimated by Major Jacob, it leaves a very handsome profit." Consequently he recommends that the work shall be authorised, as soon as any further information which might be desired was forthcoming. When Jacob had left the frontier, his plans were only partially carried out. But the main canal was so efficiently constructed,

that a gunboat could steam up through the Cutchee plains to the foot of the hills; and cultivation having followed its course, Green had subsequently to shift his outposts forty miles further into what had been the desert.

In February, Malcolm Green, the brother of Henry—one of Jacob's most efficient lieutenants—was invalided, and went home on furlough. In a letter to the Adjutant-General, in which Jacob asks that his temporary appointments may be ratified, he refers to the Records of his regiment which had confirmed him in his somewhat heterodox views as to the number of European officers necessary for native regiments. "I have altogether but four officers in two strong and complete regiments, continually at work, or as actively employed as can be in time of peace. We are stationed in a country, the climate of which is probably the worst on earth generally, and particularly as respects the effects of intense heat in destroying European energy and activity of mind." Their duties were not only unremitting, but multifarious, and they had been performed with thorough efficiency. But these few lieutenants were the nerves of the body of which he was the head, and unless the body was to be paralysed, harmony of action was essential. The corollary of these propositions was, that the Commandant should be given unfettered powers of nomination; and no doubt to the care of an organising talent like that of Jacob these powers might have been conceded with confidence. But the War Department at Poona seems to have threatened him with a subaltern who had undoubtedly passed his examinations with credit, and had taken high honours as a student in Hindustanee. Jacob intimates that if left

free to choose, he would not have him on any terms. "Passing well in Hindustanee is of minor importance." What he asks, is a man of action, with zeal, energy, and correct feeling; a fair colloquial knowledge of the languages will suffice, and such a man will soon pick up all that is wanted." He had no belief in the tests of competitive examinations. "The disposition, the temper, the constitution are peculiar, and these cannot be secured by competition in general regulations."

Malcolm Green, after many years of invaluable training, was, it will be observed, still a subaltern. That was owing to the depressing system of promotion by seniority, which Jacob persistently denounced. But the Commandant who had achieved so much, who had administered almost irresponsibly such extensive territories, though qualified as field officer for brevet advancement, was still only a brevet-major. One of the last entries in the Records of the Sind Horse—they were brought to a close in the summer of 1855—is an application for promotion to the grade of Lieut.-Colonel. He succinctly sets forth his military services, and represents that other officers of his own rank—he does not say that their claims were inferior to his own—had received their brevets as Lieut.-Colonel, while he was passed over. The appeal was successful, and he was gazetted in April.

In 1856 Frere's health had finally broken down under the strain of overwork and the exhausting climate. Reluctantly he was compelled to go on leave to England, but it was a relief to know that his friend of Jacobabad was to be Acting-Commissioner in his absence. No two men could have pulled more cordially together: on

Colonel Malcolm Green, C.B. *From a photograph by Maull & Fox.*

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questions of policy and administration their views were for the most part identical. When they differed they discussed matters dispassionately, and invariably came to an understanding. From Jacobabad Jacob's active mind had interested itself in everything connected with the general development of the country. Consequently, when he shifted his quarters to Government House at Kurrachee, he was thoroughly master of the situation, and though loath to leave the home of his creation, he gladly accepted the wider responsibilities. The close correspondence which ensued throws interesting light on what had been done, or what was being done, and on the various projects of the future. It was the ambition of both men to atone for high-handed interference by assuring progress and prosperity to the country we had annexed.

Jacob, as we know, was an indefatigable correspondent —the pen came as readily to his hand as the sword. And Frere, like all industrious men, found time to write freely on important matters. It is characteristic of him that he always desired to do more than mortal man could hope to accomplish. He took advantage of the compulsory furlough to interview and beset all the men in London who could influence the Indian projects he had at heart. Yet his absolutely unreserved letters to Jacob abound in superfluous apologies for their infrequency and brevity. He remarks repeatedly that the distractions of London are so many, that no man in the world can find leisure for the desk. It is characteristic, too, that the first letter to Jacob concerns itself with Jacob's own pay and allowances, and with the incomes of those inde-

fatigable subordinates of his which he had even more at heart—for the triple reason that they did work which ought to be well rewarded; that banishment to Sind must be made tolerable to capable men; and that Europeans must be placed beyond penury if they were to command the respect of Orientals. Frere should have been as well informed as most on the conduct of Indian affairs in London. But in that first letter, dated March, 1856, he expresses his surprise and implies his disgust at the eternal conflict between Cannon Row and Leadenhall Street. "There is a great difference in this respect" (as to salaries, &c.) "in favour of the Court. The Directors appear to me much more liberal in their ideas and far more frank and open in their statements than the gentlemen at Cannon Row. It appears that the Whigs have two questions of finance which they are determined to carry out in India—one the reduction of salaries of every class and kind; the other the assimilation of salaried offices of the same nature in every part of India. These they are inclined to carry out with little reference to what people who have been twenty or thirty years in the country think safe or expedient."

With regard to Jacob he says the Directors were well inclined to do him justice; but he was far from sanguine that their sympathies would take practical shape. He added, however, what he knew would be consolatory to one who set honour and esteem far above pecuniary considerations. "I cannot tell you how much I wish you would come home. You would find yourself as well known and perhaps better appreciated here than in Bombay or Calcutta, and one of the things which

would do people here more good than anything else is to see the working men of India before the work is all out of them."

A letter of April 8th shows how recklessly and carelessly great decisions were taken in important matters. Frere had succeeded in getting at the cause of the orders for sweeping reductions. It originated with the permanent officials at Calcutta while the Governor-General was at the hills. The propositions had been sent home without either his signature or his sanction, and "though the Court of Directors are almost to a man against the scheme, I fear the Board of Control will carry a despatch approving of it. I have hopes of getting it modified on some points so far as you are concerned. The long letters I wrote on the subject of reductions in Sind, showing cause against the Bengal scheme, have never yet come home, so that only one side of the question has yet been heard."

In April Frere congratulates Jacob on the success of the efforts to civilise Khelat and pacify the frontiers after years of toil, which were thoroughly appreciated at the India Office. "It is the greatest moral triumph I have heard of for a long time, and may, I hope, do something to open people's eyes as to what is really wanted in India. . . . I am fighting a losing battle, I fear, on the pay of Sind officials. . . . Your pamphlet on rifles is out of print, and you will, I hope, revise and republish it. I wanted copies for Sir Howard Douglas, Said Pacha of Egypt. It has done much good, I believe; but I find no one credits me when I offer to swear to the truth of the facts. I had a long argument with the

man who commanded the Horse Artillery in the Crimea, and found him quite a sceptic, as are all the others I have met, but *magna est veritas.*"

In June he reports that he had been consulting at great length with the engineers as to the improvement of Kurrachee Harbour. It was a subject on which Jacob had frequently offered suggestions. Both he and Frere felt that the city ought to have a great future as the outlet for the commerce of Central Asia and the military and mercantile gate to North-Western Hindustan. The English experts approved, on the whole, the proposals of the Sind engineers, with certain modifications, and the Court of Directors was willing to go to any moderate expense. As to the question of salaries, he had been seeking to impress on all influential men the certain mischief of reducing them, "but the influential men now are legion: you never know who is the right one, and it is like talking to the wind." However, he had found one good man in Sir George Clark; and thanks to having secured his support, he hoped that modifications might be introduced there also. For Sind, he desired a Chief Commissioner, with deputies for the upper and lower provinces. "The plan is far from perfect, but I think it the best we have any chance of getting."

A letter on the 25th of July is more pessimistic. Jacob had evidently written to complain of inefficient subordinates he had found at Kurrachee. But, as he admitted repeatedly, such men as his own lieutenants on the frontier might have made him over-fastidious.

"About your instruments—you know I *quite* agree in the opinions you express, but the difficulty if you get

rid of the bad ones is to find better. The most discouraging part of the prospect for India at present is the want of any provision for a sufficient supply of superior men. Fifty or sixty civilians per annum from Oxford or Cambridge are not enough, and the great bulk of our men do not seem to me at all superior to what they were twenty years ago. You specify a few incurables. I could add to the list, and would gladly see them all pensioned off. But how difficult it is to get rid of a man who has never robbed or committed forgery! Whether you succeed in weeding out the hard bargains or not, I am sure the whole staff will greatly improve under your management."

A month later the troubles which led to the Persian campaign were causing serious anxiety in Leadenhall Street.

"The orders which have gone out with reference to Herat will probably fully authorise compliance with all the suggestions you gave the Governor-General relative to action upon Persia, in which, I need not tell you, I most heartily concur, and unless the Persians retreat, which is very probable when they see we are in earnest, you will have ample occupation for the cold weather. Your Bolan and Quetta plan is admirable, and whatever happens elsewhere, that will, I hope, be carried out. You will be glad to have the Greens again, and I suppose they will have joined you ere you get this."

There is a blank in the correspondence until October, and then it is almost refreshing to find the friends differing for once, as to the lines of projected railways. Frere, in the amicable controversy, took the more

practical and sensible view. Jacob had always kept his back to the Punjaub and his eyes turned towards Beloochistan and Afghanistan. Frere agreed that the country should be opened up by lines the most capable of commercial development, though not immediately productive, and he quoted the example of the enterprising Great Western. "But no railway, however good the termini, could bear 120 miles of totally unproductive line, such as that through the hills to Sehwan. . . . Therefore, granting that Sehwan is the ultimate object to arrive at, no English company could make a direct line, but one *viâ* the river. But Sehwan is not on your best road to the Punjaub, which, with its ten millions of well-governed and thriving people, is a better object to aim at than Afghanistan, and therefore I would not go to Sehwan at all, but to the nearest good point on the river. As for canals, I agree with you that they are on the whole the best for Sind, but you cannot get English capitalists to make them. . . .

"You will see that things look stormy in Europe. I fear they will not leave you long at the ploughshare, and ere long the din of the battle will be putting thoughts of sabres into your head again."

When next he writes the Persian campaign had been decided on.

"On my return from Scotland I learned that Outram had gone out to take command of the Persian expedition, and that you were likely to be second in command. I need not tell you how glad I am of this—not only on Outram's account. He will have the rare fortune of having for his coadjutor the very man he would have wished

for, and the best soldier in India. But also on national grounds, for I much fear he is not so strong as we could wish him, and much dread the effect of labour and suffering on one so recently recovered from a state of dreadful debility. I have not seen him for the last two months, but when I did see him he was very far from well, and I should have dreaded the result had he been less ably supported than he will be. It will be a sad thing for Sind to lose you just now, but it will be of the first importance to have this Persian affair well launched. No one will do it better than you. Should you go (for there is still a possibility that the Persians may give in at the last), I shall probably be out ere you have gone many weeks, for I need not tell you I am disposable wherever I can be useful."

But even then, and in that comparatively trivial campaign, the Intelligence Department seems to have been sadly at fault, and the War Office rushed into it with its customary heedlessness.

"Nothing can be more deplorable than the mixture of careless confidence and ignorance on the part of those who pull the strings."

Jacob, far removed from the heart of the Empire, made too little allowance for the difficulties of a diplomatist in London. He was all for thoroughgoing action, and little alive to the necessity for compromise. In the heat of correspondence he had taxed Frere with want of faith in his principles. In January, 1857, Frere sends a spirited and eloquent vindication of his consistency, which is of special interest now that his South African policy has been impeached.

"You charge me with want of faith in my principles. On the principles themselves, as far as relates to our official duties, in all matters we are pretty well agreed, nor do I feel any want of faith in them. But you say I am over-anxious to adjust my action by other men's prejudices. I do not think I am more open to this charge than any man who is anxious to get what he thinks right done, and to effect this *among free men* there must be much concession and compromise. Burke and Peel would have been open to much the same charge from Robespierre or Louis Blanc; but Peel managed to get for England more really valuable freedom than the less compromising men on the other side the water. I do not think myself more like Peel than you are like Robespierre, but they will do as extreme examples of the two different modes of action. I should myself much prefer the shorter and more decided process you advocate, in the reform of all abuses, but I more than doubt whether you will find any but the more tedious and less complete method possible in dealing with Englishmen, who are a very prejudiced race, with a constitutional aversion to abstract principles. I feel convinced if we could *talk* these matters over we should be thoroughly agreed."

The next letter is important, and embodies his ideas as to foreign policy on the North-western frontiers.

"*March* 4, 1857.

"MY DEAR JACOB,—Many thanks for your letter of the 30th of December. How you managed to write at all, with so much of more pressing work, is to me a marvel.

As regards the Persian Expedition, I look on it as a necessary consequence of sending such a man as Mr. Murray to Teheran, and of our weak and wicked policy towards Persia for the last thirty years. As a momentary expedient to obtain redress for evils brought on by our own folly, I consider it the best thing ministers could have done; but like all such expedients it is itself an evil, and only more tolerable because we can more easily retrace our steps than in an occupation of Afghanistan.

"I wish you would put into a form which could be *private* your views of what our policy should be—men here will not read MS. My plan would be something of this sort:—

"Put a good oriental Political at Teheran, with instructions to conciliate and support Persia, and to make her feel that our policy is to strengthen and not to dismember her. I would put you in political and military charge of the whole frontier from Kurrachee (*sic*) to the sea, and give you exclusive charge of our relations with the Afghans, and provide for the assembling at any moment of a force of 20,000 men at Jacobabad, and a like force at Peshawur—for moving them up to the Passes—but do not move beyond our own boundary till there is a serious threat of the invasion of India in force. Do what you can meanwhile, and consolidate and strengthen the Afghan barrier, but do not to effect this interfere with their internal government more than you have done at Khelat. Complete the steam communication by rail and steamer from Kurrachee to Peshawur, and as far as you can make a frontier railway skirting the hills the whole way."

That was the last of the letters from London. It announced the writer's immediate departure for India, and the next, dated from the steamer between Bombay and Kurrachee, found Jacob at Bushire, whither he had gone to take command of the cavalry. Perhaps the discomforts of the voyage are partly accountable for the very pessimistic view of our Indian Administration. Frere's counsels as to marriage are more cheerful.

"*May* 15, 1857.

"MY DEAR JACOB,—Grilling as no doubt you all are at Bushire, I am ashamed to tell you how difficult I find it here to write—the filthiest den I have been in for a long time—but I must thank you for your most interesting letter, written just before you left Sind, which reached me in Bombay, having been to England in the meantime. Most fully did I enter into the difficulties of your situation, but I knew you were more than equal to them, and you were almost the only man in the force for whom I felt neither pity nor anxiety—looking on you as the mainstay of the whole business, and fearing nothing for you but such chances of war as may cut down the stoutest and noblest. Would to God I could feel equally at ease about Outram or the thousands of his men who will be exposed to a Persian Gulf hot season without the excitement of active service. The more I see behind the scenes, the greater is my amazement at the absence of anything like well-devised plan or prudent foresight in our rulers, and the stronger my conviction that there is an Intelligence carrying us forward to ends we see not, by means we least expect,

and turning our grossest blunders into means of our advancement almost in spite of ourselves. What I saw in England gave me little hope of any better government for India. On the contrary, I do not see how the most mischievous consequences can be averted if Government trim their sails to Parliamentary influences as they do now. . . . But I must wait to talk things over till we get you back from the wars, when I may have an opportunity of thanking you for the care you took to give a fair trial to many a favourite plan, and to let me know fully what was going on. . . .

"I have a great deal to tell you about that noble fellow, your brother of Christ's Hospital, and his very agreeable wife. You have not a warmer admirer in the world than she; and she is a woman whose great abilities, to say nothing of her other good qualities, make her good opinion worth having. I wish you had such a wife of your own, for depend on it, it is not good for man to be alone; and now you have hunted down almost every theory which ever entered man's head, it is time you should know what is in his heart, which I hold no uninspired man quite thoroughly knew till he was married. Could I have said more if my wife had been at my elbow?"

CHAPTER XVII

CORRESPONDENCE WITH LORDS CANNING AND ELPHINSTONE

IT seemed best to give the unreserved letters of Frere to the friend who had temporarily replaced him in the Commissionership in chronological sequence. But the acting Commissioner had been in close correspondence with the Governor-General and the Governor of Bombay. The letters of Lord Canning and Lord Elphinstone are specially interesting, not only for their references to the subject of the biography and their testimony to the estimation in which he was held, but for the sake of the distinguished writers and their views as to the Indian frontier policy and Russian advances. The letters throw no little light on the characters of the statesmen who steered the ship through the storms of the Mutiny. On June 11th there is a communication from Lord Canning, covering sixteen pages of letter-paper and touching on many subjects, which is really a State memorandum. Jacob had evidently written in warm protest against a reprimand for some rather high-handed proceeding. As usual, he had referred to the good work he had done as his best claim to absolute confidence.

"MY DEAR SIR,—Your letter of the 26th of May reached me this afternoon, and I write reply to it without delay.

"I thought I had sufficiently guarded myself against being supposed to be ignorant of, or to undervalue your character, services, and claims to consideration. Every word of my former letter was written in thorough sincerity and not in mere compliment. . . . You are very much mistaken if you suppose that I wish to substitute forms of diplomacy in place of the exercise of the high qualities enumerated in your letter: caution and consideration; coolness and courage; promptitude and decision. It is not a partiality for diplomatic forms that makes me expect that the agent of the Government, speaking in the name of the Government, shall not say more than can to his own knowledge be said certainly and safely: and that if more must be said, it shall be said on instructions from the Government which he represents.

"You say that the answer returned to Mahomed Yusuf was expressly the reply of the local authority only. There is not a single word in it to show this. . . . I do not pretend to judge how an Oriental will understand such a message, but to a plain English apprehension it would indubitably convey the impression of being spoken upon the surest authority and from the freshest instructions. It is your opinion that the answer bound the Government to nothing. I do not agree in that opinion. If there is a meaning in words, a declaration that the British Government has at present no intention of interfering with proceedings at Herat, made at a time when a Persian force had approached that place, with intent to

occupy it, is inconsistent with any preparation or design to compel the retirement of that force."

Having gone into explanations as to the Government's policy with regard to Persia, his Lordship takes a sharper tone, in the satirical vein which was so irritating to Jacob.

"Your letter alludes incidentally to your report of the facts of the case as having been imperfect. Undoubtedly it was so, and I will add that when the Government of India has the advantage of having upon its frontier an officer of great ability and long experience, and that officer finds himself called upon to transmit to it information such as has lately been received through Sind concerning Persia and things with which he is thoroughly familiar, it has a right to expect that the intelligence shall be accompanied by something more than a laconic dictum that in the opinion of the officer no importance is to be attached to it."

Then after communicating his views in a very friendly manner as to the effect of the cession of Kars to Russia on Persian politics, and inviting Jacob's opinion as to the points where Persia was most vulnerable, his Lordship goes on :—

"I believe I have said enough to show that my disapproval of your answer to Mahomed Yusuf was advisedly expressed; that the reasons are in no way touched by your letter, and that therefore I am unable to qualify it. I hope I have done this in such a manner as shall leave no ground for the supposition that I do not feel a sincere respect for your name and character, and an admiration —not an ignorant one—for your long and distinguished services; that I am not insensible of the value of your ex-

perience; or that I do not appreciate the responsibilities and difficulties of the trust which you hold. But I consider it equally desirable, with a view to perfect intelligence and harmony between us for the future, that there should be no mistake as to my opinion of what has recently occurred." His Lordship adds that to lighten Jacob's onerous responsibilities, he will personally be kept informed "on all matters which are likely to come near you."

The reservation is suggestive, and Lord Canning's language was little calculated to please his high-spirited subordinate. Canning still kept a strong hand on the reins, and Jacob, with reasonable belief in his exceptional local experience, was always inclined to take the bit in his teeth. The memorandum illustrates the incessant friction with headquarters which crossed his purposes and delayed his promotion. Had it not been for the mediation of wise friends like Outram and Frere, he would have had still more reason for complaint. If he could not patiently put up with the rebuke of the Viceroy, he was likely to be even more objectionable in his plainness of speech to the hide-bound officials he disliked and despised.

Lord Canning had written hastily, and seems to have felt he had expressed himself over-hotly; only two days later he seizes an opportunity to make the *amende.*

"CALCUTTA, *July 13th.*

"MY DEAR SIR,—I have this morning received your letter, and will not lose a day in thanking you for it.

Believe me when I say that I do so with more pleasure than I can express. The value which I attach, and which any one in my position and possessed of a grain of sense could not fail to attach to the aid and co-operation of such men as yourself, and the pride which I feel in being associated with and supported by them in the heavy task that lies upon us all, makes me most anxious that our relations should be those, not only of unreserved and uninterrupted confidence, but (if the term is not misapplied to our acquaintance, hitherto only by correspondence) of personal friendship."

He discusses the strategy suggested by Jacob, in the event of the expedition to the Persian Gulf being decided upon, and agrees with him in his doubts as to the wisdom of invading the interior.

"Your suggestion of the operations which might be carried on from this side increases my doubts. I see many reasons for foregoing the latter; but it is so very new to me, that I can only speak from impressions of the first blush. . . .

"Be that as it may, the Government at home, as I judge from Mr. Vernon Smith's letter, is quite ready to authorise the Indian Government to commence hostilities if Persia does not evacuate Herat—and I am warned accordingly. Of course this is only for your own eye.

"What do you think of the practicability and advantage of subsidising the Afghans with money and arms? If Dost Mahomed lives and continues in strength, I should

be greatly disposed to do so. If he dies or should not be able to hold his own, would any good come of it? Could we have any hope that the subsidy will be used honestly against Persia and not in the prosecution of their own feuds! And if a subsidy were given, do any conditions or precautions occur to you as necessary?

"Believe me, my dear Sir,

"Ever yours faithfully,

"CANNING."

Writing on July 15th, Lord Elphinstone alludes to a report current in the Indian newspapers that Russia had signed a treaty with America, in the hope of subverting British influence in the Persian Gulf.

"If indeed such a treaty has been concluded, your plan of a large cantonment above the Bolan Pass is the only one by which Persia can be kept in check; but I hardly think that this can be the case. I doubt whether either the Government of India or the Home Government will be again induced to pass the mountain barriers which separate India from the countries of Central Asia.

"The moment, however, is certainly a favourable one for bringing forward your plan. . . . Nevertheless, I do not expect that it will find favour with those who have to decide upon it. There is so much unwillingness to have anything to do with the countries to the westward of India. The results of our former interference were so disastrous, that a minister who would propose the occupation of a single post beyond the Passes would be a bold man."

Lord Canning was inclined to agree with Jacob—who knew the difficulties of the interior and the formidable character of the mountain barriers—that if an expedition to the Gulf were undertaken at all, the force employed should be the smallest possible, and that we should be content to occupy Bushire or Bunda-Abbas. Lord Elphinstone, with some reason as it would appear, disapproved half-measures and so feeble a demonstration. If we were to make any sensible impression upon Persia, we must march upon Shiraz, or even go further. He modestly adds, however, that he is speculating on matters of which he is very ignorant; and it is to be remembered that Jacob disapproved of the expedition altogether, expecting no good to come of it under any circumstances.

Jacob in the meantime had been corresponding with Lord Canning, pressing his views as to our policy in Beloochistan, and a month later Lord Elphinstone writes again :—

"You have most ably developed the advantage to be derived from the adoption of your proposal to establish an *outpost* at Quetta, but I think that you undervalue some of the objections which may be urged against that measure. You say that you have no objection to a corresponding advance on the part of Russia, and that if she introduces commerce and civilisation into Central Asia, so much the better for us, and that if she proceed by violence, injustice, and falsehood, she will exasperate the people against her.

"I cannot say that I share those opinions. If Russia were to establish herself at Khiva, I have no doubt she would establish a better government than exists, and

as a consequence that civilisation and commerce would be benefited, but I doubt whether it would be for our advantage that the distance between our frontier and her advanced posts should be so much reduced. As to her exasperating the people, I think she will take care not to do that. It is her policy to conciliate them. . . . But it does not follow necessarily that our taking up a position at Quetta will cause the Russians to make a similar move on their side of the chess-board. Russia will probably seize upon Khiva when she has a good opportunity, whether we advance through the Bolan or not.

"We may suppose that sooner or later the Russians will establish themselves at Khiva whether we occupy Quetta or not. . . . The question remains whether our occupation will produce all the good you anticipate—if, for example, it will remove all distrust of us and our institutions from the Afghan mind. I confess it seems to me it would be more likely to revive that distrust than to extinguish it."

Pending any decision as to the permanent establishment of an outpost at Quetta, Jacob had urged the propriety of sending a capable officer on a special mission to Khelat and Candahar, and had suggested Major Henry Green as the man for the purpose. As to Khelat, it will be seen that Lord Canning approved, but he gave reasons for objecting to interference at Candahar. Major Green writes to Jacob, announcing his arrival at Bombay after his return from the Crimea, where his gallantry had won him honourable recognition as a leader of horse: "I hope they will carry out your scheme of having a force

at Quetta; nothing I should like better than being there." Immediately afterwards Lord Elphinstone sends a note to say, that he had telegraphed Jacob's suggestion as to Green to Calcutta. "I had, indeed, in some measure anticipated it, having already proposed to Lord Canning to send Major Green and Lieutenant Ballard, either jointly or singly, to Khelat and Candahar. The Governor-General will probably fix the appointments in whatever way he may employ them. As to their office establishment, it will of course be necessary that they should have a small one, and this may be left to themselves—or to you to fix."

Lord Canning gave permission by telegram for Green to go to Khelat, but not to Candahar, following it up with a letter expressing his views as to Jacob's forward policy.

"CALCUTTA, *October* 18, 1856.

"MY DEAR SIR,—I have thought much of your proposal regarding Quetta, and with a predisposition in its favour in so far that I cordially concur in all you have said of the influence for good which English minds would exercise upon a population such as we should there have around us—assuming, as I should hope we may, that we should deal with them with openness and honesty.

"You would desire the occupation of Quetta alone, by permission of and under an engagement with the Khan of Khelat, but without obtaining any rights over the country lying between it and the frontier. We should thereby become possessed of a detached post, in advance of one of the two points on that frontier at which attack



KHELAT. *Drawn from a sketch made by Colonel Malcolm Green in* 1858.

is most to be apprehended, and so placed as to threaten in flank any enemy approaching the other point. Thus far the occupation would be a source of strength; but surely there are enormous drawbacks to this gain. A force of 5,000 men planted permanently in a country of which they are not the owners; isolated and at a distance of 200 miles from their resources; a difficult pass in their rear; the tribes which hang about it under little control, and though not politically hostile to us at present, plunderers by profession, and therefore without any reason to be our well-wishers. . . . Military occupation long continued in such a country must carry with it civil government, and civil government is sovereignty. The red line of the map would be again pushed further westward, and without finding so good a resting-place as now."

After adverting to the difficulty of establishing solidly friendly relations with treacherous chiefs who owned doubtful allegiance to a feeble suzerain, his Lordship puts forward material objections to the scheme. How were 5,000 foreigners to be fed in a country that barely sufficed for itself, and which frequently suffered from famines? He puts the case very forcibly, blending exact statistics with something like poetry, and showing the firm grasp he laid on any subject he considered. "It is calculated," he says, "that in a rich and populous country an army may be quartered without exciting discontent, when there is but one combatant to each five inhabitants." But how were 5,000 men with their followers to be fed at Quetta without jeopardising amicable relations by starving their involun-

tary hosts? The alternative was to draw supplies from India, which might be done, but only at excessive cost. However he adds, "Perhaps I *am* wrong, for the point is one which cannot have been overlooked by you, and there may be means of supplying a force in that quarter with sufficient abundance and certainty which are known to you though not known to me. If so, I hope you will set me right, for I have no reliable authority within reach —none, at least, which is built upon such experience as your own.

"Believe me, my dear Sir,
"Yours very faithfully,
"CANNING."

We have seen that Jacob looked forward to our ultimately carrying a railway through the Bolan. But in the meantime Lord Canning's objections strike one as unanswerable. Yet it is clear that Jacob had not overlooked the point, and it is unfortunate that his letter in reply is not available. At any rate it sufficed to convince Lord Elphinstone, who had previously shared the views of the Governor-General. In that letter of the 18th Lord Canning had been preoccupied with a single matter, and he merely mentioned incidentally that he approved a temporary mission to Khelat. He writes again next day on the question of extending it to Candahar. Jacob, always jealously sensitive as to the Punjaub authorities, had seemingly felt hurt at the refusal to give him power to deal directly with the Afghan Ameer.

"CALCUTTA, *October 19th.*

"MY DEAR SIR,—You must not think that there is any unwillingness to place the relations of the Government of India with Dost Mahomed in your hands if from grounds of public convenience it should become desirable to do so. Long ago the Ameer was desired to open communications with you in the event of his choosing the route through the Bolan Pass as that through which the arms should be sent to him. But up to that time, I believe without exception, all intercourse between the Governor-General and the Ameer has for obvious reasons been carried on through the channel which it first naturally took, namely, the Punjaub and the Punjaub officers. Through them the Ameer and his son have been habituated to address the Governor-General, and this has continued ever since they have been at Candahar. From that place the route by Peshawur is inconveniently circuitous, but unless the Ameer should take up his quarters there permanently, I think there would be more evil than good in a change. . . .

"There has not been, nor will there be if I can avoid them, anything to be called political relations to be conducted with Dost Mahomed. He will be supplied with arms and money against Persia, but without any conditions on the part of the Indian Government; the transmission of these supplies will, I hope, be the only matter of negotiation between us. And I am sure that whenever occasion shall arise, as recently, for using your assistance in preference to that of the Chief Commissioner of the

Punjaub, you will be able to give it without difficulty in the absence of notice and preparation. On the other hand, if anything should occur which should make you feel it your duty to communicate with the Ameer on your own judgment and in the absence of direct authority, you may be sure that I shall rely on your having acted for the best, and that the step will not be scanned very closely by official rule.

"You will have received authority to send Major Green to Khelat. I understand from Lord Elphinstone that the chief object you have in view is to keep the Khan, or those around him, to a proper use of the money he has received, which otherwise might go to other purposes than the defence of his country against Persia. . . .

"Believe me,

"CANNING."

Copies of the correspondence had been forwarded from Calcutta to Bombay.

"BOMBAY, *November* 12, 1856.

"MY DEAR SIR,—I am very much obliged to you for the perusal of Lord Canning's letters and of your long and interesting reply. . . . My opinion upon the question you have raised can be of no value, but you probably will expect me to give it such as it is. I think that you have met the Governor-General's objections to your plan on the score of distance, and successfully, as well as those which apply to the productiveness of the valley of Shawl, and the lawless character of the neighbouring tribes—nobody indeed has a better right than yourself to speak decidedly on the effects which may be expected to ensue in those countries from the introduction of a force

sufficient to put down systematic plunder—and of a firm and equitable rule.

"The main objection to the plan does not, however, appear to me to be the difficulty or presumed expense of maintaining a force of 5,000 men at Quetta. . . . The real objections appear to be: 1st. The danger of renewing the hostility and distrust of the Afghans; 2nd. The probability that such a step would be met by a corresponding advance on the part of Russia. . . . The second objection may appear to be far-fetched—the Russians will creep on when they have an opportunity, whether we remain within our present limits or not. This is true, but still we should do nothing to hasten their advance. . . . I would rather wait until the first move upon the chess-board is made by our adversaries. This move may be made much sooner than I expect.

"Our expedition is on the point of sailing. . . .

"Yours very truly,

"ELPHINSTONE."

"BOMBAY, *December 23rd.*

"MY DEAR SIR,—Sir James Outram arrived by yesterday's mail to take command of the Persian Expedition. The Queen has given him the rank of Lieut.-General, and has entrusted to him the sole conduct of our political negotiations with Persia. The operations and consequently the numbers of the force are to be immediately extended, and Sir James Outram wishes a regiment of your Horse to form a part of the reinforcements. He further desires that you should take the command of the irregular cavalry, and that you should afford him your valuable

assistance in organising a large body of Arab Horse which he proposes to raise. All this he will write to you himself: my object is simply to say that I am anxious to give full and prompt effect to his wishes. . . .

"Very faithfully yours,

"ELPHINSTONE."

"CALCUTTA, *January* 1, 1857.

"MY DEAR SIR,—Long before you receive this you will have heard from Elphinstone and from Sir James Outram of the appointment of the latter to the command in Persia, and of the selection of yourself and one of your regiments of Horse to join the army.

"Sir James Outram is anxious that you should receive the rank of Major-General for this particular service. I agree with him. . . . But the Governor-General has not the power to give the rank of Major-General to a Lieutenant-Colonel. I can, however, give the rank of Brigadier-General, and this will be done forthwith.

"General Outram will have explained the service for which he wishes your immediate aid. It is urgent, and therefore I have consented to his request. But if you should hereafter be wanted on your own frontier, I shall reclaim you without scruple, if he can safely spare you.

"I hope the appointment may be agreeable to you. It is very agreeable to me to make it, and not one bit the less so on account of difference in our views on some questions of frontier policy, or on account of the manner in which yours were expressed.

"Believe me, &c.

"CANNING."

Nevertheless there was another touch of friction, and Jacob appears to have resented being hurried out of the charge of Sind, merely to act as commandant of irregular cavalry. Lord Elphinstone writes a most conciliatory note on the 23rd.

"I hope that the official letter which went yesterday will have completely removed the misconception of the intentions of the Government under which your letter was written. I am quite at a loss to conceive how it originated, and I can only assure you that nothing was further from my intention than to give you offence, or to induce you to give up your appointment before Mr. Frere's return or your own departure. I am glad to find you are not going with Sir James Outram, as I hope you may be able to make over charge to Mr. Frere."

Finally, Lord Canning, on January 26th, explains the real purpose of the expedition. Jacob had reiterated his opinion that it was not calculated to increase the security of India.

"The object, as you anticipated, is to punish Persia—and that for offences not committed against India only. If the infliction of this punishment is relied upon as the sufficient means of increasing the protection of India, I agree with you in thinking it will fail; but the punishment is none the less necessary and the Government of India is inclined to administer it. The cost will be enormous, and some risk must be incurred. . . . I hope you are satisfied with the officers whom you have got for the service. All whom you have asked for have been despatched to you.

"Believe me, &c.,

"CANNING."

CHAPTER XVIII

THE PERSIAN WAR AND THE INDIAN MUTINY

JACOB disapproved of the expedition as strongly as Frere, and had never disguised his opinions. The story of the armed intervention is briefly this: In 1855 our diplomatic relations with Persia had been going from bad to worse. In a Court that prided itself on formalities and punctilio, the British Minister had been treated with studied contempt. Consequently, Mr. Murray left Teheran for Bagdad, refusing to return until due apology had been made. But the Shah had been more than simply uncourteous. By sending an expedition under his uncle to seize upon Herat he had infringed existing treaties and maliciously devised complications for British policy in Afghanistan. In the beginning of 1856, the Persian envoy in Constantinople had been charged to negotiate with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. Negotiations had been drawn out, and in the autumn a special envoy from Teheran arrived with instructions to settle the dispute. He undertook that the Persians should be withdrawn from Afghanistan, but declined to accede to other conditions. The consequence was another ultimatum from Lord Stratford, but in the meantime

Herat had been occupied and war proclaimed by Lord Dalhousie.

Orders had been sent from Calcutta to Bombay to make immediate preparation for the despatch of the expedition. The force was to consist of 6,000 combatants, more than a third being Europeans, and the transports were to be escorted by war steamers of the Indian Navy. The whole arrangements were so admirably organised and carried out, that they even astonished Jacob, who was exceptionally well-informed and always disposed to be critical. "I certainly had not imagined before that the Bombay Presidency possessed such mighty resources at once available, or that its departments were at all capable of the gigantic efforts necessary for carrying out such admirable arrangements on so grand a scale." That was written in May, when he raises a lament over the chronic inefficiency of our Intelligence Department. "Well, indeed, it is that it has been so, for our information regarding the resources available for us in this country seems to have been sadly defective, and it is now clear to me that the wonderful efficiency of the arrangements for supplying from Bombay every possible want of the force in Persia, has alone prevented the most serious ill-consequences to the expedition, which I am now more than ever convinced we ought never to have entered on."

His idea of wise policy was the securing a strong frontier. He had consistently protested against breaking ground in the Persian Gulf, and he wrote in March, when left in command at Bushire: "The effect of such

expeditions will be momentary only, will be enormously expensive, and will leave matters on our frontier in India, as regards security from threat, insult, or real attack, exactly as before. If this expedition be undertaken to punish Persia for insolence, &c., well and good. Let us then understand that revenge is our sole object, and this we may accomplish, if thought worth our while. But if our object be to secure India, we must fail lamentably, and be compelled under far greater difficulties to undertake ultimately some such course of proceeding as that indicated by me."

Always protesting against any needless extension of our responsibilities, he had indicated a thoroughgoing course of proceeding as the alternative to the withdrawals he advised. With a view to future operations, he would annex the seaboard; then Persia might be assailed, if *need* be, with full effect from her sea-faces. The province might be made to pay, to a certain extent; there were two good and tolerably healthy harbours—for the mouths of the Euphrates were pestilentially malarious—and we might entrench ourselves behind the mountain ranges, which, though presenting insuperable obstacles to advance, would assure us a formidable wall of defence. But in his opinion that alternative scheme was sheer folly: "It appears to me, that we could command success by another far more easy and certain mode of proceeding." That mode of proceeding was the policy of subjugating Beloochistan, to be so successfully carried out by Sir Robert Sandeman. He adds, however, "I hold a decided opinion that the expedition is a great error; . . . but the course of action

having been decided on, no effort on my part shall be wanting to command success in any part of the proceedings it shall fall to my lot to conduct, and I trust that having strong convictions of my own, conscientiously arrived at and expressed, I shall not be found deficient in the force and energy necessary to the just execution of those of others."

Outram had landed at Bombay in December, 1856. The 1st Division, under General Stalker, had already sailed, and, with his usual generosity, he had written from on board ship to the Governor-General, that if Bushire was still resisting, he presumed it would be the wish of his Lordship that Stalker should have the credit of taking the place. As it chanced, they had been brother cadets and gazetted on the same day. He said considerately, that he knew not whether Stalker would desire to remain with the army on being superseded; if it were his wish, he would be left in command at Bushire, while he himself marched forward at the head of the 1st Division. But while preparations were being pushed forward for the despatch of a second division, the news arrived of the surrender of Bushire, and Outram sent Stalker his warm congratulations. He was delayed at Bombay till the middle of January by the extraordinary omission which had limited his brevet rank as Lieutenant-General to India alone. But on January 13th, the Governor in Council announced that the 2nd Division had been organised under Havelock; that the entire force was to be commanded by Outram; and that the cavalry was to be under Brigadier-General Jacob. Jacob was mainly indebted for the appointment to Outram's

strong representations to the home authorities. At the same time, Outram had suggested that his friend should have the brevet rank of Major-General, so that he might succeed to the command, in the event of his own illness or death — contingencies he regarded as extremely probable. Failing that, he had urged on the President of the Board of Control that in order that Jacob might be promoted to the rank of Colonel his name should be submitted as one of her Majesty's Aides-de-camp, on the score of old services acknowledged by Lord Ellenborough. "These services have since been eclipsed by the far more important services—civil as well as military—which he has rendered to the State as custodian of the Sind frontier for fifteen years past." The application was acceded to, and Jacob heard that he had received the coveted honours, a few days after disembarking at Bushire.

Outram had sailed for the Gulf on January 15th, and his vessel was to touch at Kurrachee, that he might communicate with Jacob. There he learned to his disappointment that sudden disturbances in Khelat might detain the Sind Horse and their Commandant. He wrote an urgent letter to Lord Elphinstone, praying that he would not sanction any countermand of a reinforcement on which the completeness of the expedition depended; and consequently the Sind Horse followed in due course, but Outram's advance into the interior was delayed for various reasons. The Persian General had formed an entrenched camp at Barayjan, forty-six miles from Bushire. Outram marched to the attack in the early days of February, only to find the camp and

RISALDAR-MAJOR FAIZ KHAN

Of the 6th Bombay Cavalry, formerly Jacob's Horse.

magazines abandoned. He took possession of the stores, exploding the powder magazines, and being assailed on his return by 6,000 of the enemy, he routed them with heavy loss—it was only the same deficiency in cavalry from which we have suffered in South Africa, and elsewhere, that saved the scattered Persians from annihilation. February was passed in preparation for the attack on Muhamra, the fortress below Basrah commanding the Euphrates, and in weary waiting for the promised reinforcements. Gradually they dropped in, on transports towed by slow steamers, and last of all came Jacob with his horsemen. The arrangement was that Outram was to embark 4,000 men for Muhamra, leaving 3,000 under Stalker to garrison Bushire. There had been no sort of friction between the old brother cadets; and the Generals had set an example of simplicity to their soldiers by sharing the same bell-tent. But Stalker sickened suddenly and died four days before the sailing of the expedition. That very day Jacob had landed and was placed in command of the garrison in Stalker's place. He was mortified at not going forward at the head of his Horse, but Outram softened the unwelcome order by appealing to his soldierly spirit and reminding him of the importance of securing the base. He consoled him further by assuring him that he would not have been left behind, had not the charge of Bushire been a serious responsibility, with the probability, approaching to certainty, of his having to repel an assault in force.

The campaign ended more abruptly than either anticipated, although Jacob had predicted some time before

that the Persian business would not come to much, and that the question of the peace would be decided in Europe. When Outram began his bombardment of Muhamra the Persians fled, abandoning their stores and blowing up their magazines. Before further operations were undertaken, news came by express from Bagdad that peace had been concluded on advantageous terms for Britain. Outram left for India in June, whither he was followed four months later by Jacob, on whom the command with the charge of conducting the evacuation had devolved. As seems to have been too often the case, his services had been most unaccountably ignored at headquarters, and Outram, on arriving at Bombay, lost no time in doing his utmost to remedy the neglect. In a supplementary memorandum addressed to the Governor-General, after calling attention to various subalterns named in his despatches who had been overlooked in general orders, he proceeds :—

"As there is no allusion to General Jacob, who was entrusted with the most important duty of the whole campaign, that of maintaining the entrenched camp at Bushire after the departure of the Muhamra force, the omission must, I presume, have been intentional, with the view of specially thanking him in a separate despatch on the completion of his service in Persia ; for your Lordship cannot have overlooked the noble self-denial and devotion to duty of that distinguished officer, in so cheerfully undertaking, at my earnest desire, the very arduous and responsible and very disagreeable (as solely defensive) task of maintaining that position, threatened

by a vastly superior (numerically) force of the enemy, when he might have justly claimed his right to accompany the Sind cavalry to Muhamra.

"By so readily acceding to my desire on that occasion, General Jacob earned my warmest gratitude and acknowledgment, as your Lordship will observe from the accompanying extracts of letters which I addressed to your Lordship and others. He at once relieved my anxiety regarding this important position, and to his masterly arrangements, bold bearing, and unceasing activity and vigilance, do I mainly attribute the enemy's abstinence from any attempt on Bushire—as positively were they awed thereby as our troops were inspirited, who otherwise might well have been depressed by the sudden and simultaneous and peculiar deaths of their former General and of the Naval Commander (Commodore Ethersey), which had just preceded General Jacob's assumption of the command, and by the departure of so large a body of their comrades.

"But my obligations to General Jacob did not end with his holding in check the Persian army opposed to him until the termination of the war. I was again beholden to him for maintaining the command of the troops in Persia after my departure, when he might have claimed to come away under your Lordship's telegraph message. Your Lordship is aware that I was enabled to send back *all* the European troops, solely under the confidence in the native troops that remained by General Jacob's presence —and so long as Bushire is held that officer could not safely be withdrawn—and to no other officer would I entrust the delicate and difficult duty of carrying out the

final evacuation of the place; for it is by no means certain that our difficulties in India may not encourage the Persians to break the treaty and renew hostilities, when the withdrawal of our troops would be by no means an easy operation.

"Aware of these circumstances, I cannot suppose that your Lordship will allow General Jacob's services in Persia to be passed over without notice, and I can have no doubt that your Lordship will deem him worthy of a gazette to himself; but delay in the publication of your Lordship's approbation will greatly weaken its effect. I should be much gratified, therefore, if your Lordship would avail yourself of the opportunity afforded by my orders making over the command of the troops in Persia to General Jacob, which, perhaps, might be published with a notification under your Lordship's command of the sentiments of your Lordship, and appreciation by the Government of India of the services of General Jacob."

Representations so forcible had immediate attention: the strange omission was promptly rectified, and Jacob had ample justice done him in a special despatch. Meantime he remained at the post of duty, but he had need of all his self-control, while chafing at involuntary inaction. The fate of British India was trembling in the balance, and all his friends and subordinates were to the front, playing active parts in the momentous drama of which he was condemned to be an idle spectator. The Mutiny did not come to him as a surprise, though he was unprepared for the suddenness of the explosion. Frere wrote two years after his death, "Poor John Jacob who

knew them" (the Bengal army) "well, had long before pointed out the rottenness of their whole system. . . . He had been vilified in every possible way for his pains, officially silenced by Lord Dalhousie and the Calcutta philosophers, so far as it was possible to gag such a man, and few, but those who knew him personally, thoroughly believed him." Again he had written: "Jacob went to the root of the matter and left the rulers of India no room to say that the truth had not been preached to them." Now the prophet, whose voice had been as one crying in the wilderness, learned that his predictions had come true. Frere had landed at Kurrachee from Bombay, on the 18th of May, to resume the government of Sind. On his way from the wharf to Government House he was met by a mounted trooper with a note from his Deputy Commissioner. It enclosed a letter, dated Lahore, from Mr. Brunton, the chief engineer of the Punjaub railways, announcing the outbreak. "We are in a fearful state of anxiety here. At Delhi the whole of the Indian troops are in mutiny. They have killed every Christian in the place," &c., &c.

Frere had been in some measure prepared by his own forebodings and Jacob's warnings. It was a sad reception for an invalid, imperfectly restored to health, landing from the wretched steamer of which he had complained, after a tedious and stormy passage. His equanimity was never shaken, or he had regained it before he reached the Residency. Within an hour or two a letter was despatched to Lord Elphinstone at Bombay, and a copy of it forwarded by special steamer to Outram and Jacob. To Jacob he sent a private note. "The news which greeted

me is of great import, and as regards Lahore, can scarcely be very much exaggerated. I send it for your and Outram's perusal, as this fulfilment of what you have so often and so long ago predicted may materially affect his plans as to the sending back Europeans to India." A letter to Outram next day followed him to Bagdad. It was sent after receipt of official confirmation of Mr. Brunton's intelligence. And it concludes: "I have no time for congratulations on your many successes, or to say how much I wish you were out of the heat and malaria in Persia and among us again in India, where, verily, we can at present ill spare men like you and your General of Cavalry. God keep you both." The same day—and it shows how extreme was the anxiety—Mr. Gibbs, the Deputy Commissioner, had written to Jacob at Bushire. "Further particulars have been received this morning from Mr. McLeod, the Financial Commissioner, confirming the worst part. The Europeans of Delhi have been massacred and the magazines taken by the insurgents, &c. . . . McLeod adds, the electric telegraph has saved us. He thinks the insurgents have committed an error in setting up the King of Delhi. The post from Lahore to Bombay is cut off, and the letters are coming *viâ* Kurrachee. . . . Frere has sent a copy of McLeod's letter to Sir J. Outram, directed to him or you. I send this that you may be sure of getting the news. I hope you will soon be back. We shall require the S.I. Horse and European troops, as we shall doubtless be called on for aid. I think the artillery should come back sharp." Another letter followed from Frere next day. Clear in its rapid sketch of the situation as reported, it is

curious to see the signs of haste in the scrawling writing, scribbled over many pages. Overwhelmed with business as he was, Frere sought to satisfy the devouring anxiety of his friend, and unbosomed himself with his accustomed freedom. After touching on events at Meerut and Delhi, he goes on: "Sir John Lawrence writes on the 16th from Thelum, where a movable column was to be formed. His tone is rather desponding, but there had been no desertion in the Punjaub, and my impression is that the first explosion once over, it only requires a little more vigour than is usual among the Bengalees to put the disaffected down. . . .

"From this you will see that matters in the North-West and Punjaub are very serious, and likely to be more so if men despond, as they seem somewhat inclined to do, and that it is of very great importance to the maintenance of our rule that we should have the means of sending them succour, which at present, as you know, we have not, though I propose to push up a brigade if we can manage the river carriage, relying on your sending us something to fill the void here. I say no more, as you can tell the importance of this as well as me, who did not foresee as you did this result of Bengalee mismanagement; and I know you will send whatever you can spare."

Four days later there is another and a longer letter, when apparently the pressure had somewhat relaxed, for it is penned more deliberately.

"The newspapers will tell you nearly as much as any of us know about the state of affairs in the North-West and Punjaub." After adverting to the progress, or rather the paralysis, of operations around Delhi, "The Com-

mander-in-chief at Amballa, with four European regiments burning to avenge their countrymen, sat still and awaited the twenty days which the Commissariat declared to be necessary to enable them to move. At the urgent and almost insulting instance of Lawrence, he moved on to Kernaul, and there died of cholera. The command, *pro tem*, devolved on General Reed, of her Majesty's Service, late in the Punjaub. He instantly wrote urging General Barnard to advance, and desiring Hewitt to join him, is himself hastening up. He was vigilant and energetic in the Punjaub—whether he will be able to withstand the baneful influence of the Bengal headquarters, remains to be seen. Even you who foresaw all this can have no idea of the utter incapacity of the Bengal officers to meet the crisis. . . . No one of the brigadiers seems to have any idea beyond disarming, and he feels quite safe when he has managed that. At Peshawur things are in a very ticklish condition. The Native Infantry and irregulars (not local) have made common cause, and I fear they will give much trouble. Here all is quiet and loyal—how long they may continue so remains to be seen. I would gladly trust our Native Infantry without Europeans, but the General does not in the least understand any difference between one native and another, and I am in daily dread of the alarm and mistrust his foolish measures are causing. . . . Our great want in North-West India is good cavalry. Anything you can send back will be most acceptable. But the best thing of all you can do, is to come yourself as soon as you can.

"I have increased the police and strengthened dawk lines, and opened one *viâ* Omercote and Ajmere to Agra

(for a fortnight the Punjaub letters to Calcutta came hither and through Bombay), and urged with little effect that reinforcements be sent to the Punjaub. If we had only a good General, I feel sure we could assist most materially.

"P.S.—If either of the steamers can be trusted to run down, I hope you will send her ; she will be invaluable.

"Do., do., Sind Horse."

Frere's representations to the General had their effect when he had undertaken to relieve him of all responsibility. The drain for the Persian war had already reduced the force in Sind to what must have seemed to ordinary prudence an irreducible minimum. In place of being occupied by 14,000 men, a third of them Europeans, there were only four native infantry regiments, one Belooch battalion, two batteries of native artillery, and 1,300 irregular horse. Besides these was a single European regiment, with the depôt of another. Yet Frere, having secured the consent of the General, at once sent away the Belooch, with a wing of the Europeans. He would have done even more, had the Indus flotilla—the construction of which he had vigorously urged—been more available. Writing to Outram on the 5th of June, after alluding to the last unsatisfactory news from the Punjaub, he says: "Here all is quite quiet and we are sending such reinforcements to Mooltan as we have carriage for. But we are in great want of river steamers. I do not know whether it would be possible to get any of those now with you down at this time of the year. As to horses, they might certainly, I should think, come hither, for they would suffer little on board a good ship.

Their great want in the Punjaub and North-West seems to be good cavalry and horses."

So we see it was always the same familiar story : our forces in the field wanted mobility and were baffled by the lightly equipped irregulars who eluded them.

He forwarded an extract from a letter of Lord Elphinstone's. "I fear that you have no means of speedy communication with Bushire, but in case any vessel is going for that port, I wish you would write to Sir J. Outram and General Jacob and tell them that I have received the Governor-General's instructions to recall them both to India. Lord Canning observes that this is not a time when we can spare our best men."

In a letter of the 6th of June, there is an allusion to a difference with Outram, of which we find no trace elsewhere, and which, remembering Outram's generous appeal to headquarters in Jacob's favour, we may be sure must have been speedily made up. "I was sorry to hear of your trouble with Outram. Without ever rating him so highly as you did, I have a great personal regard for him, and thought he would have performed this present service as well as any man I know, yourself excepted. I was not prepared for the utter prostration of his mind, and of the effects which I regret, one is his quarrelling with his best and most disinterested friend.

"About Murray & Co., I quite agree with you, and only wish anything you could say would open people's eyes to the folly of allowing such people to misrepresent us. Your letters to H. E., the Persian C.-in-C., are the first bit of truth and plain dealing they have heard for some time past from an Englishman. They are capital.

. . . I hope we shall see you soon on your way to Calcutta, where they want you even more than we do here, and you know how much that is."

Lord Elphinstone wrote directly to him at the same time from Motteram.

"I merely write a few lines to communicate to you the Governor-General's wish that you should return to Sind with the least possible delay. In sending me a message to this effect, and directing me also to write to Sir James Outram for the same purpose, Lord Canning added, 'We require all our best men at this crisis.'

"I have written to Sir James Outram on the subject of sending back as many of the troops as can be spared. They are disbanding and disarming at such a rate in Bengal that I have no doubt we shall be called upon to take some of their stations. . . . I am very glad that the Governor-General has expressed a wish that you should return to Sind—not that I believe there is anything to be apprehended in that province, but it is possible that there may be something to do in the Punjaub."

Frere writes again on June 24th :—

"MY DEAR JACOB,—I was agreeably surprised by the arrival of Outram and his staff. But the intelligence they brought us was not so agreeable, for I find you are to remain at Bushire with many a man we should be glad to have in India just now.

"The enclosed is the latest from Lahore. You will see that the Punjaub is quiet, almost the whole of the native regular army having been disarmed, disbanded, or deserted. It is no exaggeration to say that if a Brigadier

can by the help of a few Europeans, artillery volunteers, police, and a Punjaub corps or two, get his regular regiments to ground their arms and so disarm them, the station is considered safe. Safer still, if the disarmed sepoys walk off during the night. . . .

"Neither here, in Sind, or in Bombay, do I see any cause for anxiety regarding the army, except an amount of incapacity in some commanding officers, quite enough to ensure disaster with any troops in the world, should any emergency arise requiring action. Lord Elphinstone has done everything man can, and is, I feel sure, equal to any emergency. Such is the state of Indian affairs.

"It is such that had I the power I should at once say to you, leave only a formal guard, if any, at Bushire, place heavy stores under charge of a small detachment, with a steamer to take care of them, and come down yourself, and bring every available man, horse, and steamer you have. I have at this moment emergent requisitions from (1) Lahore, (2) Deesa, and (3) Bombay, all asking for European artillery, &c. There is a most urgent call for reliable cavalry, but we have none to send. So you see your men will be acceptable, yourself much more so. You have no idea of the imbecility of the poor old General; his staff are some of them not much better, and others he does not consult—and the smallest move involves an amount of talk and writing quite incredible. It is fortunate all is so quiet here, for what they would all do if there were a row, I cannot imagine; and you can have no idea what trouble it takes to avoid panic, and stop volunteer arming, defence meetings and such stuff.

"But you will be most wanted when the reconstruction begins. Grant's appointment is a bad omen, and the nonsense talked about 'want of faith in natives,' 'more Europeans,' &c., is equally bad. I hope, however, the extent of the mischief will preclude 'darning,' and that men like you will have a fair hearing. Do employ any leisure you have in writing your views as to the reconstruction of the Bengal Army."

The next letter, dated in the middle of July, gives a melancholy record "of mismanagement and disaster," and tells how the panic the writer had been striving to avert had come to a head in Calcutta.

"Here and in the Punjaub we are all quiet and well as before, thank God, though the Punjaub is only kept from following the North-West by being better managed. In the North-West, Delhi is still untaken, the garrison, largely augmented by bands of mutineers, who have been allowed to join by the folly, or worse than folly, of our military chiefs. From Delhi to Benares every station has mutinied, and within these limits and from the hills to the Narbudda, including the whole of Rohilkund, Oude, Bundelkund and the Doab, we only hold the forts at Agra and Allahabad and fortified positions at Cawnpore and Lucknow. Our latest intelligence is that Indore and Mhow have revolted, and that the Gwalior troops have joined the mutineers. Lawrence holds out well at Lucknow, and Sir H. Wheeler at Cawnpore. Allahabad had a narrow escape, but was saved by Colonel Neill of the Madras Army and some Fusiliers.

"There has been great panic at Calcutta—how far justified by events, I cannot say, for the legislation of the

fortnight bears most clear evidence of panic among our rulers. Matters are quieter in our own Presidency, owing in great measure to Lord Elphinstone's coolness and judgment, but there has been much panic there too, among people that ought to know better. I trust you will not only speedily come down yourself, but bring all your troops, except just enough to hold Karrak, with the help of the cruisers. If the Persians were to break the treaty, or fail to evacuate Herat, you could not act aggressively to any purpose without a larger force. Every man with you is wanted here.

"But we more especially want *you* to show people how to make use of their means, which are sufficient to do a vast deal, if rightly used. You have no idea of the utter shiftlessness of all but a *very* few. I could fill a volume with instances, but they must keep till we meet. The only thing which would reconcile me to your not coming here would be to see you going to Calcutta, though among such a crowd of imbeciles I fear even you would be swamped.

"P.S.—If you were in India I am sure we should soon see a good movable column of sepoys doing good service. At present, except old Roberts, not a man seems to think it possible to do anything without Europeans and Europeans exclusively."

On July 23rd, Lord Elphinstone follows up his letter of three days before with another and a very long one, containing orders for the withdrawal of the bulk of the forces. Evil tidings had been coming in fast, with urgent appeals for assistance from all quarters.

"I therefore asked the permission of the Government

of India to withdraw the force, leaving only a small garrison at Karrak. This has been granted, and the orders now sent to you are the consequence. You will observe that the whole of the force is to be sent direct to Bombay, and that it is proposed to form a moveable column in the Deccan under your command." He proceeds to explain the reasons for apprehending troubles there, and the weakness of the European garrisons in the Presidency. For example, there was but the wing of a regiment in Poona. Moreover, the feast of the Mohurrum was approaching, and if Delhi had not fallen before, serious outbreaks were feared in many quarters. "I am sorry to say that we have evidence of very hostile feelings towards us among the Mussulmans. I hope that this is not the general feeling of the Mahommedan population, but there can be no doubt that many of the Faithful talk of the King of Delhi as *our* King and of the mutineers as *our* army."

That was the first intimation to Jacob of the intention to give him opportunities of distinguishing himself in command of a column. He had to curb his impatience for three weary months while superintending embarkations and dull garrison routine, and to have the cup with which he was being tantalised dashed from his lips after all.

On August 5th Frere again reverts to proceedings at Calcutta, and is far from complimentary as to the legislation of the Governor-General in Council.

"The *Himalaya* comes in at Calcutta with 1,500 fresh English troops and ladies cease to sleep on board ships in the Hoogly. In some things the Government shows

great vigour—they pass laws at the rate of two or three a sitting—some are not very well considered—some very badly concocted, but they come out hot and hot, and in the absence of harder missiles must strike terror into the insurgents, if their effect be at all proportioned to the difficulty of understanding them. Their general drift is, that any one who respects any one may hang any one else. So I hope Pelly takes care of himself and keeps you in good humour. Beyond this sort of legislation there are not many signs of power to cope with the crisis; but as there are now no more signs of mutiny, and the people do not seem inclined to take up the new dynasty, the fire in Bengal and the North-West must be nearly burned out for want of fuel. In Bombay Lord E. has done admirably all he could, and would have done more but for sundry imbecilities about him, known to you as well as to me. They have discovered that it is no use trying to move in Sind till November or December, so they are utterly neglecting this line of operations and are buying 3,500 camels in Sind to enable Roberts to move in Gujerat. What I want is to see you take a well-appointed column across to Delhi and recover the character of our native troops, which, to judge from the talk current nowadays, is gone for ever. Except Roberts, no one seems to know how to handle them, and men who ought to know better seem half-afraid of them."

Until October there is a blank in the correspondence, and by that time, with the general unrest and the weakening of the garrison disaffection had spread to Sind. But the troubles had been quelled, and Frere made so light of them, that he only refers to them after commenting on

events elsewhere. They may have seemed trivial by comparison, yet they were serious enough; and the Commissioner was in great personal danger.

"'Here we have had a mutiny or attempt at one at every one of the regular stations—all happily put down without the loss of a single loyal life. It has been hard work, on the one hand, to screw the old officers up to due severity, and on the other to prevent them being afraid to act for fear of 'exciting' the mutineers. The move seems to have been entirely confined to the Oude Brahmins and their blind followers. The other castes generally stood firm and the country folk were everywhere well affected. The police have had a great share of the credit. Jacobabad is our only station which has not been so disgraced. But Merewether has had hard work, and at one time affairs looked very threatening at Khelat. He has done admirably. He deported Dargo Khan, Jalkrain, and Dilillorad. The only fault I had to find was his not hanging them. . . .

"Lord Elphinstone still continues to stand nearly alone in seeing and doing what is right. Lawrence's management in the Punjaub is admirable."

The last letter addressed to Persia, to be found in Jacob's old leathern portfolios, is dated August 27th. It may have been the last that was written, for even then Frere was looking for his immediate arrival at Bombay. It begins with an allusion to Jacob's cousin, who did distinguished service through the Mutiny in the Mahratta country, having previously been political agent in Cutch.

"There seems to have been mismanagement at Nusserabad and Kolapoor, and shameful panic producing

much evil elsewhere, but George Le Grand [1] has already done much good in the South; and when you and your good men get down to Bombay, you will do great good, and enable Lord Elphinstone to act aggressively, which he has hitherto been ill able to do, partly for want of a commander who knows how to manage native soldiers and partly from the continual demands made on his force by timid people at out-stations. No man has done better than he has throughout, and I look for very important results when he gets you at his right hand.

"You will be able to enlighten them in Bombay on many points connected with Sind. I hope they *are* convinced that 160 effective European bayonets, which is all we have between the sea and Mooltan, is not quite enough as a permanent strength for the force in this part of our Indian frontier, and I suppose when they get more men for themselves they will send us a few in return for the six companies sent so opportunely to the South. But they do not seem at all aware of the value of this time for reinforcing the Punjaub and Delhi. After all I can say and write, Melville insists that it is unsafe to move by the Indus before December, and unless you can stir them up, I fear they will entirely neglect it. . . .

"I did nothing here in the way of raising additional corps while I had hopes of your return, but seeing little hope of getting you back, I am trying to get Bob Johnstone to carry out your views in raising an extra regiment of infantry. Not, you will say, a fair trial. But the principles are so plain and simple that a man

[1] Afterwards Sir George Le Grand Jacob.

can hardly fail to understand them, and if we do not turn out a corps as you would have done it, I am sanguine of doing better than has been done elsewhere, where no attempt ever has been made to follow the true laws, so plain and free from complication which you lay down."

CHAPTER XIX

KHELAT CORRESPONDENCE

THENCEFORTH his time was passed in expectation. Eager to be in action in India, he was detained at the desire of the British Minister in Persia. Each letter he received must have added to his impatience. Outram scrawls at length from Calcutta on August 6th, taking his immediate departure for granted. He presumes that Jacob will land with his cavalry where they will be most easily directed on Mhow, where the army of Central India is assembling and awaiting reinforcements from England. "I have urged the Governor-General to give you command of that army, and he appears most highly to approve of the idea, satisfied as he is that you, of all men, are best fitted for the great military and political responsibilities which must rest on that Commander. As the Commander-in-chief of all India will, I presume, command the Eastern Army, yours will be the highest command in India next to his. My own part in the campaign will be very secondary—merely preserving the country up to Cawnpore and maintaining the Commander-in-chief's communications."

A very much longer letter from Lord Elphinstone on

the 23rd gives a depressing account of affairs in general, and again expresses anxiety for Jacob's arrival. Delhi still held out; disaster was impending at Cawnpore; the relieving columns were held in check or baffled, and disturbances were again threatening in the Deccan. On the 5th of October he hurriedly sent off another despatch, apprehending that Jacob might have already sailed. News from Sir Salar Jung, at Hyderabad was more reassuring, and the Mohurrum had passed off quietly. But there was a new Khan in Khelat, and he was threatened by his turbulent feudatories; the roads of the Punjaub were infested by disbanded mutineers, and it was feared there might be serious troubles on the Sind border. Therefore, if the letter arrived in time, he desired that Jacob should land at Kurrachee and resume his duties on the frontier. The letter never reached him. He touched at Kurrachee on his way to Bombay, where, at Merewether's request and on Frere's responsibility, some squadrons of the Sind Horse were disembarked. The attempts at mutiny, so lightly dismissed by Frere in his letter, had been really serious, and might have led to such massacres as those at Cawnpore and other Indian stations, had they not been suppressed by the resolute action of the Commissioner. The fidelity of Jacob's troopers at Jacobabad had never been shaken, but the Sepoy infantry and the regiment of Bengal cavalry there were on the verge of an outbreak. With the rest of his men he proceeded to Bombay, and Mr. Martineau, in the "Life of Sir Bartle Frere," tells a picturesque story of the intelligence that awaited him. 'On most soldiers it would have fallen as a crushing blow, and ambitious men, even

disciplined to self-control, would have lamented it as the misfortune of a lifetime. But as for Jacob, when the chance of his life had slipped through his fingers, and the dreams of glory he had cherished at Bushire were dissipated—

"He had been selected for the command of the Central Indian Army, and when at last he was able to leave Persia he went on to Bombay under the idea that he would have to take up the command. The occasion, however, did not admit of delay, and Lord Elphinstone, unable to wait for him, had given the command to Sir Hugh Rose. Pelly went on board the ship in which Jacob was, as soon as it had come into the harbour of Bombay, with a letter from Lord Elphinstone. He found him reading in the cabin. To most soldiers the loss of so important a command would have been a bitter disappointment. Jacob read the note with unconcern and went on reading his book. He returned with perfect contentment to his old quarters at Jacobabad."

Had he steamed into the harbour a few hours sooner his days might have been prolonged, and he might have died Lord Jacob of Jacobabad, though few men would have been more indifferent to the distinction. He went back straightway to his frontier duties, nor is there an allusion in any letters extant to any disappointment he may have experienced. Frere is corresponding with him again in the old familiar terms. Jacob sells him a favourite riding-horse for Mrs. Frere's use. Her husband writes on November 25th that "if the gentlemen in Rajpootana do not take care, we shall have to reconquer Central India as well as Oude." Happily the rebels were



General Jacob's House at Jacobabad. *From an engraving published in* 1852, *in Sir Bartle Frere's collection.*

persuaded to evacuate Rajpootana, and so Central India had not to be reconquered. The regiment of Sind Horse sent from Persia to Bombay had done good service in the Southern Mahratta country under Major Malcolm Green. Afterwards the men were marched back to head-quarters at Jacobabad, by a route which was left to their Commandant's discretion, being twice detained on the way to assist the field forces under Sir George Lawrence and General Roberts respectively. Another body of irregular Belooch Horse had been raised on the spur of the moment in answer to a request of Lawrence, under the direction of Frere and Jacob. The command was given to Lieutenant Macaulay, and if the drill left something to desire from a martinet's point of view, the discipline and order were excellent. Macaulay was granted absolute powers, and he got his savage troopers under such perfect control that they actually respected private property, and in the midst of flocks and over-flowing granaries contented themselves with their rations. Our soldiers, trained in Jacob's school, did credit to his rare instinct of selection, for to a man they were born leaders of men.

In February, 1858, while Malcolm Green and his regiment were still on the march, Frere wrote urgently to Lord Elphinstone as to strengthening the Sind garrison. He had sent away more troops than could safely be spared to districts in India which were in immediate peril; the force in Sind had *never* been so small, and though for the moment there was a lull in the storm, he did not believe it had spent its violence. The unrest in the Punjaub might spread to Upper Sind. The 6th

Bengal Cavalry were notoriously disaffected. As for these, he would either have them disbanded or hand them over to Jacob to be entirely reorganised on the plan of his own Horse, with absolute power to dismiss and replace the European officers. The latter alternative he deemed the preferable one. Meantime he reiterated a previous request—that Jacob might be charged with the raising of two regiments of Silidar Infantry for frontier service, and begged that Lord Elphinstone would communicate again, and immediately, on the subject with the Governor-General. This time the order was promptly given, and Jacob immediately bestirred himself to raise the regiments.

But during this the last year of his life he was chiefly preoccupied with the affairs of Khelat. When at Bushire he had heard of the death of the Khan—a *protégé* who had proved amenable to his counsels and whose reign gave fair promise of comparative peace and prosperity. The successor was a youth of feeble character, and as his departed kinsman had been, he was a puppet in the hands of an unscrupulous favourite. It seemed likely that Jacob's labours had been wasted and that all the trouble was to recommence. Macaulay had gone immediately to Khelat, unescorted, but he could not be long spared from his duties, and had come back in a few days to report that the outlook was gloomy. It was then that it was finally decided to send Henry Green thither as Resident. His instructions were to establish a moral influence over the Khan and baffle the intrigues that were rife in the Court. Persian agents had been busy with promises and bribes, and they had found a ready

accomplice in the Jam of Beila, whose territories lay along the Persian frontiers, and who hoped to make away with the Khan and claim the reversion of the Khanate. The minor chiefs were divided by jealousies, but each had his game to play, and all were jealous of the Jam. As for the Khan, he could not have had a more fatal adviser than his minister, who was detested by all the feudatories. It was in these circumstances that Green rode into Khelat, escorted by a handful of the Sind Horse. In a town which was a hotbed of faction, and swarming with robber chiefs and their armed followers, till he saw how the land lay and found some firm footing, he knew that his life was not worth an hour's purchase. Nothing would have suited the Persian emissaries better than the murder of the British Resident, and to the Khan and his minister the mission was most obnoxious. But like all those frontier wardens, Green was absolutely fearless. As he had no military force to fall back upon, he went about unarmed, assuming a confidence he could not feel. The Khan's reception of him was barely civil. The wily minister professed to assume that his relations would be only with the ruler, and that he would avoid all intercourse with the disaffected chiefs. But, as Frere wrote to Lord Elphinstone, "Green gave them to understand that was not at all the style in which he meant to live, and the attempt was abandoned." The Khan was slowly impressed by the manly straightforwardness of the English soldier, and ultimately seems to have conceived a real liking for him. The minister, after the fashion of his kind, became obsequious to servility. As Frere writes, "The chiefs

have frankly stated their wishes, compliance with which will strengthen the Khan's position and make him happier and more safe." But they did more than that. They combined and came to Green, offering and even entreating that they might dethrone the Khan and replace their Belooch master with the English Envoy.

His political success confirmed Frere more strongly than before in the wisdom of occupying Quetta permanently as an outpost. He writes Lord Elphinstone in March :—

"Now that Green has recovered our hold over the Khan, perhaps the best thing we can do is to leave him and General Jacob alone, merely putting it into their power to secure Quetta should it be threatened by any external foe. This they can easily do if General Jacob has such a force at his disposal as shall enable him to support Major Green in case of need. As long as he is on good terms with the Khan and his chiefs, he has the resources of the country, such as they are, at his disposal. But I feel convinced it will be a fatal day for us if either the place passes into other hands or we cease to be paramount at Khelat. The value of Quetta is probably quite as well known at Paris and St. Petersburg as here, and the Brahooees and Afghans are always discussing it."

At the same time he writes to Jacob: "I have heard from Lord Elphinstone. He is, I think, becoming a convert to the necessity of occupying Quetta, but still seems to consider our hands are too full for it just now. This seems to me as though a man, with a deep and rapid river in his front, were to abstain from seizing the only bridge, until the enemy on the other side ceased to threaten him."

But in the meantime Green and Jacob had a more immediate subject of pre-occupation than the politics of Central Asia. The Murrees were the most troublesome and powerful of the hill tribes who owned nominal allegiance to Khelat. Never at rest, they could hardly have become peaceable had they desired it. Their sterile territories seldom sufficed for their support, and when the food supply ran short, they must plunder or starve. It was the Murrees who had repulsed Major Clibborne, capturing three of his guns which were still in their possession. Since Jacob had been in charge of the frontier, Sind had been safe from their raids, but they had periodically ravaged the Khan's dominions, and descending on the Bolan Pass had interrupted the Central Asiatic trade. The Punjaub authorities urged retaliation and reprisals. Jacob had been powerless, for he had peremptory orders not to take offensive action beyond the British border. But now, with a political agent at Khelat, circumstances had changed. The chief object of Green's mission was to establish tranquillity in Beloochistan, with a stable government and a sufficient revenue. The legitimate mode of dealing with the Murrees was by inciting their suzerain to action. The Khan was not unwilling to listen. Both he and his chiefs were affected by the attacks on the Kaffilas, on which they had levied tribute at their discretion, after the fashion of the robber barons of the Rhine. Green was arranging for an armed expedition, and Jacob approved the idea, though he doubted whether the moment was opportune, and was so disgusted by the vacillation of the Khan that he was inclined to throw him over. Even Jacob, with all his knowledge of

Green and the Belooch seems scarcely to have realised the influence he had suddenly obtained; and Frere, though lavish of praise, warned him against an excess of zeal. One of Green's chief difficulties was with that Jam of Beila, and as the Jam's malevolent neutrality could not be disregarded, he was disposed to summary measures. Frere was in favour of caution and consideration. He reminded Green that the Jam had been on the whole a good neighbour to us, and that "whatever schemes he might have entertained to the prejudice of a Power of which his father had probably never heard, he has always acted as we had a right to expect; he catches and gives up fugitives, and prevents his own people from molesting ours. We must deal with him according to his acts." It was the doubtful attitude of the Jam, with the recommendations rather than orders from Kurrachee, and the leaning of Jacob towards a temporary withdrawal from Khelat, which suspended warlike preparations throughout the summer.

But during both summer and autumn there was incessant correspondence between Jacobabad and Khelat; in fact the letters most frequently crossed. The relations between the men were peculiar, and the letters threw strong light on the pronounced individualities of the writers. Jacob was most at home in the *rôle* of dictator; his weakness, perhaps, was an overweening assertion of independence towards men who were set in authority over him, and he exacted implicit obedience from those who were under his control. But his guiding principle was to choose good men for his work, and then leave them almost unlimited discretion. It was in his power

to recall Green at any time; repeatedly, as we shall see, he presses the propriety of his coming back—he even gives positive orders to that effect; but he listens to argument, and allows himself to be overpersuaded. And Green, fully alive to the increase of responsibility, tells "dear Jacob" that it would be well to leave him where he is. When his superiors become pressing, he begs for a few weeks' reprieve, and acts in the confident expectation that they will be given. Nor have we ever met with a more striking illustration of the effect of straightforward—almost overbearing dealing—on weak-kneed Orientals. We have the triumph of a strong will over a weak one, and of moral strength with British prestige in the misty background over the matchlocks and knives of the ragamuffins who obeyed an autocrat's behests. The Resident's nerve proved equal to every emergency. Both Frere and Jacob gladly admitted that his audacity was fully justified by results.

Jacob writes on the 23rd of August, and begins with allusion to an accident to his eyes, which seems to have caused more anxiety to Green than to the sufferer. It may be owing to that accident, though recovery was very soon reported, or the premonitory symptoms of failing health, but thenceforth there is a marked change in the handwriting. At first the firm hand begins to falter; then the straight lines diverge at all manner of angles, and the last of the scrawls are scarcely to be deciphered. That letter proceeds: "Please now do come back to me as soon as convenient. Your remaining longer will only do harm. I am sorry to see you seem disappointed with the results of the proceedings regarding your mission, but

you may rely on it that all was well considered by me, and I am myself perfectly satisfied. I think you have a little misunderstood the matter—that is the work which we have had and still have to do. I wished to have you with the Khan chiefly for the purpose of making up for the want of physical force at our command at present. . . . The good you have done in Beloochistan will still remain ours, and we shall, I trust, soon be strong enough in arms throughout India to enable us to smile at the people who teach that we are weak and fallen in pieces. The death of the late Khan and the evil nature of his successor have rendered it necessary to re-arrange our whole proceedings, but there need not be any change of principles of action."

Then he explains how he proposes to re-arrange the proceedings.

"The move to Quetta, which would have been the best possible move at the time I proposed it, could not now be made with advantage. Indeed, under the most favourable circumstances I could not have the necessary force ready in less than fifteen or eighteen months, and we must therefore now make different arrangements altogether. . . . Do not suppose that I am ignorant of the nature of the man—of the state of society in Beloochistan, &c. General reading, study and observation I find to lead to more correct and deeper knowledge, even of such circumstances and such people; yet I have been among these people and I know them well,—practically as well as from reflection. You have arrived at your knowledge by a different method, and indeed no two thinking beings proceed by exactly the

same road to their conclusions. You have done most excellent service, and need not be dissatisfied because you could not do more. It is of no use our making our own particular link of the chain immensely strong, when all the others are weak. That is the best piece of work *which is best proportioned to the whole.* I shall, I am persuaded, get the whole imperial apparatus into a more healthy state before long. Meantime I am still more confident that the good work you have accomplished among the chieftains of Beloochistan will stand, and certainly lead to great good."

Frere wrote shortly afterwards in almost identical terms —which were the highest praise and greatest encouragement. "The only fault I have ever found in you is that you do not seem satisfied with your own work; that you seem impatient and anxious to be doing more, when I see you have done more than I believed possible." And Green, knowing that he had "done excellent service," and confident that he was in a position to advance the good work, was loth to leave it unfinished. He was so full of the Khelat affairs that he wrote Jacob, begging him to try to induce Lord Elphinstone to visit Beloochistan in the following year. The veteran administrator, with a fuller appreciation of the many claims on the anxious Governor of Bombay, answers that it will be as easy to persuade his lordship of the advantage of destroying Bombay and burning the shipping. "Our rulers in India, all of them, have within their own governments, at present, a task too great for their power; all are over-worked and over-matched. Our business here is to supply as much force as we can, to make up as

far as possible for the want of power elsewhere. We must work with what we can command, and not with what we might have been able to command under other circumstances. The business is clear enough, and I do not feel at all unequal to its performance.

"We must gather our strength again, rouse all England to understand our position, reinstate our governors in confidence and calm security within, and then work on again to restore and improve our outer defences. Meantime the less fuss there is here the better. I will gather as much strength as I can on the frontier, and if I can complete the force now ordered," (the two regiments of Silidar infantry) "well."

In a letter from Khelat which crossed that one, Green indicates his successful methods of diplomacy. "The Candahar Wukkeel's doing his best, I hear, to persuade the Khan to renounce our alliance. I told Mahomed Khan that he might tell the Khan that we did not care a curse who he sided with; that when he was in difficulty we offered him friendship, as a lion might do to a puppy dog—that if he did not choose to accept it, we did not care a farthing—but that if at any future time a misunderstanding occurred through his obstinate folly, that the Khan would be called to answer—not his people or chiefs, who from the time I have entered the country have shown their wish to be in the closest alliance with the British Government. Were not this the case, the country would not be in the profound peace it has been since my arrival. I am assured on good authority, that did it ever become known that I was displeased with the Khan nothing could save him. The latest attempt of

this old devil, Gool Mahomed, has been to try whether in case of his creating a row our men would stand by us. He is the man who has called in this Afghan, and sooner than fall would think nothing of *murdering* us. He knows that the chiefs who would stand by me are at Punjoor, and that he has at his command some 500 ruffians of Pathans, commanded by a knave formerly in the Bengal army, and ready for any villainy. The Khan was yesterday in my tent and this knave was present, and I then informed the Khan that my patrols were ordered to shoot any man who appeared in our lines after 8 p.m., and if I caught any one I would shoot him with my own hand—this was in open durbar."

Tolerably firm language to the Khan and his minister, when the envoy was virtually defenceless and when the minister, in terror of disgrace, was actually tampering with his escort. Nothing can show more conclusively that the coolness was unaffected than the postscript. He asks Jacob, with all the interest of a travelling dilettante, whether he knows anything of a certain Loakman Hakeem who, according to the Moslems, taught Europeans to make watches, guns, and steam-engines. "Also that Adam was a Moslem; ditto, Jesus Christ—that the latter will appear first on earth, and not be able to find *the* road, when Mahomed will appear to show it him." Jacob, who had most of the lore of the East at his finger-ends, sends answers more or less satisfactory, in a subsequent letter.

"*August 26th.*

"MY DEAR GREEN,—Nothing can be better than all you have been doing and saying from first to last, and

most excellent results must shortly ensue from the noble way in which you have fulfilled the delicate and dangerous duty entrusted to you. All that you write only confirms me in the correctness of my determination to withdraw you from the Court of Khelat at present.

"I will no longer work with this young knave who is unworthy to be ranked among princes. We will now readjust the board and go to work in another way. All will go right if I can get recruits. . . .

"Meanwhile come back to me, telling the Khan that I will not place at his Court a representative of the English Government, when I now find that he is, at least, not friendly towards us, and that he has taken as his chief adviser our bitter enemy. The way you have behaved to that Gool Mahomed delights me. I wish the chiefs had publicly executed him before departing for Punjoor."

The next letter from Khelat again anticipates Jacob's second mandate of recall.

"*August 23rd.*

"MY DEAR JACOB,—I wrote you a note yesterday, just to tell you not to be anxious about me. I will carry this year through in spite of everything. I have never changed in my plans since I entered the country. I have not in any manner compromised the Government, and have instilled into the minds of *all* that their only safety is in unity and that my only wish is to unite them and make them strong."

In the next paragraph he explains the reasons that made him loath to leave his post.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HENRY GREEN, K.C.S.I.

From a photograph by Pragnell & Co

"Managing the country is simple enough: it is the outside pressure that is making against me. A political officer being here has turned all the eyes of Asia in this direction, and every effort is being made to detach Beloochistan from us. I know all about the treaty and your wishes, but I tell you plainly that these people, united or not, cannot stand alone against Central Asia, and on our giving them up, must form other alliances to save themselves. I have brought the chief and people to my feet, and consider, as far as that is concerned, that I have been successful. From the moment I leave they fall to pieces, because I have not had time to consolidate my work, and cannot do so until Government will take a bold line of politics. The Khan could not call ten men together in all Beloochistan unless they knew I sanctioned it. I could call out 10,000, but cannot pay or feed them. The Khan is, I am certain, half-witted. I have kept him up as yet, because I told the lad on my arrival that I would be his friend, and if I have to leave the country, not a child shall say I have not kept my word through ingratitude, opposition, and difficulty. . . . I will remain here until the time comes to proceed to Cutchee" (to put down the Murrees), "when, if the Khan does not give in and rule properly and turn off the scoundrels about him, I will leave him and he will fall, and next year the country will be in the hands of the Afghans or Persians."

Acknowledging that despatch and another in similar terms, Jacob writes on the 29th of August:—

"All you say is right enough, and was well known to

me. But I cannot consent to keep with the Khan of Khelat a British representative while the Khan himself is secretly but perseveringly thwarting all our measures for the establishment of his authority and the good government of his country; while he maintains, in a position of trust and honour, a man known to be bitterly opposed to the British Government, . . . and last, not least, while he withholds from the army serving him in the field the supplies and payments necessary for their maintenance.

"Either all advisers hostile to our interests must be at once publicly disgraced or removed, and the Khan must without any reserve take up the line of policy you have indicated to him, or we must withdraw the British mission from his Court. On no other terms can you remain a day longer with hope of ultimate advantage."

The letter from Khelat that crossed that holds out hope of some such immediate decision. The Khan had gone in person to Green to say he intended to proceed to Cutchee and punish the Murrees, and in Green's presence had given orders for a muster of the tribes. "He has lied to me so often, that I have little faith in anything he says, but he must now do one thing or other. I told him that if he intended really to conduct this affair he must go the whole animal."

Then alluding to a passage in some former letter of Jacob's, he expostulates and vindicates his proceedings with unaccustomed warmth. "I have held Beloochistan by myself alone, and kept it quieter than any province in India or England. I have kept the knaves under my feet and tried to make something of the Khan—what else in

God's name did you wish or intend me to do? I tell you more, that had I not been here, Khelat would have been in possession of the Candaharees. You must have understood from my letters that I had been howling for troops. I merely told you what my common sense pointed out."

"*September 1st.*

"MY DEAR JACOB,—Received yours of the 26th. Trust me for a few days longer. Please God I will not disappoint you. If I can bring things all square it will not *weaken* us, and I may be able to destroy these Murrees—do not think I am making *violent* efforts to carry things out in spite of common sense, and depend upon it I will leave at the *right moment*. I have all confidence in myself, and you must have often found that there is an *exact moment* for doing everything. I think when I come to explain things you will own that I have neither mistaken your position or mine."

"KHELAT, *September 4th.*

"MY DEAR JACOB,—Received yours of the 29th, with the letters for Wullee Mahomed and the Khan, which I have looked up. I shall inform the Khan of what you say, but my object is to smash Gool Mahomed by the Brahooees themselves—he is daily getting more and more shaky. Did I not believe that the Khan individually was powerless in the old man's hands, I would have left long ago. I have told the Khan that I shall leave this on the 1st proximo, the usual time of leaving for the plains. I want to do everything in the most deliberate manner."

"KHELAT, *September 8th.*

"MY DEAR JACOB,—I have just received news that the Khan's force in Punjoor has settled everything satisfactorily. All the people who were in rebellion have made their salaams to his chiefs, and paid *two* years' revenue—last year's and this—this force is now free for Cutchee."

"KHELAT, *September 9th.*

"What I have been doing and what I considered it the Government's duty to do are two very different matters. I considered it my duty to point out to you for the information of Government what I considered the position of affairs—with India in the state it has been I felt it was no time to show evidence of weakness, and that the only way was to act as if there were 100,000 men at Kurrachee. At the same time I was perfectly aware what I was about. I knew exactly how far I could carry moral force with these people, and where to stop when physical force would have been required to carry out my views. I am satisfied that I have acted wisely and with consideration in all I have done as yet, but I feel a great difficulty in explaining on paper why I have done that or this. . . . Since writing the above I have received your letter of the 5th. I am afraid Mr. Frere, and perhaps yourself, think I am fitted for little else but to lead a forlorn hope. Well, be it so; notwithstanding all Mr. Frere and yourself write, I think I have had most things in view. I repeat it—that our prestige is gone in these countries—we are no longer feared—and that there is an uncertainty whether our alliance is worth having. A show of force is required. Moral effect is gone now. My humble opinion is that

we should annihilate the Murrees and then occupy Quetta in force. In writing to you I have made a mistake in entering too much into details, which I should not have done with any one else. With regard to the last letter, I was perfectly aware of the clumsy attempt."

"JACOBABAD, *September 15th.*

"MY DEAR GREEN,—Your letter of the 9th arrived. All you write is sound and true enough, except that you may be sure that both Mr. Frere and myself thoroughly understand your position and the extreme delicacy and difficulty of the work you have had to do, and the admirable manner in which you have performed the task, in spite of the greatest difficulties which could possibly have been imagined always opposing you. Except also your observations as to moral force, which your own proceedings triumphantly refute. I have more than once, indeed, reported that I consider your influence in Beloochistan as valuable to us as an army of 10,000 soldiers."

The discursive letter, written in a scrawling hand, with irregular lines, becomes for some pages positively illegible. The writer's failing eyesight must have been at its worst, and probably his strength was sorely shaken. It would seem that these pages give ample justification for Green clinging to his post when Jacob was urging—and indeed ordering him to leave. Jacob may have been somewhat enfeebled by illness and confinement, and he was concerned for the personal safety of a friend whom he dearly loved and could ill afford to lose. In fact, Green, to use

his own expression, was leading a forlorn hope, in advance of the advanced trenches. Then the writer seems to pull himself together, and proceeds—

"I have been doing my best to support Mr. Frere, and have continually assured him, that with your aid in Beloochistan, we could certainly keep all quiet, come what may, both without and within. In fact, we have had to support Government with our own internal resources, the force of our own minds, and have to a great extent succeeded. While it is certain that disorder in Upper Sind would have been the signal for insurrection in the Punjaub.

"Latterly, to tell you the truth, I have thought that those diabolical scoundrels, Gool Mahomed and Co., would be trying to get rid of you by poison or assassination, and I felt I had no right to subject you to the risk of such a fate. I would far rather lose my own life than do so. These villains are extensively connecting their ramifications all over the country. I know they must feel that you are their most formidable enemy; other means failing, it is likely that this would be attempted. I had good reason for believing this, as you will see by the enclosed, which please return to me and show to no one."

If Jacob, who had habitually taken his own life in his hands, and who valued his subordinates for their absolute indifference to danger when duty was in question, felt such intense anxiety as to Green, it gives a good idea of our political agent's position in Khelat. Confronting



SIND FRONTIER FIELD FORCE, JACOB'S RIFLES. *From a photograph in Sir Henry Green's collection*

death daily, in all its forms, when his cook might have been bribed, or some fanatic incited to despatch him, he had to carry a weighty load of responsibility, to conduct an intricate system of diplomacy, and to dominate the Khan and his counsellors with a show of unruffled confidence. The chief interest of the correspondence is that it shows the qualities indispensable in the men who have ever forced themselves to the front as the builders of our Indian Empire.

With regard to the regiments Jacob was raising and the recruits he had hoped to get from Khelat, Green writes :—

"I need not say I have turned over and thought a great deal about recruiting for your Rifle Regiments, and have great doubt about these men answering, on account of their impatience of heat and confinement. Regarding Quetta, I yesterday for the first time mentioned the subject to some Brahooees. They said if Jacob Sahib would go there, every man in the country would kill a goat for joy—we know, they said, he will take us into his pay, and we would prove as faithful as your Hindustanees."

It may be doubted whether these fierce marauders would have, in any sense, come up to Jacob's standard, for he had written to Frere in the spring, when he undertook to raise the regiments : "I do not propose to govern them by force or fear. I will have sober, God-fearing men in my troops, as old Cromwell said, and will govern them by appealing to their higher, not to their baser attributes. The object of all our training shall be to develop mental power. The more we can

raise our subordinates in the scale of rational beings, the more we can command them." And it must be confessed that the Brahooees of the Bolan were scarcely eligible subjects for his training. Sober they might be, but they were by no means God-fearing, and the unregenerate elements were in the ascendant.

Green obtained Jacob's assent to subsidising the projected expedition: all the preparations were far advanced, and his own departure had only been delayed by his having to staunch some blood feuds among the chiefs, who would have turned on each other instead of engaging the enemy. At last he left Khelat for Dundada, where the levies were gathering, but there he was met by melancholy tidings. He changed his horse and hardly drew rein till he reached Jacobabad, to find the man who had made Jacobabad on his death-bed.

CHAPTER XX

THE DEATH IN HARNESS

THE long strain had told at last. Upon his return from the Persian Expedition Jacob's labours had increased. Besides his ordinary round of multifarious duties he was charged with the raising of three new regiments, and in his letters to Green he repeatedly complains of a lack of efficient assistance. Merewether had done all that could be done in his absence, but the spirit of unrest had spread from the Punjaub to the northern mountaineers whom his strong hand had bridled for so many years. The weakening of the border garrisons had excited the Boogtees. In the beginning of September they broke out and raided the fields and pastures of the Murrees. "They 'lifted,'" as Frere writes to Lord Elphinstone, "a greater booty than had ever been taken in the hills before." "It is obvious," he adds, "that the old border spirit has by no means died out. In daring, skilful arrangement, and enterprise, the foray is quite equal to any of those, the memory of which survives among the legends of the frontier tribes.

"It is well to bear this in mind, because since the arrangements on this frontier were left in General Jacob's hands,

the success of his measures has been so complete that it is frequently ascribed to some difference in the character of the tribes."

Doubtless this recrudescence of the old troubles caused Jacob much additional anxiety, and dashed the hopes he had fondly cherished of leaving a legacy of peace to his successors. For though that resolute will refused to give in, he must have felt that his strength was fast failing. The very tremor of his hand must have told him as much, as it gave sinister warnings to his friends. A year after his death Frere wrote to Lord Elphinstone :—

"He had been for some time less capable of the unceasing mental exertion to which he had been accustomed, while the pressure of work on him was much increased. He had none of his old lieutenants to help him, and had to teach his own ideas to young officers. . . . Unwilling to decline any share of the labour thus falling on him, or to seek aid from others in bearing it, he began to find his strength unequal to the task, and for the first time in his life he must have felt that the bodily machinery, which had so long borne the burden which an unceasing mental activity had thrown upon it, was showing symptoms of being overtasked." And we read in a letter from an officer of his Belooch Rifle Brigade, dated a few days after the funeral :—

"Truly, indeed, did Mr. Frere speak when he heard of his alarming state, 'If anything happens to that man, not one in a thousand can ever replace him.' It is beyond me to make you understand the work that man got through from early morning to midnight. For the last ten years he has been hard at work at his desk, and never

was his brain at rest. Although but 46 years of age, he died of complete exhaustion. For a month previous to his death he had been out in the district with lots of other fellows, giving himself barely time to eat his meals. To every one else he appeared in excellent health and spirits, but five or six days before he returned here, he complained of fever and pains in the head."

The marvel was that he had not succumbed long before. In March he had written to a friend: "The business I strive to get through daily would be sufficient to overwhelm fifty brains instead of one—I seldom get above three hours' sleep in the twenty-four, and the work will kill me, which I do not regret: for I have proved and established principles and built foundations on which others will be able to work, without being oppressed by the load of odium, foul abuse, and universal opposition which has been heaped on me."

Captain Pelly, landing at Kurrachee, after leave, heard of his state of health with great anxiety, and hastened to join him. He found him in the desert, suffering from sleeplessness and weakened by frequent bleeding at the nose. When the more acute symptoms showed themselves, he consented to go back, but refused to be carried. He insisted on riding to Jacobabad—a distance of twenty miles—though often bent double in the saddle. He had always distrusted and disliked doctors, and now, with all his habitual self-confidence, preferred prescribing for himself. His officers entreated him to have medical assistance, but he refused, declaring that all he needed was rest. The rest was soon to come. Green had ridden in on the 4th, and hastened to his friend's bedside. At

that time five physicians were in attendance, and the senior of them had prescribed while the sufferer was unconscious. Green was not satisfied with his skill or treatment, and asked one of the juniors to undertake the case. He hesitated on the score of etiquette, till threatened with arrest and court martial. But nature was worn out, and no remedies could avail. The excitement of the welcome arrival had lent a flicker to the expiring lamp, but the invalid relapsed again into unconsciousness. Next day Green summoned to the antechamber the European and native officers of the station, the Belooch chiefs who happened to be in the town, and the envoys of the Khan of Khelat. At midnight, when the end was evidently near, he brought them into the death-chamber, and the picturesque assemblage at the closing scene suggests a noble subject for an historical picture. It is said there was not a dry eye in the company, and the old troopers of the Sind Horse mingled their tears with those of the leaders of the robbers whose strength they had broken.

The funeral was the more impressive from the absence of all pomp and parade. By Jacob's express desire there were no military honours, nor was even a volley fired over the grave. The deep silence among the martial mourners was only broken by the sobs and lamentations of women in the background. The officers of his regiments were grouped round the grave; it was one of them who read the funeral service, and the *cortége* who came crowding behind were the men of the Sind Horse, the Belooch mountaineers, who had learned to fear and love him, and the thriving cultivators of adjacent



General Jacob's Grave at Jacobabad. *From a photograph in Sir Henry Green's collection.*

fields which had been reclaimed from the waste by his beneficent genius. The Belooch comforted themselves with the fond imagination that as his body had been committed to their soil, his spirit would remain to watch over them. The will was brief, and all his belongings were bequeathed to his friend Merewether.

The charge of the frontiers devolved upon Green, who was subsequently confirmed in the command. In the meantime the arrival of Merewether was hourly expected, and Merewether would temporarily supersede him as Jacob's lieutenant. They were old comrades and fast friends, but it gives an idea of the untractable spirits whom Jacob had barely tamed, that one of Green's native officers came to him secretly on the evening of the funeral, taking it for granted that he would wish to hold the post against a supplanter, and assuring him that the men were ready to stand by him. But Green had urgent business elsewhere, and had scarcely seen his friend laid in the ground before he was again in the saddle. Agents from the Indian rebels had been busy in these districts, and he feared that the news of Jacob's death might excite the chiefs who had been terrorised into friendship to raiding and looting expeditions. So he hurried back to Khelat to keep the peace among his irregular levies. It may be added that his successful campaign against the Murrees was not only the realisation of one of Jacob's political schemes, but a satisfaction to the sentiment of the keen old artilleryman. Jacob's soldierly pride had always smarted from the recollection that Clibborne had abandoned three of his guns and that the Murrees exulted in

the possession of these trophies. Two of the guns were recovered and brought back to be mounted at Jacobabad; the third had been thrown over the precipices in the Nuffoosk Pass and could not be found by the most diligent search.

Some years afterwards an officer ordered on an engineering survey to Upper Sind wrote from Jacobabad: "This is the capital where Jacob ruled in despotic fashion, where the name of that great commander is reverenced as that of a being more than mortal. A great work he did in spite of angry chiefs. This pretty capital is his building, and the years of peace which Sind has enjoyed will be his eternal glory. They show you his great house now tumbling in pieces: one wall of the lofty upper floor has fallen inwards. It was raised, not to live in, but to show the unruly chiefs of Sind that they had a master."

As a reformer with the courage of his convictions, and as the most combative of controversialists, few men had to experience more stormy times from envenomed adversaries in the Press. But when the great soldier and administrator was gone, the leading journals were lavish of commendation. Quotations might be multiplied, but one or two brief extracts may suffice. The *Times* began a leader with the sentence, "The Indian Army has lost a general, and the Indian service a hero. . . . With the single exception of Sir James Outram, he represented, perhaps, more vividly than any living soldier, that natural and inherent superiority of power, which, when expressed in the race instead of the individual, gives Englishmen the dominion over

TROOPERS OF THE 6TH BOMBAY CAVALRY, FORMERLY JACOB'S HORSE.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR W. MEREWETHER.

India." The *Telegraph* wrote: "Another noble Englishman lies dead in India—the victim of neglect, if not of absolute persecution. The brain-fever which struck Brigadier-General John Jacob was no sudden or accidental calamity, but the climax of long suffering—of responsibility too great for human nature to bear—of disappointment, fatigue, and irritation. Never did a finer soldier step than this gallant sentinel of our Indian frontier; never was merit more grudgingly rewarded; never was a man made to feel more literally the curse of an unfriended commoner's position in the refusal of official acknowledgment and professional promotion." And the *Spectator* chimed in with almost identical language. "England has lost another of her bravest and noblest sons. John Jacob, a *chevalier sans peur et sans reproche*, the brilliant swordsman, the originator of a military system, the skilful inventor, the only Englishman who has founded and given his name to a town in India, for ten years the lonely and vigilant sentinel of the frontier of our Indian Empire, is no more. In the very flower and vigour of his manhood he has been struck down by brain-fever; a frame of iron, an unconquerable soul, which had endured for years immense labour under the burning sun of the Sind desert, and harder still, had waged perpetual battle with the 'Ephesian wild beasts' of official blindness, routine, and stupidity, suddenly gave way under the pressure on the brain. Thus John Jacob has died, a martyr to his devotion to duty. . . . The death is an irreparable loss to the Empire."

These belated tributes to a great and original genius

may remind us that the gallant soldier, after his splendid services, had only brevet rank in the army he did much to remodel: that the brilliant administrator who had brought order out of chaos, plenty out of sterility, and prosperity out of desolation, had been chilled by neglect and rewarded by disappointment. But who dare say that the career was a failure? His ambition was satisfied when his work was done. He died in the knowledge that he had never failed in his duty to his country and the districts entrusted to his charge. Few men cared less for fame, but few have done more for Humanity or deserved better of their country.

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